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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis explores the implications of power in relation to the psychological 
contract. The majority of the psychological contract literature, because of its 
underpinning assumptions of mutuality and reciprocity, largely downplays the 
dynamics of power in the employment relationship. The key objective of the 
current study therefore is to make further empirical and theoretical 
developments in relation to the psychological contract by exploring these 
power dynamics in the relationship between employees and employer. 
Concerning power, the complex interdependencies and the associated 
workplace struggles characterizing the employment relationship between 
employees and the different representatives of the organization are 
investigated.  
 
From an empirical perspective, the research contributes in a twofold manner as 
the results not only highlight the complex interdependencies and the 
workplace struggles in the employment relationship but also offer new 
knowledge about work and management in Pakistan. This context of 
employment relations based on underlying power dynamics that are embedded 
into the complex and interdependent relationships between employees and 
organizational representatives is globally significant in terms of workplace 
research, yet generally neglected in the relevant studies.   
 
The current study has a qualitative orientation and follows a critical realist 
research philosophy. Using data collected from 43 interviewees in three call 
centre organizations, the research additionally makes a theoretical contribution 
to the psychological contract from the perspectives of mutuality, reciprocity 
and agency. The results illustrate that, in comparison to mutuality and 
reciprocity, interdependence and negotiation play a critical role in the 
psychological contracts of employees. Largely acknowledging the implications 
of power dynamics, these concepts highlight that employees, based on their 
perceptions of interdependence (rather than mutuality) in the employment 
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relationships, tend to focus primarily on negotiation (rather than reciprocation) 
in their psychological contracts with employers.  
 
Concerning agency, different classifications of human agents are highlighted 
(i.e. primary agents, secondary agents, multiple agents, incumbent agents). The 
current research extends the concept of agency beyond the boundary of human 
agents into the domain of the electronic agents of the organization. The results 
highlight that it is not only the perceived capability to reward or punish but 
also the perceived tendency to actively use that capability which significantly 
influences employees’ assumptions to consider particular organizational 
members as the agents of the organization. From the viewpoint of relational 
interdependence in the employment relationship, the efforts made by 
employees to decrease their dependence on employers and increase the 
employer’s dependence on them are illustrated. The research findings 
demonstrate that these efforts are largely motivated by the employees’ 
objective of promoting their bargaining power in employment relationship.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background to the research 
The concept of the psychological contract serves as an important 
organizational behaviour construct in order to explore the dynamics of the 
employment relationship (Shore et al., 2012). Over the last two decades, there 
has been an exponential growth in the number of journal articles published on 
the subject (Conway and Briner, 2009). First coined by Argyris (1960) as a 
psychological work contract, the notion has captured researchers’ attention due 
to its capability to explore employment relationship as an ongoing exchange 
unfolding dynamically on a day-to-day basis (Guest et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
the concept gains currency as a result of the significant support it provides in 
understanding the influences of micro and macro factors on employees’ 
subjective experiences of work (Wellin, 2012). 
 
The concept of the psychological contract is mainly characterized by its 
dynamic, complex and subjective nature (Shore et al., 2012). According to 
Marks (2001, p. 458), ‘it is something specific and internal to the individual ... 
and is therefore difficult to describe and almost impossible to generalize’. 
However, as noted by Conway and Briner (2009), the majority of the relevant 
research, with a positivistic approach and the key objective of the 
generalization of results, has been dominated by ‘quantitative empirical 
studies’ (p. 73). This mismatch in the qualitative orientation of the 
psychological contract and the quantitative approach of the majority of 
psychological contract researchers has led the relevant research to fall into a 
‘methodological rut’ (Taylor and Tekleab, 2004, p. 279).  
 
Based on this approach, ‘much of the work in the area considers the “state” of 
the psychological contract and its impact on work outcomes [e.g. job 
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satisfaction, turnover and commitment] rather than the content or the nature of 
the contract itself’ (Marks, 2001, p. 458, quotation marks in original). 
Similarly, Shore et al. (2012) argue that there has been a dearth of critical 
accounts in the relevant research aimed at the theoretical development of the 
concept. Acknowledging the issue of the under-developed theorization of the 
concept, Conway and Briner (2009) highlight different limitations in the 
current psychological contract theory (e.g. definitional ambiguity, inadequate 
explanatory power, the use of inappropriate quantitative methodologies etc.) 
and argue that these limitations ‘need to be taken seriously in order for the 
field to develop’ (pp. 72–73).  
 
The majority of the psychological contract literature, because of its emphasis 
on the assumptions of mutuality and reciprocity, largely downplays the 
implications of power dynamics in the employment relationship (e.g. C. Hui, 
G. E. Dabos, M. B. Arthur, P. M. Bal, R. Schalk, S. A. Tijoriwala). This has 
largely resulted in an oversight of the issues related to the complex relational 
interdependencies in the employment relationship. These issues are critical as 
they provide support in shifting the focus from the limited view of power 
based on the narrow class terms of workers and capitalists (Hindess, 1996) to 
the in-depth view of power highlighting the ongoing workplace struggles 
between employees and the different agents of the organization.  
 
Exploring the concept of the psychological contract in relation to this context 
of power contributes to the relevant research on the theoretical as well as 
empirical basis. From a theoretical perspective, it highlights the significance of 
interdependence and negotiation in contrast to the prevailing assumptions of 
mutuality and reciprocity in the psychological contract literature. In addition, 
this context of power contributes from an empirical perspective by 
demonstrating the ongoing struggle in the interdependent employment 
relationships in which employees resist and respond to the employer’s efforts 
for reshaping these dependency relations in their own favour.  
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1.2 Research objectives and questions 
In spite of the exponential growth in the number of journal articles published 
on the subject, the concept of the psychological contract has ‘serious 
conceptual and empirical limitations’ (Cullinane and Dundon, 2006, p. 125). 
Similarly, Conway and Briner (2009) maintain that the ‘psychological contract 
research has grown exponentially in terms of the number of published articles 
… however, this growth has not resulted in a significant or marked increase in 
conceptual clarification, theory development or good quality empirical 
evidence’ (p. 121). They attribute these limitations largely to the unitarist 
philosophical assumptions underlying the psychological contract literature 
which implicitly presumes that employment relationships are generally 
established on the basis of power symmetry.  
 
Explaining their viewpoint further, they argue that the assumptions of 
mutuality, reciprocity and so on are: 
 
at odds with the fundamental power imbalance faced by most 
employees. From this perspective, the psychological contract is just 
another concept … that seeks to advance capitalism. The effects of 
possible managerialist bias in psychological contract research 
deserves further exploration as taking a more employee-oriented 
perspective which also takes in account power may help meet some 
of the challenges associated with the notion. 
 
(Conway and Briner, 2009, p. 120)  
 
This viewpoint is later endorsed by other psychological contract researchers to 
further explore the under-researched implications of power in the relevant 
research (e.g. Guest et al., 2010; Hallier, 2009; Inkson and King, 2011; 
Rodrigues and Guest, 2010; Shore et al., 2012). Based on this line of 
argument, the overarching objective of the current study is to explore the 
psychological contract in relation to the under-researched implications of 
power. This principal objective in turn informs the study’s main research 
question: 
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RQ: What are the implications of power in relation to the psychological 
contract? 
 
Researchers have highlighted the notions of mutuality, reciprocity and agency 
as three major constituent elements of the psychological contract (Wellin, 
2012). The concept of mutuality refers that employee and employer generally 
agree on mutual objectives in order to accomplish gains for both parties 
(Rousseau, 2011). Mainly based on the unitarist perspective, the concept of 
mutuality implicitly assumes that employees generally have sufficient 
bargaining power to negotiate and subsequently consent to the terms of 
employment (Cullinane and Dundon, 2006). Inkson and King (2011), 
however, raise concerns about this assumption particularly in the case of the 
larger category of lower level employees because of the prevailing power 
asymmetry between them and their employers. Researchers therefore argue 
that the assumption of mutuality largely underplays the implications of power 
dynamics in employment relationships (e.g. Conway and Briner, 2009; Guest 
et al., 2008; Inkson and King, 2011; Legge, 2005). This issue calls for 
investigating the assumption of mutuality in relation to the under-researched 
implications of power. Based on this objective, the first sub-question of the 
current study is: 
 
SQ1: What are the implications of power from the perspective of 
mutuality in relation to the psychological contract? 
 
The concept of reciprocity is also considered as another major constituent 
element of the psychological contract (Kiazad et al., 2014). Gouldner (1960) 
originally conceptualized reciprocity on the basis of the assumption of power 
parity in the exchange relationship (Molm, 2010). In employment relationship, 
the assumption of reciprocity implies that employees generally tend to respond 
to the employers’ inducements on a reciprocal or parity basis (Bal et al., 2008). 
Cullinane and Dundon (2006), however, have raised concerns regarding the 
assumption of reciprocity as the employment relationships are not necessarily 
established on the basis of power parity. According to Hallier (2009), the 
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assumption of reciprocity projects employees with comparable bargaining 
power to their employers, which is not the case particularly for the larger 
category of lower level employees. Researchers therefore argue that the 
assumption of reciprocity largely underplays the implications of power 
dynamics in employment relationships (e.g. Conway and Briner, 2009; Guest 
et al., 2010; Shore et al., 2012). Based on this argument, another objective of 
the current study is to investigate the assumption of reciprocity in relation to 
the under-researched implications of power. This objective in turn informs the 
second sub-question of the current study:  
 
SQ2: What are the implications of power from the perspective of 
reciprocity in relation to the psychological contract? 
 
In addition, the notion of agency is considered as another key concept in the 
psychological contract literature (Lee and Taylor, 2014). However, similar to 
mutuality and reciprocity, the implications of power remain under-researched 
in the domain of agency as well (Shore et al., 2012). Guest (1998, p. 652) 
argued that the notion of ‘contract’ implies the existence of power symmetry 
as the terms of employment are voluntarily accepted after negotiation between 
employee and employer. However, accepting ‘such a document does not mean 
you have to like it [because] a contract between employer and employee … is 
rarely a document between equals’ (Guest, 1998, p. 652).  
 
According to Cullinane and Dundon (2006), the ‘power relations [between 
employees and organizational representatives] … are taken for granted and go 
unchallenged, and this assumption is implicit in much of the psychological 
contract literature’ (pp. 122–123). Similarly, other psychological contract 
researchers maintain that the naive treatment of power has largely resulted in 
deflecting attention from the complex issues associated with struggles for 
power in the relationships between employees and organizational 
representatives (e.g. Conway and Briner, 2009; Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 
2007; Shore et al., 2012). This issue calls for investigating the under-
researched implications of power dynamics in the domain of agency. Based on 
this objective, the third sub-question of the current study is: 
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SQ3: What are the implications of power from the perspective of 
agency in relation to the psychological contract? 
 
 
1.3 Justification for the research 
The psychological contract construct has attracted increased interest (Guest et 
al., 2010). However, Conway and Briner (2009) argue for further theoretical 
developments due to the noticeable divergence in the conceptualization of the 
notion. Similarly, Shore et al. (2012) emphasize the need to proceed towards 
more general agreement on the conceptualization of the construct. According 
to Guest (1998, p. 650), a general agreement is imperative as the 
disagreements over the conceptualization of the construct have largely resulted 
in an ‘analytic nightmare’. The key justification for the current study, 
therefore, is to make further theoretical and empirical developments in order to 
proceed towards more general agreement over the conceptualization of the 
psychological contract. As argued by Conway and Briner (2009), this will not 
only support in reducing the existing ambiguity over the conceptualization of 
the notion but will also enhance its utility from a practical perspective.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
With a qualitative orientation, the current research follows a critical realist 
research philosophy. The discussion in chapter 3 highlights in detail, why 
critical realism, in comparison to positivism or interpretivism, is considered as 
the most appropriate choice for the current study. Furthermore, after a detailed 
discussion of the relevance and suitability of different research strategies, the 
case study strategy is chosen for the current research. For the purpose of data 
collection, 43 semi-structured interviews are conducted. Semi-structured 
interviews are selected as they not only help the research participants to 
express their responses in an unrestricted manner but also support the 
researcher in managing any unanticipated themes emerging from these 
responses.  
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The current research employs the technique of template analysis for the 
analysis of data. Template analysis has been used in a number of qualitative 
studies with a critical realist research philosophy and case study approach (Au, 
2007; Biedenbach and Muller, 2012; Carter, 2012; King, 2004). In the domain 
of the psychological contract, the researchers following a critical realist 
research philosophy have also used the technique of template analysis for the 
analysis of their research findings (e.g. Kenny and Briner, 2013; McDowall 
and Saunders, 2010). 
 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis consists of six chapters as described below: 
Chapter 2 aims to present a critical review of the relevant literature for the 
current study. The chapter is arranged into two parts. The first part (A) largely 
focuses on a critical evaluation of the psychological contract literature. In 
addition to other issues (e.g. the divergence of the different definitions, the 
mental schema or exchange model approach to the concept etc.) the discussion 
highlights the under-researched implications of the notion of power in relation 
to three major themes (mutuality, reciprocity and agency) in the domain of the 
psychological contract. The second part (B) of the literature review focuses 
mainly on the notion of power as in the first part (A), the concept of power is 
generally discussed from the perspective of its underplayed implications in the 
domain of the psychological contract. Based on a detailed critical evaluation of 
the different notions of power, the discussion finally presents the 
conceptualization of power chosen for the current study.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology adopted in the thesis. The chapter begins 
by highlighting issues related to the philosophical underpinnings of research 
and subsequently presents the research philosophy opted for the current study, 
i.e. critical realism. The following discussion focuses on the issue of research 
strategy. The case study strategy is finally selected after a detailed 
consideration of the relevance and suitability of different research strategies. 
The next section then turns to the issue of data collection and highlights semi-
structured interviews as the data collection method for the current research. 
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Finally, the discussion illustrates the details of the template analysis, a 
technique followed in the current study for the purpose of data analysis.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the findings of the research. The current study aims to 
explore three key concepts in the domain of the psychological contract i.e. 
mutuality, reciprocity and agency. Based on this outline, the findings chapter 
is organized into three major sections, each focusing on one of these concepts. 
Chapter 5 discusses the findings of the current study in the context of the 
relevant literature. Similar with chapter 4 which presented the research 
findings, chapter 5 is organized into three major sections. Each section focuses 
on one of the three key concepts (i.e. mutuality, reciprocity and agency) 
investigated in the study. 
 
Chapter 6 draws the thesis together by highlighting the principal conclusions. 
The discussion then proceeds to the contributions the thesis makes to the body 
of knowledge in this area and proposes an alternative framework based on the 
research findings. The next section focuses on the limitations of the study. The 
following discussion highlights the practical implications of the research. In 
the final section of the chapter, areas for future research are specified. 
 
1.6 Contributions to knowledge 
This study contributes to the relevant research from the empirical as well as 
theoretical perspectives. The empirical data of the study not only highlights the 
complex interdependencies and the associated workplace struggles in the 
employment relationship but also offers new knowledge about work and 
management in Pakistan. This context of the employment relationship, which 
is based on underlying power dynamics that are embedded into the complex 
and interdependent relationships between employees and organizational 
representatives, is globally significant in terms of workplace research, yet 
generally neglected in the relevant studies.   
 
From a theoretical perspective, this research contributes to knowledge in 
relation to the key concepts of mutuality, reciprocity and agency in the 
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psychological contract literature. Regarding the first concept, the study 
demonstrates the significance of interdependence rather than mutuality in the 
employment relationship. The results highlight that, in contrast with the 
assumption of mutuality, the concept of interdependence fully acknowledges 
the critically important but largely underplayed implications of power 
dynamics in the psychological contract literature.  
 
Concerning reciprocity, the research contributes to knowledge by highlighting 
the significance of negotiation in relation to the psychological contract. The 
concept of reciprocity is largely based on the assumption of power symmetry 
between exchange actors (Gouldner, 1960). However, the employment 
relationships for most employees are generally characterized by power 
asymmetry in favour of the employers (Inkson and King, 2011). Negotiated 
contracts therefore gain currency in the conceptualization of the psychological 
contract as (unlike reciprocal contracts) they acknowledge the implications of 
power asymmetry in employment relationship (Cook et al., 2013; Molm, 
2010).  
 
In relation to agency, the study contributes to the psychological contract 
literature by highlighting different classifications of organizational agents (i.e. 
primary agents, secondary agents, multiple agents and incumbent agents). This 
research also extends the concept of agency beyond the boundary of human 
agents into the domain of the technology-based electronic agents of the 
organization. The study further demonstrates that it is not only the perceived 
capability to reward or punish but also the perceived tendency to actively use 
that capability which significantly influences employees’ assumptions to 
consider a particular organizational member as the agent of the organization. 
Another key contribution that this thesis makes is a conceptual framework 
based on the concepts of interdependence, negotiation and different 
classifications of organizational agents. 
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1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has laid the foundations of the thesis. It has presented the 
background to the research and highlighted the research questions. The 
methodological underpinnings of the research were briefly described. The 
outline of the thesis, explaining the aims of the different chapters, has been 
presented. The justification of the research and the contributions the thesis 
makes to the body of knowledge in this area have been specified. The 
following chapter is based on a critical review of the relevant literature. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature review 
 
2A.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to present a critical review of the relevant literature for the 
current study. The chapter is arranged in two parts. The first part (A) largely 
focuses on a critical evaluation of the psychological contract literature. The 
discussion in this part begins by highlighting issues regarding the assumptions 
underlying the concept of the psychological contract. The discussion next 
focuses on the issue of the divergence among the different definitions of the 
psychological contract. It highlights the different key terms (e.g. expectations, 
aspirations, obligations, beliefs, promises, perceptions, implicit contracts etc.) 
that are drawn on in order to conceptualize the notion of the psychological 
contract.  
 
The issue of the conceptualization of the psychological contract as either a 
mental schema or an exchange model is then investigated. The discussion 
argues for a conceptualization of the psychological contract as an exchange 
model. This is because the notion of the psychological contract is principally 
an exchange agreement or a contract between two actors (i.e. the employee 
and the employer). In order to determine the viewpoint of these actors, the 
concept needs to be investigated from the bilateral perspective of social 
exchange. The missing implications of the social exchange theory in the 
relevant literature are then highlighted. It is argued that, even though the 
psychological contract literature generally acknowledges the notion of social 
exchange, nevertheless it has largely ignored the key elements of 
interdependence and power asymmetry in the exchange relationship. 
 
After highlighting these issues, the discussion focuses on the three constituent 
elements (mutuality, reciprocity and agency) of the psychological contract. 
The discussion on mutuality begins by highlighting the issue of the use of 
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rhetorical language with a managerialist orientation. The assumption of 
mutuality largely underplays the issue of power asymmetry in the employment 
relationship. It is important to explore the notion of the psychological contract 
from a pluralist rather than a unitarist viewpoint in relation to mutuality. The 
discussion emphasizes that it is very challenging to induce mutuality (not only 
implicitly but also explicitly) due to the potential inconsistency of the 
messages communicated by the different agents of the organization.  
 
The discussion ends by highlighting the limitations of the four drivers of 
mutuality suggested by Rousseau (2001). I emphasize that it is very 
challenging to maintain the implicit nature of the psychological contract due to 
the highly explicit orientation of the first two drivers (i.e. shared information 
and objective accuracy in perceptions). Similarly, in relation to the last two 
drivers (having the power to demand things and having the power to consent to 
or reject the terms of the contract), I argue that only a small category of 
employees (i.e. managerial, professional, knowledge or technical workers) 
have sufficient bargaining power to actively make demands, or to consent to or 
reject the terms of the employment contract.  
 
Regarding the assumption of reciprocity, I emphasize the incompatibility of 
Gouldner’s (1960) notion of reciprocity with the psychological contract 
literature. The linguistic issues associated with the use of the term ‘reciprocity’ 
are highlighted. The discussion also focuses on the issue of power asymmetry 
in the employment relationship. It is argued that, consistent with its dictionary 
meanings and the conceptualization of Gouldner (1960), the notion of 
reciprocity suggests that employees have comparable bargaining power to their 
employers and therefore has limited relevance in the domain of the 
psychological contract. This is because the notion of power symmetry is 
generally not valid in the case of lower level employees. 
 
In relation to agency, the significance of a bilateral rather than a unilateral 
approach to the notion of the psychological contract is highlighted. The 
psychological contract cannot plausibly be considered as a contract if it is 
conceptualized unilaterally as an individual employee’s mental schema. 
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Moreover, it is argued that the unilateral mental schema approach, focusing 
only on the employee’s perspective, inevitably leads to biased or subjective 
mutuality. The issue of whether the psychological contract is established 
between employees and the organization, or between employees and the 
different agents of the organization, is also discussed. The review then focuses 
on the notion of the representation of the organization through its different 
agents (e.g. supervisors, immediate managers, senior managers etc.) and 
highlights the issue of the development of breach perceptions among 
employees in relation to the diverse representation of the organization. Finally, 
the implications of the notion of power asymmetry, which are underplayed in 
the literature on agency, are discussed.  
 
The discussion in part A highlights the issues regarding the three key 
constituent elements (i.e. mutuality, reciprocity and agency) of the 
psychological contract. However, in spite of all these issues, it does not 
recommend that we abandon the concept. Other researchers have also 
acknowledged the increasing popularity of the concept particularly over the 
last two decades (e.g. Conway and Briner, 2009; Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 
2007; Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; Guest et al., 2010; Shore et al., 2012). 
Finally, before concluding part A, the review highlights the issue of the 
relevance and applicability of the psychological contract literature for the 
current study.  
 
The second part (B) of the literature review focuses mainly on the notion of 
power as in the first part (A), the concept of power is generally discussed from 
the perspective of its underplayed implications in the domain of the 
psychological contract. The discussion begins with a critical analysis of the 
dimensional views of power put forward by Dahl (1957), Bachrach and Baratz 
(1962) and Lukes (1974). It highlights the issue of the conceptually 
overlapping nature of Lukes’ three-dimensional, Bacharach and Baratz’s two-
dimensional and Dahl’s one-dimensional views of power.  
 
The discussion then looks at Lukes’ re-conceptualization of power from three 
major perspectives (i.e. power as a capacity, the negative notion of power and 
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the location of power). It highlights Hindess’s critique of Lukes’ three-
dimensional view of power. Foucault’s (1977) view of power and Emerson’s 
(1972a, b) theory of mutual dependence are also critically analyzed. Based on 
a detailed discussion of all these notions of power, the conceptualization of 
power chosen for the current study is presented. The last section of the 
literature review focuses on the issue of the relationship between structure and 
agency.  
 
2A.2 The underlying assumption of the psychological contract  
Since its inception, the concept of the psychological contract has been largely 
viewed as important for understanding the dynamics of the employment 
relationship (Clinton and Guest, 2014; Conway and Briner, 2009; Shore et al., 
2012). According to Cullinane and Dundon (2006), the concept has captured 
researchers’ attention to the extent ‘that it is now firmly located within the 
lexicon of the Human Resource Management (HRM) discipline’ (p. 113). A 
frequently cited definition of the psychological contract is the ‘individual 
beliefs, shaped by the organization, regarding terms of an exchange agreement 
between the individual and their organization’ (Rousseau, 1995, p. 9). The 
notion of the psychological contract is typically based on an underlying 
assumption of changes in traditional employment relationships, particularly 
over the past few decades (e.g. Briscoe and Hall, 2006; Grimshaw and Rubery, 
2010; Hess et al., 2012; Rubery et al., 2010). 
 
Researchers have argued that traditional employment relationships until the 
1980’s have generally been characterized by their long-term nature (e.g. 
Arthur and Rousseau, 1996; Briscoe et al., 2012; Sullivan and Arthur, 2006). 
Rousseau (1995, 1997, 2005) describes prominent features of these traditional 
employment relationships as being that employees entered employment at an 
early stage and stayed for a long period with that employer in order to gain 
benefits from a seniority system that rewarded loyalty to the organization. 
Millward and Brewerton (2000) and Sullivan and Arthur (2006) maintain that 
from the 1980’s onwards, there has been a gradual decline in these traditional 
employment arrangements. Researchers posit that this decline, in addition to 
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factors pertinent to the organizations themselves (e.g. increased market 
competition, motives of cost efficiency, meeting short-term goals etc.), is 
largely fuelled by increasing individualistic trends among workers, who are 
now more concerned with their employability security than their job security 
(Briscoe and Hall, 2006; Hess et al., 2012).  
 
The researcher, however, agrees with the emphasis of Rodrigues and Guest 
(2010) and argues that an assumption of a substantial evolution in the 
dynamics of employment, largely resulting in a decline in traditional 
employment relationships, is rather naive. This argument is consistent with the 
concern of Cullinane and Dundon (2006) that the psychological contract 
literature is largely based on the assumption of a paradigm shift in terms of 
‘irreversible declines in unionized labour, increasingly individualistic 
employees and so on. We are not denying there have been changes. However, 
the problem is that there exists an unquestioning assumption about the scale 
and so-called inevitability of such change, which much of the psychological 
contract and HRM literature seems to embrace with very little scrutiny’ (p. 
123). 
 
The argument of Cullinane and Dundon (2006) is consistent with the concerns 
of other researchers regarding the validity of the assumptions of a substantial 
decrease in the role of trade unions and of an increase in the individualistic 
trends among contemporary employees (e.g. Clarke and Patrickson, 2008; 
Dobbins and Dundon, 2014; Hallier, 2009; Guest, 2004a). Watson (2004) 
attributes these assumptions to the prevailing tendencies of researchers to 
exaggerate and overgeneralize in order to emphasize the evolution in 
employment arrangements. Similarly, Hallier (2009, p. 853) and Inkson and 
King (2011) argue that these tendencies have largely resulted in the 
conceptualization of the ‘new’ employment relationship in the psychological 
contract literature in a way that is not relevant to the actual working 
environment of most workers (i.e. those who are not managerial, professional 
or knowledge workers).  
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Rodrigues and Guest (2010, p. 1157) also criticize the assumptions regarding 
the ‘collapse’ of traditional employment relationships, based on empirical 
evidence from the US, Japan and Europe. Referring to one of these 
assumptions (i.e. an increasing preference for employability rather than job 
security among contemporary employees), they argue that the majority of 
contemporary workers ‘still value traditional careers’ (Rodrigues and Guest, 
2010, p. 1161). In terms of another assumption (i.e. an increasing tendency 
among employees to take responsibility for and control of their own career 
development), they argue that employees are rather ‘being forced to manage 
their own careers, instead of relying on formal organizational career 
development programmes’ (Rodrigues and Guest, 2010, p. 1159). Based on 
the concerns of Rodrigues and Guest (2010, p. 1158) and the analyses of other 
researchers, an evidence-based approach, therefore, needs to be followed in 
order to empirically evaluate the assumptions emphasizing substantial changes 
in traditional employment relationships which underlie the notion of the 
psychological contract (e.g. Arnold and Cohen, 2008; Clarke and Patrickson, 
2008; Feldman and Ng, 2007; Hallier, 2009; Inkson and King, 2011). 
 
2A.3 The definition of the psychological contract 
In addition to these concerns regarding the underlying assumptions, there is 
another issue of divergence in the different definitions of the psychological 
contract. In spite of an extensive volume of published literature, there exists 
very limited agreement over the conceptualization of the psychological 
contract (see Conway and Briner, 2009; Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; 
Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; Guest et al., 2010; Rousseau, 2011; Shore et al., 
2012; Wellin, 2012). This debate regarding the conceptualization of the 
psychological contract was intensified to the level of an argument between 
Rousseau (1998) and Guest (1998), ultimately resulting in further escalation of 
disagreement and confusion. The following definitions of the psychological 
contract from researchers reveal the magnitude of the variation in its 
conceptualization.  
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The notion of the psychological contract implies that the individual has a 
variety of expectations of the organization and that the organization has a 
variety of expectations of him. (Schein, 1970, p. 12) 
 
 
individual beliefs, shaped by the organization, regarding terms of an exchange 
agreement between the individual and their organization. (Rousseau, 1995, p. 
9) 
 
 
the perceptions of both parties to the employment relationship – organization 
and individual – of the reciprocal promises and obligations. (Guest et al., 2010, 
p. 17) 
 
 
an implicit contract between an individual and his organization which specifies 
what each expects to give and receive from each other in their relationship. 
(Kotter, 1973, p. 92) 
 
 
perception of the two parties, employee and employer, of what their mutual 
obligations are towards each other. (Herriot, 2013, p. 38) 
 
 
the perceptions of reciprocal expectations and obligations implied in the 
employment relationship. (Isaksson et al., 2003, p. 3; Isaksson et al., 2010) 
 
The following table highlights the divergence in the conceptualization of 
different researchers based on the key terms emphasized by them in order to 
define the notion of the psychological contract. 
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Table 2.1: Key conceptualizations of psychological contracts          Source: Developed for the thesis 
Researcher                             Key terms  
 
Argyris (1960) 
 
Levinson et al. (1962) 
 
Schein (1970) 
 
Kotter (1973) 
 
Rousseau (1995, 2011) 
 
Herriot (2001, 2013) 
 
Isaksson et al. (2003, 2010) 
 
Guest et al. (2010) 
 
 
Expectations and aspirations 
 
Mutual expectations 
 
Expectations  
 
Implicit contract, expectations 
 
Expectations, obligations, beliefs, promises  
 
Perceptions, obligations 
 
Reciprocal expectations and obligations  
 
Perceptions, reciprocal promises, obligations 
 
 
An initial examination of the above definitions used by different researchers 
results in confusion over the currency of the psychological contract i.e. ‘what 
it is the psychological contract refers to’ (Conway and Briner, 2009, p. 80). 
Researchers emphasize different key terms, such as implicit agreement 
(Rousseau 1989), beliefs (Rousseau, 1995), obligations (Rousseau, 2011), 
expectations (Kotter, 1973; Schein, 1978; Shore et al., 2012), perceptions 
(Herriot, 2013) and promises (Guest and Conway, 2002a; Guest et al., 2010). 
According to Conway and Briner (2009), this incongruent emphasis on 
different key terms ‘is probably the major area of disagreement’ in the 
conceptualization of the psychological contract (p. 80). However, exploring 
the initial literature of the psychological contract reveals the existence of these 
disagreements even between the founding authors of the concept. For instance, 
the initial work of Argyris (1960) on the psychological work contract was 
based on the notions of expectations as well as aspirations, which differs from 
Levinson et al. (1962), who predominantly emphasized expectations.  
 
2A.4 The common feature of ‘expectations’ 
The incongruent definitions reflect no consistent pattern in terms of the 
currency (i.e. the contents) of the psychological contract. However, a relatively 
common element of expectations can be partially traced in the majority of the 
discussions. Initially Argyris (1960) and Levinson et al. (1962) conceptualized 
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psychological contracts on the basis of mutual expectations. Following Argyris 
(1960), Schein (1978) also explained the psychological contract as ‘a set of 
unwritten reciprocal expectations between an individual employee and the 
organization’ (p. 48). Later Kotter (1973) discussed the psychological contract 
in terms of an implicit agreement ‘which specifies what each expect to give 
and receive’ (p. 93). Similarly, Stiles et al. (1997) maintain that psychological 
contracts are shaped by the ‘reciprocal expectations’ of the individual 
employee and the organization (p. 57).  
 
Rousseau (2011), in spite of her emphasis on obligations, beliefs and promises, 
recognizes the role of expectations by arguing that ‘expectations, apart from 
promises, play a key role in psychological contracts’ (p. 209). She further 
emphasizes that expectations are not only important during the employment 
period but also play a significant role at the pre-employment stages in terms of 
‘a priori belief about how employers should treat or reward employees’ 
(Rousseau, 2011, p. 209). Similarly, Conway and Briner (2009, p. 81) argue 
that expectations play a vital role in the formation of the psychological 
contract and ‘may arise from a number of sources (parental socialization, pre-
employment experiences, previous employment experiences, etc.)’. 
 
The statement of Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler (2000, p. 906) that it is not clear 
‘where expectations end and obligations begin in the minds of employees’, 
also highlights the significance of expectations in employees’ psychological 
contracts. The recent psychological contract literature acknowledges the 
significance of expectations by emphasizing that any discrepancy in the 
‘expectations of exchange of favors’ may strengthen employees’ perceptions 
of ‘psychological contract breach and violation’ (Guest et al., 2010; Montes 
and Zweig, 2009; Shore et al., 2012, p. 140). Radford and Larwood (1982, p. 
67), however, caution that in the employment relationship ‘many expectations 
remain inexplicit’. Baker (1996) argues that this problem may also surface in 
the case of obligations, promises or beliefs. According to him, this is largely 
because ‘neither the employer nor the employee can, at any point in time, 
know fully what will be required from each of them’ (Baker, 1996, p. 16). 
Researchers, therefore, emphasize the significance of explicit communication 
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in order to promote the development of mutual expectations between 
employee and employer (e.g. Clinton, 2011; Conway and Briner, 2009; Guest 
et al., 2010; Shore et al., 2012).  
 
2A.5 Methodological challenges 
Another issue is the incompatibility of the predominant survey method with 
the psychological contract theory. Highlighting this issue, Conway and Briner 
(2009) argue that about 90% of psychological contract studies are based on 
questionnaire surveys, while only 10% make use of qualitative interview data. 
Largely based on a positivistic approach, the common use of the survey 
method by the majority of the psychological contract researchers (including 
Rousseau and Guest) has led the relevant research to fall into a 
‘methodological rut’ (Taylor and Tekleab, 2004, p. 279).  
 
According to Conway and Briner (2009), ‘the most glaring and disturbing 
feature of this rut is the mismatch between the survey method and 
psychological contract theory’ (p. 106). For them, the psychological contract 
as an exchange process unfolds dynamically on a day-to-day basis. The 
questionnaire surveys are ‘fundamentally inappropriate to examining 
psychological contracts’ as they are likely to provide ‘invalid and unreliable’ 
information regarding these everyday events (Conway and Briner, 2009, p. 
107). In addition, surveys are not compatible with the subjective nature of the 
psychological contract. Questionnaire surveys with a standardized layout are 
generally designed with an emphasis on objectivity in the research findings 
(Saunders et al., 2009). However, this layout largely prevents them from 
capturing the subjective data embedded in the respondents’ idiosyncratic 
beliefs and perceptions regarding their psychological contracts.  
 
Consistent with the critique of Conway and Briner (2009), other researchers 
emphasize using qualitative research methods in order to advance our 
understanding of psychological contracts (e.g. Bankins, 2011; Morgan and 
Finniear, 2009; Nadin and Williams, 2011). However, there are several issues 
that have largely resulted in a reluctance among researchers to make use of 
qualitative research methods. First, the research findings based on qualitative 
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research methods, because of their subjective nature, can be interpreted in 
multiple ways (Bryman, 2008; Schwandt, 2003). Despite their context-rich 
nature, the subjectivity of the findings may reduce the interest of potential 
sponsors in such research projects (Silverman, 2000). According to Martin et 
al. (1998), this issue may have ‘serious practical implications for companies, 
many of whom take major decisions based solely on positivistic organizational 
surveys’ (p. 36).  
 
Second, as the findings of qualitative studies are generally based on samples of 
relatively smaller sizes, they may have to be subject to further verification for 
the purpose of generalization (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996; Saunders et al., 
2009). This apparent inability of qualitative findings to be generalized to 
broader levels may serve as another obstacle to their wider acceptance (Symon 
and Cassell, 2012). In addition, researchers attribute the scarcity of qualitative 
research in the domain of employment relationships to the politics among 
academics and practitioners, which ultimately obstruct the impartial 
appreciation of qualitative approaches (Grunig, 2002; Schwandt, 2003). 
Referring to these issues, which have resulted in the under-acknowledgement 
of the qualitative perspective in the relevant research, Conway and Briner 
(2009) argue that ‘while there are practical, career and other reasons why most 
researchers continue to use inappropriate methods and designs, we are in little 
doubt that insight into psychological contracts will not develop to any 
significant degree if we do not change how we research it’ (p. 108).  
 
The emphasis of Conway and Briner (2009) has intuitive resonance, as the 
initial work of the psychological contract researchers (e.g. Argyris, Levinson, 
and Schein) was largely qualitative in nature (Atkinson, 2007; Bankins, 2011). 
Recognizing this initial trend, there have been increasing calls for the 
proportionate acknowledgement of the qualitative perspective in the relevant 
research (Morgan and Finniear, 2009; Nadin and Williams, 2011). The 
emphasis of these researchers is consistent with the viewpoint of Poppleton 
and Briner (2008). According to them, qualitative studies ‘may hold new 
implications for theory and practice [as they] can complement survey-based 
designs by [highlighting] the idiosyncratic and complex ways in which people 
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understand and manage [their] relationships and demonstrate how different 
contextual factors at different level of analysis come into play’ (Poppleton and 
Briner, 2008, pp. 483–4).   
 
2A.6 An exchange model or a mental schema 
Two different approaches emerge in the various conceptualizations of the 
psychological contract. The first comprises an exchange model between 
employees and the employer, while the second is largely based on an 
employee’s mental schema. The exchange model approach is based on the 
assumption of a bilateral agreement and focuses on the versions of both parties 
i.e. the employee and the employer. The notion of the psychological contract 
as an exchange model was originally proposed by Argyris (1960) and followed 
by a number of researchers (e.g. Aggarwal and Bhargava, 2014; Chaudhry and 
Tekleab, 2013; Conway and Coyle-Shapiro, 2012; Guest et al., 2010; Herriot, 
2013; Parzefall and Coyle-Shapiro, 2011; Shore et al., 2012).  
 
The theory of social exchange (discussed in next section) serves as a basis for 
conceptualizing the notion of the psychological contract as an exchange 
model. This approach appears to be more pertinent to the notion of the 
psychological contract as it incorporates the versions of both parties i.e. the 
employee and the employer. Unfortunately, this approach has suffered from 
the vague representation of the employer’s side of the contract. This has 
ultimately led to the agency problem in relation to the bilateral approach in the 
psychological contract literature (Conway and Briner, 2009; Shore et al., 
2012). The relevant research has yet to uncover a clear criterion for the 
identification of the organizational agents, representing the employer’s side of 
the contract.  
 
In comparison with the exchange model approach, the relevant research, 
largely under the influence of Rousseau (1995, 2001, 2011), conceptualizes 
psychological contracts on the basis of mental schemas. A schema ‘can be 
explained as a model evoked in a given situation to help individuals cope with 
and understand what they experience. The schema is revised as time goes by 
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and new information and feedback from the environment regarding a 
phenomenon is gathered’ (Svensson and Wolven, 2010, pp. 188-9). Schemas 
influence the formation of an employee’s psychological contract through their 
role in interpreting any information, especially incomplete information, at the 
early stages of the employment (Rousseau, 2001; Tomprou and Nikolaou, 
2011).  
 
Although, this view of the psychological contract as a mental schema also 
acknowledges the notion of exchange, this assumption of exchange is largely 
based on the perspective of the individual employee. Thus, the 
conceptualization of the psychological contract as a mental schema lacks a 
holistic perspective as it focuses only on one party of the contract i.e. the 
employee. According to Rousseau (2001), the psychological contracts are 
largely based on individuals’ perceptions; therefore, it is only their perspective 
that needs to be the primary focus. She further argues that as psychological 
contracts are predominantly subjective, employees do not necessarily need to 
discuss or agree their terms and conditions with the employer (Rousseau, 
2011).  
 
Rousseau’s approach is helpful in avoiding the agency problem. However, 
focusing on a single party’s perspective only i.e. that of the employee, raises 
the question of whether this unilateral approach fulfills the criterion of a 
‘contract’ or is only the perception of a contract. Considering a psychological 
contract unilaterally as an employee’s mental schema renders the associated 
issues of mutuality, reciprocity and power as irrelevant because these concepts 
cannot be operationalized without the recognition of the other party. Even if 
psychological contracts are assumed as a perception of a contract, as 
emphasized by Rousseau, there still exists an indispensable need to clearly 
identify the other party, i.e. the employer, in order to meet the basic criterion 
of a contract.  
 
Based on the above discussion and consistent with the viewpoint of other 
researchers, this research conceptualizes a psychological contract as an 
exchange model (e.g. Aggarwal and Bhargava, 2014; Argyris, 1960; Chaudhry 
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and Tekleab, 2013; Conway and Coyle-Shapiro, 2012; Guest et al., 2010; 
Herriot, 2013; Parzefall and Coyle-Shapiro, 2011; Schein, 1970; Shore et al., 
2012). However, the agency issue still needs to be adequately addressed. 
Although, an extensive amount of the psychological contract literature has 
theoretically supported the bilateral approach, no empirical study has been 
conducted with the primary objective of developing the criteria for the 
identification of organizational agents (Shore et al., 2012). This research, 
therefore, attempts to develop the criteria that can be used in order to 
distinguish the representatives of the organization i.e. the organizational 
agents. This will provide support not only for the identification of agents’, but 
will for further exploration of the notion of the psychological contract from the 
perspective of social exchange theory.  
 
 
 
2A.7 Social exchange theory 
The early work on the notion of social exchange can be attributed to Walras 
(1874), whose work implied the concept, arguing that the world may be 
considered as a broader market comprising a number of smaller markets where 
social capital is traded (p. 84). Influenced by Walras (1874), Blau (1964) 
explicitly referred to the notion of social exchange in his work. Blau (1964) 
principally emphasized the influence of power on the exchange process in 
terms of the ‘interdependence’ of the exchange actors (p. 118). He argued that 
the exchange relationship is generally characterized by ‘the asymmetry of 
power relations’ between the exchange actors (Blau, 1964, p. 115). Given the 
‘inherently asymmetrical’ nature of power relations, the benefits for the 
exchange actors are largely determined by their interdependence on each other 
(p. 117). 
 
The psychological contract researchers, irrespective of their approach (i.e. 
whether mental schema or exchange model) generally refer to social exchange 
theory in their discussions of the contract management process (e.g. Bal et al., 
2010; Cassar and Briner, 2011; Chaudhry and Tekleab, 2013; Colquitt et al., 
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2013; Conway and Briner, 2009; Conway and Coyle-Shapiro, 2012; Coyle-
Shapiro and Shore, 2007; DeConinck, 2011; Fox, 1974; Shore et al., 2012). 
However, the psychological contract literature, despite acknowledging the 
significance of social exchange theory, largely downplays the implications of 
one of its vital features i.e. power asymmetry in the exchange relationship 
(Blau, 1964). This is because the relevant literature is largely based on the 
assumptions of mutuality and reciprocity (discussed in detail in the next 
sections), implying the notion of power symmetry in the employment 
relationship.  
 
These notions of mutuality and reciprocity, therefore, may not be considered 
as highly relevant for a large category of employees (i.e. non-managerial 
employees) because of the prevailing power asymmetry between them and the 
employers (Hallier, 2009; Inkson and King, 2011; Rodrigues and Guest, 
2010). Other researchers have raised similar concerns because of the issue of 
power asymmetry (particularly for lower level employees) in the employment 
relationship (e.g. Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; Cullinane and Dundon, 
2006; Guest and Sturges, 2007; Guest et al., 2010; Shore et al., 2012). Based 
on this argument, the current study attempts to explore the underplayed 
implications of the notion of power asymmetry in the domain of the 
psychological contract, particularly from the perspective of the assumptions of 
mutuality and reciprocity in the employment relationship.  
 
2A.8 The assumption of ‘mutuality’ 
The majority of the psychological contract literature, following the 
conceptualization of Rousseau (1989, 1995, 2001, 2011), is based on the 
assumption of mutuality between employee and employer (e.g. Dick, 2010; 
George, 2009; Hess and Jepsen, 2009; Suazo et al., 2009; Wellin, 2012). 
According to Dabos and Rousseau (2004, p. 53), mutuality is ‘the degree to 
which the two parties agree on their interpretations of promises and 
commitments each party has made and accepted (i.e. agreement on what each 
owes the other)’. As evident in the above definition, mutuality primarily refers 
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to the degree of agreement between employee and employer in terms of the 
promises and commitments made to each other.  
 
From the perspective of mutuality, Rousseau (2011, p. 191) further emphasizes 
the notion of implicitness by referring to the unwritten or unspecified nature of 
these promises and commitments, which are ‘implied, regarding an exchange 
agreement’. However, Rousseau’s conceptualization has inherent limitations 
due to the contradictory nature of its underlying assumptions. According to 
Conway and Briner (2009, p. 83), ‘if psychological contracts entail a strong 
form of mutuality, then it seems improbable that such a clear understanding of 
a contract’s terms could be perceived without some outward sign of 
agreement. Alternatively, if psychological contracts are defined by a weak 
form of mutuality, can this reasonably be considered to be a contract, as the 
perceived terms and details of the exchange remain unspecified?’  
 
While emphasizing the significance of explicit communication between 
employee and employer in order to promote the ‘specificity of the exchange’, 
they ask ‘can someone have a contract with an organization, without knowing 
its terms? [This is because the] strong forms of agreement are conceptually 
incompatible with the implicit nature of psychological contracts, whereas 
weak forms of agreement are incompatible with the contractual nature of 
psychological contracts’ (Conway and Briner, 2009, pp. 82–3). It can be 
argued that the notion of implicitness inevitably reduces the degree of 
mutuality or agreement, which in turn significantly affects the contractual 
nature of the psychological contracts.  
 
Guest et al. (2010, p. 183) endorse this viewpoint by arguing that the implicit 
nature of promises and obligations ‘raises questions about the way in which 
they are communicated.’ Other researchers posit that in this case employees 
and employers may develop different interpretations of the same contract (e.g. 
Jun Je et al., 2012; Shore et al., 2012). Moreover, given the issues of the highly 
dynamic, idiosyncratic and implicit nature of the psychological contract, and 
the diverse representation of the organization, the achievement of such 
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mutuality appears to be very challenging (Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; 
Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; Guest, 1998).  
 
Cullinane and Dundon (2006) argue that the unwritten or unspecified nature of 
the commitments in the psychological contract ‘provide the relationship with a 
strong element of indeterminacy’ (p. 115). According to Atkinson et al. 
(2014), the disagreements resulting from this indeterminacy generally lead to 
the perceptions of the breach of the psychological contract. However, in spite 
of conceptualizing the psychological contract as an implicit agreement, 
Rousseau nonetheless asserts mutuality to the level of ‘objective agreement’ 
and argues that a ‘failure to reach such an agreement can give rise to 
psychological contract violation’ (Dabos and Rousseau, 2004, p. 52). It is 
argued that Rousseau’s conceptualization inevitably leads to the breach of the 
psychological contract, as the assumption of implicitness renders very limited 
possibility for employee and employer to bring about mutuality or agreement 
in their psychological contract.   
 
The same issue of self-contradictory conceptualization can be noted in 
Levinson et al.’s (1962) definition. According to them, the psychological 
contract is ‘a series of mutual expectations of which the parties to the 
relationship may not themselves be even dimly aware but which nonetheless 
govern their relationship to each other’ (Levinson et al., 1962, pp. 21–2). This 
appears to be self-contradictory as it requires the expectations to be mutual or 
agreed between the parties despite the fact that the parties themselves are not 
aware of their own expectations. Conway and Briner (2009) raise similar 
concerns regarding the possibility of mutuality or agreement in the 
expectations that largely ‘affect and define the psychological contract’, even 
when both parties are ‘largely unconscious’ of their own expectations (p. 75).  
 
2A.8.1     The use of rhetorical language with managerialist orientation 
The Oxford English dictionary defines ‘mutuality’ as ‘two or more people: 
having the same feelings for each other; standing in reciprocal relation to one 
another’ (emphasis added in bold and italics to the online citation). This raises 
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issues about the conceptualization of mutuality in the psychological contract 
literature. In any relationship between parties A and B, the expectations, 
obligations or promises will be mutual or ‘the same’ if they are unidirectional 
and both parties are working for the benefit of a unified party (e.g. either both 
A and B work for the benefit of A, or both work for B or both work for any 
other party C). However, in normal circumstances, this scenario is relatively 
uncommon as in any relationship ‘parties within the exchange are motivated to 
maximize personal gains at minimum cost’ (Mitchell et al., 2012, p. 101).  
 
This has significant implications for the employment relationship as, according 
to Detert et al. (2007, pp. 994–5), ‘employees have different interests than the 
organization and are motivated to pursue their own interests’. This motivation 
to pursue their own interests tends to prevail in any contract between two 
individuals or groups. In the employment relationship, employees and 
employers will tend to maximize their own interests. For example, an 
employer may expect the employee to work hard and with dedication for low 
wages. In direct contrast, an employee may expect a moderate workload with 
high wages (Mitchell et al., 2012). Therefore, each party has interests and 
expectations which are not necessarily mutual or the same. Rather, their 
interests in many cases are competing (Detert and Linda, 2010).  
 
As far as mutual expectations (Conway and Briner, 2009), obligations 
(Rousseau, 2011), or promises (Guest et al., 2010) are concerned, it can be 
argued that, even if made explicit, these are not mutual or the same, as both 
parties (i.e. employee and employer) from their own perspectives have 
different, indeed in many cases competing, versions of expectations, 
obligations or promises. From a linguistic perspective, therefore, it can be 
argued that the use of the term ‘mutuality’ is in contradiction to the underlying 
dynamics of the employment relationship between employee and employer.  
 
The use of the term ‘mutuality’ may imply a linguistic issue only. However, 
researchers argue that the emphasis on the assumption of mutuality in the 
domain of the psychological contract largely serves as a management 
instrument in order to promote the interests of the organization (e.g. Clarke 
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and Patrickson, 2008; Guest, 1998; Guest et al., 2010; Hallier, 2009; Inkson 
and King, 2011; Prujit and Derogee, 2010). Cullinane and Dundon (2006) 
argue that ‘the use of language and linguistic devices can mask an awareness 
of underlying conflicts between employees and the employer’ (p. 124). This 
view echoes the concern of Hamilton (2001) that the use of rhetorical language 
in the domain of employment relations generally masks the issues experienced 
by most employees.  
 
Similarly, from the perspective of mutuality and reciprocity, Hallier (2009, p. 
853), while referring to the issue of the use of rhetorical language with a 
managerialist orientation, argues that the ‘management’s legitimatory 
intentions [can be] easily seen through by employees because of the visible 
gap between the espoused message and the lack of dedicated policy and 
practical support provided by employing organizations’. From the perspective 
of power, the emphasis of these researchers is consistent with the concern of 
Guest (1998) that the assumption of mutuality incorrectly suggests that 
employees have comparable bargaining power to their employer. Inkson and 
King (2011) also argue that the emphasis on the assumption of mutuality is 
generally not valid for most employees due to the prevailing power asymmetry 
in favour of employers. 
 
2A.8.2  The unitarist and pluralist perspective  
As noted, in contrast to the assumption of mutuality, employees and employers 
generally have different or conflicting interests in order to maximize personal 
gains from the employment relationship (Detert and Linda, 2010; Mitchell et 
al., 2012). The human resource management literature discusses this topic of 
similar or conflicting interests in the unitarist and pluralist debate. According 
to the unitarist perspective, employees and employers generally agree on the 
shared objectives in order to accomplish mutual gains for both parties 
(Calveley et al., 2014). Therefore, the possibility of conflicts in the 
employment relationship is relatively limited (Johnstone and Wilkinson, 
2012). Beardwell and Claydon (2007), however, argue that the unitarist view 
overstates the unification of the goals of both parties because of its emphasis 
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on the exchange actors (i.e. the employer and employee) largely shaping their 
objectives in a way that is consistent with the goals of the other party. 
Similarly, Grint (2005), while referring to industrial disputes between 
employees and their organizations, argues that the unitarist perspective has 
limited application in the domain of employment relations, as it overstates the 
unanimous reconciliation of the goals of both parties.  
 
The unitarist perspective has been criticized as a management tool utilized to 
gain more control over employees (Inkson and King, 2011; Legge, 2005). In 
contrast, the pluralist approach acknowledges the inevitability of 
disagreements between employee and employer and, therefore, urges the 
development of appropriate mechanisms to manage these conflicts. The 
current study follows the pluralist rather than the unitarist approach. The 
researcher’s decision to follow the pluralist approach is consistent with the 
viewpoint of other researchers conceptualizing the notion of the psychological 
contract from a pluralist perspective (e.g. Conway and Briner, 2009; Coyle-
Shapiro and Shore, 2007; Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; Guest et al., 2010; 
Hallier, 2009; Shore et al., 2012). The overwhelming evidence of contract 
breach and violation also manifestly points towards the pluralist rather than the 
unitarist orientation of the psychological contract literature (e.g. Cassar and 
Briner, 2011; Epitropaki, 2013; Kiazad et al., 2014; Suazo and Stone-Romero, 
2011).  
 
2A.8.3  The issue of diverse employer’s representation  
Another challenge is the diverse representation of the employer by means of 
different agents of the organization. The psychological contract researchers 
generally argue that an organization comprises a number of agents 
representing the employer’s side of the contract (e.g. Conway and Briner, 
2009; Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; George, 2009; Rousseau, 2011; Suazo 
et al., 2009; Wellin, 2012). These agents, however, may not necessarily 
represent the organization in a consistent manner (Guest et al., 2010; Shore et 
al., 2012). From the perspective of seeking mutuality at a broader individual–
organization level, it becomes difficult to establish mutuality (not only 
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implicitly but also explicitly) because of the potential inconsistency of the 
messages communicated by the different agents of the organization (Coyle-
Shapiro and Shore, 2007; Shore et al., 2012).  
 
2A.8.4  The limitations of the drivers of mutuality 
With the exception of Rousseau (2001), the relevant literature is silent on the 
issue of how to promote implicit mutuality between employees and the 
different agents of the organization. In her frequently cited article, Rousseau 
(2001, p. 535) posits the following four drivers of mutuality. It is, however, 
argued that these four drivers have manifest limitations in terms of promoting 
mutuality in practical employment conditions. These drivers are:  
 
 Shared information 
 Objective accuracy in perceptions 
 Having the right or power to demand things in one’s own 
interest 
 Having the right or power to consent to or reject the terms of 
the contract.  
 
The problem over Rousseau’s driver of shared information stems from its 
disagreement with her own (i.e. Rousseau, 1989, 1995, 2001, 2011) 
conceptualization of the psychological contract as an implicit agreement 
between employee and employer. On the one hand, Rousseau emphasizes the 
‘implicit’ nature of the psychological contract but on the other hand she argues 
for sharing ‘explicit’ information. There are issues regarding the second driver 
(i.e. objective accuracy in perceptions) as well. Even though she considers 
psychological contracts as highly ‘subjective’, nonetheless she emphasizes 
‘objectivity’ in the perceptions of the contracts.  
 
It appears to be very challenging to achieve objective accuracy in the 
perceptions of mutuality because of the highly implicit and subjective nature 
of the psychological contract. According to Guest (1998, p. 652), seeking to 
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achieve objective accuracy in the perceptions of mutuality is like ‘two 
strangers passing blindfold and in the dark, disappointed at their failure to 
meet’. Other researchers have also raised concerns regarding the notion of 
mutuality because of the implicit nature of the psychological contract (e.g. 
Conway and Briner, 2009; Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; Cullinane and 
Dundon, 2006; Guest et al., 2010; Jun Je et al., 2012; Shore et al., 2012).  
 
Similarly the last two drivers (i.e. having the power to demand things in one’s 
own interest and having the power to consent to or reject the terms of the 
contract), other than the issue of their largely overlapping nature, also provide 
very modest support in promoting mutuality between employees and the 
employer. Rodrigues and Guest (2010), based on their detailed empirical 
evidence from the U.S., Japan and Europe, argue that only a small group of 
employees (i.e. managerial, professional, knowledge or technical workers) 
generally have enough bargaining power to actively negotiate their terms of 
contract with the employer. Inkson and King (2011) posit that the assumption 
of mutuality is relevant only ‘in the case of professional and managerial 
workers, who are typically equipped with valuable personal knowledge’ (p. 
43) and therefore ‘possess appreciable labour market power’ supporting them 
in their negotiation with the employer (p. 50). 
 
Inkson and King (2011) echo the concern of Cullinane and Dundon (2006) that 
‘an advocacy of focusing upon mutuality presents its own difficulties, 
especially where there is a large power differential between employer and 
employees’ (p. 116). They further posit that, if the power asymmetry is 
inherent in the explicit contracts, the employer’s prerogative to distribute 
resources as they think appropriate for themselves is further magnified in the 
case of psychological contracts, due to their unspecified and implicit nature. 
The concern of Cullinane and Dundon (2006) echoes Guest’s (1998, p. 652) 
view that ‘a contract between employer and employee may have legal force 
but it is rarely a document between equals’ Based on Guest’s (1998) argument, 
if legal employment contracts cannot ensure mutuality, it appears unrealistic to 
assume mutuality or agreement in psychological contracts, which are not even 
legally enforceable by law (Suazo et al., 2011).  
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The above discussion highlights issues regarding the assumption of mutuality 
from the perspectives of implicitness and power asymmetry. At this point, it is 
valid to raise the question that, given the limited relevance of the notion of 
mutuality, what is the factor that engages both employee and employer in the 
employment relationship. Consistent with the viewpoint of other researchers, it 
is the interdependence of both employee and employer in their attempt to 
achieve their objectives (e.g. Detert and Linda, 2010; Mitchell et al., 2012; 
Tjosvold and Wisse, 2009). This constantly binds them together in the 
employment relationship. When either or both parties conceive of an overall 
better bargaining opportunity with another employment relationship, the 
current relationship comes to an end. This is consistent with the established 
view of social exchange in which both parties analyze their relationship on the 
basis of the costs incurred and the benefits received from that relationship 
(Mitchell et al., 2012).  
 
Mitchell et al. (2012) support Blau (1964) and Thibaut and Kelly (1959), who 
argue that the objective of gaining benefits serves as the foundation for any 
exchange relationship. These benefits are largely determined by the degree of 
‘interdependence’ of both parties (Blau, 1964, p. 294). The viewpoint of Blau 
(1964) is further endorsed by other researchers who argue that an individual 
will have less power in a relationship, if s/he is more dependent on that 
relationship, ultimately resulting in the reduction of the benefits acquired (e.g. 
Cook and Emerson, 1978; Cook et al., 2013; Molm, 2010; Uhl-Bien and 
Carsten, 2007). The phenomenon of interdependence rather than mutuality, 
therefore, appears as a suitable notion in order to conceptualize the 
psychological contract.  
 
The interdependence rather than the mutuality approach will not only set the 
research free from the virtually impossible task of establishing mutuality to the 
level of ‘objective accuracy’ (Rousseau, 2011, p. 197) in an implicit contract 
but will also support researchers to explore the notion of the psychological 
contract from the perspective of the power asymmetry between employee and 
employer. The emphasis on exploring psychological contracts from the 
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perspectives of interdependence and power asymmetry supports the argument 
of Harvey and Randles (2002) that the notions of asymmetric power and 
interdependence of the actors are intrinsic in any exchange process. The roots 
of this argument can be traced further back into the influential writings of Blau 
(1964) which emphasized the implications of ‘interdependence’ (p. 118) and 
the ‘inherently asymmetrical’ nature of power relations (p. 117) in the 
exchange relationships.  
 
2A.9 The ‘reciprocity’ issue 
Most of the psychological contract literature following the conceptualization 
of Rousseau (1995, 1998, 2001, 2011) is further based on Gouldner’s (1960) 
notion of reciprocity between employee and employer (e.g. Bal and Vink, 
2011; Dick, 2010; George, 2009; Parzefall, 2008; Wellin, 2012). According to 
Dabos and Rousseau (2004, p. 53), the notion of ‘reciprocity refers to the 
degree of agreement about the reciprocal exchange’ between employee and 
employer. In addition to the other limitations, an apparent conceptual issue 
with this description of reciprocity is that it is very difficult to differentiate 
reciprocity from mutuality, as the focus is on the ‘degree of agreement’ which 
also describes the notion of mutuality.  
 
The notion of reciprocity in the psychological contract literature is largely 
based on the assumption of an implicit mutuality, i.e. both parties reciprocate 
on the basis of mutual or agreed expectations, obligations or promises 
‘implied, regarding an exchange agreement’ (Rousseau, 2011, p. 191). The 
assumption of reciprocity on the basis of an implicit mutuality has manifest 
limitations in terms of its application in practical employment conditions. As 
noted, it is very challenging to achieve mutuality on an implicit basis in the 
employment relationship. The task of stimulating reciprocity on the basis of 
non-existent implicit mutuality is even more complicated. This is because if 
the terms of the exchange agreement (i.e. expectations, obligations or 
promises) remain implicit, it is very challenging for both parties to reciprocate 
on the basis of such unidentified terms. As Shore et al. (2012, p. 300) argue, 
‘employees who tend to communicate in an implicit manner may experience 
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more difficulties in expressing their thoughts and having others understand 
them’. Guest et al. (2010) also highlight similar issues as a result of the 
implicit or unspecified nature of expectations, obligations or promises on 
which this reciprocity is established.  
 
There are several other issues associated with the assumption of reciprocity in 
the psychological contract literature. Gouldner (1960) originally 
conceptualized reciprocity from the perspective of the relationship between 
individuals. However, the psychological contract literature has generally 
applied the notion of reciprocity to the relationship between an individual and 
the organization. According to Gouldner (1960), the act of reciprocity is 
predominantly autonomous in its orientation. That is, the actors engaged in the 
reciprocal exchange relationship generally reciprocate independently without 
any consultation with the other party. The notion of the reciprocal exchange, 
therefore, may not be considered as relevant in the domain of the employment 
relationship. This is because employee and the employer generally engage in 
the process of formal consultation in order to negotiate the terms of the 
employment contract (Deakin and Njoya, 2008; Suazo et al., 2011). However, 
these terms of employment may be imbalanced as a result of the possible 
power asymmetry between the exchange actors (Blau, 1964; Cook et al., 2013; 
Tjosvold and Wisse, 2009). 
 
Gouldner (1960) argues that the actors reciprocate without any consultation 
with the other party. This may result in uncertainty as to whether and how the 
other party will reciprocate (Molm, 2010). However, this is not the case for 
employment relationships, where formal employment contracts largely 
determine the nature of returns for both parties i.e. employee and the employer 
(Suazo et al., 2011). Based on these inconsistencies, it is argued that the notion 
of reciprocity, even though extensively acknowledged in the psychological 
contract, is not generally aligned with the dynamics of the employment 
relationship. Other researchers have also raised issues about the relevance of 
the assumption of reciprocity in the psychological contract (e.g. Conway and 
Briner, 2009; Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; Guest et al., 2010; Shore et al., 
2012; J. B. Wu et al., 2006).  
38 
 
 
2A.9.1  A language perspective 
There are also language issues with the notion of reciprocity. As with the 
assumption of mutuality, the literal meanings of reciprocity, according to the 
Oxford English dictionary, are not compatible with its conceptualization in the 
psychological contract literature. The Oxford English dictionary describes 
‘reciprocity’ in the sense of parity or equality as ‘equivalent in meaning or 
force’. Reciprocity implies the notion of power symmetry in a relationship. As 
noted, the assumption of power symmetry in the employment relationship is 
relevant only in the case of a small category of employees i.e. managerial, 
professional, technical, knowledge workers (Cappelli, 2004; Inkson and King, 
2011; Rodrigues and Guest, 2010). Therefore, the assumption of reciprocity 
becomes irrelevant to the large group of employees who do not belong to these 
categories. The Oxford English dictionary defines ‘subordinate’ as an 
individual ‘dependent upon the authority or power of another’. Referring to 
this dictionary meaning, the use of the term reciprocity becomes inherently 
contradictory in an employee–organization relationship, as subordination 
implies a lack of power while reciprocity suggests equivalent power.  
 
2A.9.2  The issue of power asymmetry 
Similar with the conceptualization of other researchers, Gouldner (1960) 
argues that reciprocity is generally established on the basis of power symmetry 
and the freewill of the exchange actors (e.g. Burgess and Nielsen, 1974; Elgar, 
1958; Gergen, 1969; Malinowski, 1922; Mauss, 1925; Michaels and Wiggins, 
1976). As well as being kind, individuals may also freely and negatively 
reciprocate the unkind or harmful actions of other individuals. That is, the 
actors in a reciprocal exchange relationship can pay back any previous act of 
harm or kindness in line with their freewill because of the existence of a power 
symmetry between them.  
 
The assumption of reciprocity has limited relevance in the domain of the 
psychological contract. This is because the notion of power symmetry is 
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generally not valid in the case of the major category of lower level employees 
(Inkson and King, 2011; Rodrigues and Guest, 2010). This argument is further 
endorsed by Vettori (2012) who notes that, after accepting the employment 
contract, employees are generally obligated to respond not according to their 
freewill but as prompted by the employer’s preferences.  
 
Cullinane and Dundon (2006, p. 123) agree, arguing that the ‘employee needs 
and expectations are often imposed by corporate values and interests … while 
much of the psychological contract literature seems to pre-suppose some level 
of an equal two-way exchange process’. Similarly, Coyle-Shapiro and Shore 
(2007) argue that in order to ‘develop our understanding of how the 
employee–organization relationship operates we need to direct attention to 
non-reciprocal mechanisms that may underpin the relationship’ (p. 179). While 
referring to the issue of power asymmetry in the domain of the employment 
relationship, they further posit that, ‘an obedience norm may have greater 
prominence than a norm of reciprocity in explaining the “relationship”’ 
(Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007, p. 179, quotation marks in original).  
 
Cook et al. (2013) also support this viewpoint by arguing that power 
asymmetry in the exchange relationships generally results in unequal gains for 
the exchange actors. Supporting evidence can be drawn from the writings of 
Gouldner (1960) as well. According to him, power symmetry among the 
exchange actors is imperative in order to establish reciprocity in the exchange 
relationship. Similarly, Blau (1964) posits that power asymmetry or 
disproportionate interdependence in the social exchange relationship generally 
results in an unequal flow of benefits for the exchange actors.  
 
It can be argued that the notion of reciprocity, because of its underlying 
assumption of power symmetry in the exchange relationship, has limited 
relevance in the domain of the psychological contract (Cook et al., 2013; 
Gouldner, 1960; Molm, 2010). Supporting this viewpoint, other researchers 
have also raised similar concerns (e.g. Coyle-Shapiro and Conway, 2004; 
Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; Guest et al., 
2010; Shore et al., 2012). The current study, therefore, attempts to explore the 
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notion of reciprocity from the perspective of power asymmetry in the 
employment relationship as one of its aims. 
 
2A.10 The issue of agency 
The concept of agency mainly deals with the issue of the representation of the 
organization (Boxall and Purcell, 2011; Conway and Coyle-Shapiro, 2012; 
Guest et al., 2010; Shore et al., 2012; Suazo et al., 2009; Wellin, 2012). The 
relevant research, largely following the influential guidelines of Rousseau 
(1995, 1998, 2001, 2011), has predominantly focused on the employee’s 
perspective of the contract. According to Rousseau (2011, p. 194), the 
psychological contract is primarily a perception of a contract largely 
influenced by the ‘employee’s mental schemas (i.e. mental structures that 
organize knowledge)’. While explaining her conceptualization, principally 
based on the employee’s perspective, she argues that the issue of organization 
representation (i.e. agency) is not important as the contract is established 
between employee and the organization, while ‘the agent is merely a go-
between’ (Rousseau, 1998, p. 669).  
 
In contrast to this unilateral view and consistent with the bilateral 
conceptualization of other researchers, it is, however, argued that a 
psychological contract cannot plausibly be considered as a contract if it exists 
only in the mind of an employee (e.g. Boxall and Purcell, 2011; Conway and 
Briner, 2009; Guest et al., 2010; Shore et al., 2012). That is, in order to qualify 
even as a perception of a contract, there is an indispensable need to identify the 
other party of the contract (i.e. the employer). The researcher further argues 
that focusing only on the employee’s perspective inevitably leads to the issue 
of biased or subjective mutuality.  
 
The support for this viewpoint can be drawn from the writings of Rousseau 
(2004) herself as she argues that ‘an individual’s psychological contract 
reflects his or her own understanding of the commitments made with another. 
Individuals act on that subjective understanding as if it is mutual, regardless of 
whether that is the case in reality’ (pp. 120–121). The researcher’s argument 
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regarding the issue of biased or subjective mutuality inherent in the 
conceptualization of Rousseau (as a result of the predominant focus being 
largely on the employee’s perspective) is further supported by her own 
emphasis that the agreement in the psychological contract ‘is, of course, in the 
eye of the beholder. It does not mean that any two or more parties to some 
agreement actually in fact agree’ (Rousseau, 2011, p. 197).  
 
When considering agency, Rousseau contradicts her own unilateral 
conceptualization of the psychological contract. On several occasions, 
Rousseau undermines her own argument (of emphasizing only the employee’s 
perspective), as she conceptualizes mutuality as ‘a common understanding’, as 
an ‘agreement between worker and employer’ and also as ‘when both parties 
agree on the terms’ of the contract (Rousseau, 2004, p. 123). In her recent 
work, she emphasizes the issues of ‘shared information between the parties, 
and interactions that test their agreement’, in order to promote mutuality 
between employee and employer (Rousseau, 2011, p. 197). These excerpts 
manifestly point towards the inherent contradiction in her approach to the issue 
of agency. On the one hand, with a unilateral approach, she asserts to focus 
only on the employee’s perspective; on the other hand, she emphasizes issues 
(e.g. common understanding, shared information, agreement between 
employees and employer etc.) evidently pointing towards the need for 
acknowledging the employer’s viewpoint as well. Other researchers have also 
raised similar concerns about Rousseau’s unilateral conceptualization 
regarding the notion of agency (e.g. Boxall and Purcell, 2011; Conway and 
Briner, 2009; Guest et al., 2010; Shore et al., 2012).  
 
 
2A.10.1 Psychological contract with whom? 
The above discussion highlighted the significance of the bilateral 
conceptualization of the notion of agency. However, there is also the issue of 
whether the psychological contract is established between employees and the 
organization as a single entity, or between employees and the different agents 
of the organization. Marks (2001) argues that the idea that the psychological 
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contract ‘is solely a relationship between the individual and a single entity 
known as the organization, is clearly obsolete’ (p. 457). According to her, the 
notion of considering the psychological contract as a relationship between 
employee and the organization (rather than the different agents of the 
organization) is ‘problematic [because] although we know who the employee 
is, there is a problem understanding what is actually meant by “the 
organization”’ (Marks, 2001, p. 457, quotation marks in original). 
Furthermore, the organization cannot negotiate or communicate the contract 
on its own. Rather these are tasks of the employee’s line manager or the HR 
manager, who do so on behalf of the organization (Marks, 2001).  
 
The emphasis of Marks (2001) has intuitive resonance and provides support in 
avoiding the agency problem (i.e. the representation of the organization, 
discussed in the next section). However, this viewpoint is not completely 
compatible with the conceptualization of the majority of the psychological 
contract researchers (e.g. Conway and Briner, 2009; Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 
2007; Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; Guest et al., 2010; Rousseau, 2011; Shore 
et al., 2012). According to this prevailing conceptualization, employees largely 
perceive their psychological contracts as established with the organization. As 
emphasized by Conway and Briner (2009) ‘researchers have argued that 
employees somehow aggregate psychological contract messages 
communicated from principals, agents and practices that variously represent 
the organization … in order to arrive at a view of the organization as if it were 
a coherent single entity (p. 84).  
 
Furthermore, researchers generally acknowledge the role of the administrative 
contract makers or administrative agents (e.g. human resource policies, 
mission statements etc.) in terms of representing the organization or 
communicating the expectations of the organization (e.g. Chaudhry and 
Tekleab, 2013; Conway and Briner, 2009; Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; 
Shore et al., 2012; Wainwright and Sambrook, 2011; Wellin, 2012). Following 
the conceptualization of Marks (2001), it would be challenging to investigate 
the notion of employees’ psychological contracts established with these 
43 
 
different agents of the organization, as employees cannot plausibly establish 
their psychological contracts with these administrative agents.  
 
However, consistent with the Marks’s (2001) viewpoint, Conway and Briner 
(2009) argue that, even though employees perceive ‘the organization as the 
other party in the relationship’ (p. 84), nevertheless the organizations in turn 
cannot ‘have psychological contracts as such a notion would entail 
anthropomorphizing organizations and bring with it a range of problems, not 
least the problem of identifying how an organization could hold a set of 
subjective beliefs’ (p. 79). The diverging viewpoints of these researchers can 
be aligned by arguing that, even though employees establish their 
psychological contracts with the organization, the organization in turn cannot 
have psychological contract with employees. The role of the organization in 
this case (as the other party in the relationship) is mainly symbolic as an 
abstract entity (Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007). According to Conway and 
Briner (2009) and Shore et al. (2012), the focus needs to be on the 
organizational agents as contract makers who (on the basis of messages 
communicated to employees) represent the organization and principally shape 
employees’ psychological contracts established with the organization.  
 
2A.10.2 The representation of the organization 
As noted, employees (on the basis of messages communicated from the 
organizational agents) generally establish their psychological contracts with 
the organization. However, associated with this notion is the complex issue of 
the representation of the organization, i.e. ‘who represents the organization in 
the exchange relationship with the employee’ (Shore et al., 2012, p. 56). The 
concern of Shore et al. (2012) gains currency due to the noticeable differences 
among the researchers regarding this issue. For some researchers (e.g. Aselage 
and Eisenberger, 2003; Chen et al., 2008; Liden et al., 2004; Petersitzke, 2009; 
Tsui et al., 1997; Zagenczyk et al., 2011) these are the supervisors who 
represent the organization, while for others (e.g. Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler, 
2002; Porter et al., 1998; Shore et al., 2012; Tomprou and Nikolaou, 2011) 
these are the senior managers. Other researchers (e.g. Lee and Taylor, 2014; 
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Tekleab and Taylor, 2003; Tekleab et al., 2005) consider the immediate 
managers as the agents representing the organization. Other than supervisors, 
senior managers or immediate managers, some researchers (e.g. Conway and 
Monks, 2008; Guest, 2007; Guest and Conway, 2002a) have also focused on 
the role of human resource managers as the agents of the organization.    
 
In addition to the differences among the researchers regarding agency (i.e. the 
representation of the organization), another important issue is the lack of any 
empirical support provided by these researchers for their emphasis on these 
representatives as the agents of the organization. To the knowledge of the 
researcher, no empirical research has explicitly focused on defining any 
guideline for the identification of organizational agents. The researcher’s 
concern is echoed in Shore et al.’s (2012) remarks that ‘there is no research 
that explicitly asks employees who they have in mind (i.e. which 
organizational agents) when they answer questions about the EOR [employee 
organization relationship]’ (p. 30).  
 
The prevailing tendency has been to focus on the discussion of the 
complexities associated with the notion of agency rather than to empirically 
advance our understanding. For example, Rubery et al. (2010) posit that, in 
non-traditional types of employment such as agency employment, the actual 
employer is not clear, and therefore it is very challenging to identify 
organizational agents. The argument of Rubery et al. (2010) has logical appeal, 
but it needs to be acknowledged that the concept under scrutiny is a contract 
and the complications of ascertaining the organization’s side of the contract do 
not warrant ignoring the employer’s perspective.  
 
The need for better understanding of the representation of the organization also 
gains currency as it is largely associated with the development of the 
perceptions of contract breach among employees (Conway and Coyle-Shapiro, 
2012; Restubog et al., 2011). As argued by Conway and Briner (2009), the 
organization side is generally represented by a number of agents (e.g. 
supervisors, immediate managers, senior managers, HR managers etc.) 
Considering the diverse representation of the organization, there is a high 
45 
 
possibility that the representatives or agents may communicate different or 
even contradictory messages about the expectations of the organization 
(Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007). This may lead to inconsistency in employee 
and employer interpretations of the same contract, resulting in the perceptions 
of breach.  
 
Recognizing this issue, Shore et al. (2012) recommend consistency in the 
messages communicated by the different agents of the organization (including 
human resource policies and mission statements) to employees. According to 
Guest et al. (2010), we need to focus on more or less explicit deals that are re-
negotiated between employees and organizational agents over time. This re-
negotiation will be helpful in bringing about consistency in employee and 
employer interpretations of the contract, inhibiting the development of the 
perceptions of breach.  
 
2A.10.3 The issue of power asymmetry 
There is another important issue associated with the underplayed implications 
of the phenomenon of power. The notion of the psychological contract 
generally refers to social exchange theory in the context of the relationship 
between employees and the different representatives of the organization (e.g. 
Cassar and Briner, 2011; Chaudhry and Tekleab, 2013; Colquitt et al., 2013; 
Conway and Briner, 2009; Fox, 1974; Shore et al., 2012). From the 
perspective of social exchange, Blau (1964, p. 117) emphasizes the ‘inherently 
asymmetrical’ nature of power in the relationships between the exchange 
actors.  
 
Based on the conceptualization of Blau (1964) and other researchers (e.g. 
Cook et al., 2013; Guest et al., 2010; Mitchell et al., 2012; Molm, 2010), it is 
argued that power asymmetry between employees and organizational agents 
has been largely ignored in the study of the psychological contract because of 
the assumptions of mutuality and reciprocity, which imply power symmetry 
between the exchange actors (i.e. employees and the different agents of the 
organization). Endorsing this viewpoint, other researchers have also raised 
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concerns regarding the ignored implications of power asymmetry between 
employees and the different representatives or agents of the organization (e.g. 
Conway and Briner, 2009; Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; Guest et al., 2010; 
Shore et al., 2012).  
 
The viewpoint of these researchers largely echoes the concern of Cullinane 
and Dundon (2006, p. 119) that ‘… entering into a relationship with an 
employer, for the majority of employees, it means that they become 
subordinate to their employers’ power and authority, because it is employers 
who control and direct the productive resources of the enterprise’. The 
organizational representatives generally have a dominant influence in their 
interdependent relationships with employees as a result of their capacity to 
control the productive resources of the organization (Cullinane and Dundon, 
2006). Therefore, the exchange relationships between the majority of 
employees and organizational agents are largely based on the dynamics of 
power asymmetry or disproportionate interdependence, as employees are more 
dependent on the organizational rewards under the control of these 
representatives (Podsakoff et al., 2006; Rubin et al., 2010; Tremblay et al., 
2013).  
 
2A.11 The growing interest in the psychological contract 
The above discussion has highlighted several key limitations from the 
perspectives of mutuality, reciprocity and agency in the conceptualization of 
the psychological contract. However, none of the researchers, despite all their 
critiques, recommend abandoning the notion (e.g. Conway and Briner, 2009; 
Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; Guest et al., 2010; Meckler et al., 2003; 
Rousseau, 2011; Shore et al., 2012). According to Cullinane and Dundon 
(2006), ‘in spite of a number of serious conceptual and empirical limitations in 
the literature, the idea of a psychological contract remains extremely popular’ 
(p. 125). Similarly, Conway and Briner (2009, p. 71) maintain that over the 
last 20 years, there has been a ‘rapid increase in the number of journal articles, 
now several hundred, published on the subject. It has also over the same period 
had considerable appeal to managers and practitioners’.  
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There are a number of reasons for this growing interest in the concept of the 
psychological contract. First, the concept has ‘highly intuitive links with 
employment contracts’ (Conway and Briner, 2009, p. 71). Second, the notion 
of the psychological contract provides significant support for understanding 
the influences of micro and macro factors on employees’ subjective 
experiences of work (Wellin, 2012). Third, based on the notion of breach, the 
psychological contract theory contributes distinctively to our knowledge of 
exchange in the domain of employment (Conway and Briner, 2009; Restubog 
et al., 2011). Fourth, because of its assumption of dynamic and ongoing 
exchange, the psychological contract is distinguished ‘from many other 
organizational psychology theories that tend to focus on simple cause–effect 
relationships or include attitudinal constructs that provide little insight into 
everyday work experience and behavior’ (Conway and Briner, 2009, p. 72). 
 
Conway and Briner’s (2009) view is endorsed through the application of the 
concept to a number of other relationship dyads outside the domain of 
employment. Examples of these studies include IT outsourcing inter-firm 
relationships (Koh et al., 2004), seller–buyer relationships in online markets 
(Pavlou and Gefen, 2005), customer relationships and corporate reputation 
(MacMillan et al., 2005), buyer–supplier relationships in the motor industry 
(Kingshott, 2006), salesperson–customer relationships during product return 
transactions (Autry et al., 2007), service provider–customer relationships 
(Schneider and Bowen, 1999), relationships between landlords and tenants 
(Radford and Larwood, 1982), relationships between students and professors 
(Taras and Steel, 2007), and advisor–student relationships (Bordia et al., 
2010).  
 
The significance of the notion of the psychological contract also stems from 
the limitations of formal employment contracts. Suazo et al. (2011) posit that 
no formal or legal contract can cover all aspects of employment. According to 
Deakin (2004, p. 203) ‘the substantive meaning of the contract of employment 
is not made clear by statute’. This substantive meaning, however, depends 
upon the subjective interpretations of the employment contract and is 
48 
 
discussed under the concept of the psychological contract (Shore et al., 2012; 
Suazo et al., 2011; Wellin, 2012). This capacity to examine the subjective 
elements of the employment relationship experienced by employees on daily 
basis is, therefore, a key strength of the psychological contract (Conway and 
Briner, 2009; Shore et al., 2012).  
 
2A.12 The relevance and applicability of the psychological contract  
literature for the current study 
The first part (A) of the literature review mainly focused on the critical 
evaluation of the psychological contract literature. At the concluding stage of 
this part, it is pertinent to evaluate the relevance and applicability of the 
psychological contract literature for the current study, which is based on a 
Pakistani context. Addressing this issue is vital, as the relevant literature has 
been largely developed in Western societies. Hui et al. (2004) previously 
raised this issue during their study, principally aimed at investigating the 
generalizability of the psychological contract literature to Asian societies. 
They considered ‘whether it is possible to study in a meaningful way worker–
employer relationships in such societies [non-western societies of developing 
Asian countries] using approaches derived from more developed countries’ 
(Hui et al., 2004, p. 311).  
 
Conway and Briner (2009), endorsing the affirmative findings of Hui et al. 
(2004), argue that the ‘psychological contract studies have been conducted 
across many different occupational groups and national contexts and these 
generally support the main predictions of psychological contract theory’ (p. 
72). This view is further supported by a number of empirical studies with 
results endorsing the generalizability of the concept in non-western Asian 
societies. A few examples of these studies are India (Aggarwal and Bhargava, 
2014), China (Chen et al., 2008; Hui et al., 2004), Hong Kong (Westwood et 
al., 2001), Japan (Thomas et al., 2003), Taiwan (Chen and Kao, 2012) and 
South Korea (Kim and Choi, 2010).  
  
The case of Pakistan is similar. Raja et al. (2004, pp. 363–64), consistent with 
the later endorsement of Sajid et al. (2011) and Bashir and Nasir (2013), posit 
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that ‘in planning the study, we considered but did not find any reason to expect 
that our predictions, based on Western research, would not apply in Pakistan. 
Having conducted the study, we had no specific experiences that violated this 
expectation.’ Based on the observation of Conway and Briner (2009) and the 
supporting empirical evidence from these non-western countries including 
Pakistan, it can be argued that the psychological contract literature has 
established relevance and applicability in the non-western context and can be 
safely used for the purpose of investigation in the current study.  
 
The first part (A) of the literature review mainly focused on the critical 
evaluation of the psychological contract literature. The discussion now 
proceeds to the second part (B) of the literature review. It focuses primarily on 
the notion of power as in part A, the concept of power is generally discussed 
from the perspective of its underplayed implications in the domain of the 
psychological contract. The discussion presents different conceptualizations of 
power and finally proceeds to the notion of power followed in the current 
study.  
 
2B Power  
Conceptualizing power has long been debated in social sciences. A researcher 
may be mesmerized by the divergence of the different approaches as, 
according to Lukes (2005, p. 30), power is an ‘essentially contested’ concept. 
These conceptualizations have mostly been far from sharing a common ground 
(Fleming and Spicer, 2014). The aim of this part is to provide a detailed 
critical overview of the different conceptualizations of power. Based on this 
detailed overview, the conceptualization of power opted for the purpose of the 
current study is presented towards the end of the part. 
 
2B.1 Lukes and the three dimensions of power 
A major contribution to the debate in the social sciences about the 
conceptualization of power is made by Steven Lukes’ (1974) influential book, 
‘Power: A Radical View’. Developed as a critique of the preceding 
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theorizations of power by Dahl (1957) and Bachrach and Baratz (1962), the 
book itself has spawned many critiques and academic commentaries in the last 
four decades (Fleming and Spicer, 2014). Based on these critiques, Lukes 
reconsidered his original notion of power and presented an updated 
theorization in the second edition of his book (Lukes, 2005). This section aims 
to make a critical evaluation of Lukes’ notion of power in relation to Dahl’s 
one-dimensional and Bachrach and Baratz’s two-dimensional view of power.  
 
2B.2 Dahl’s one-dimensional view of power – coercion 
According to Lukes (1974, 2005), Dahl’s (1957) notion of power is one 
dimensional in which ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do’ (pp. 202-3). This involves making 
decisions and enforcing them directly upon other actors. Actors, the objects 
and subjects in the relationship of power, as postulated by Dahl (1957), may 
comprise individuals, groups, other human aggregates, offices, roles, 
governments or nation-states. Dahl’s (1957) notion of power has several 
features. First, power is considered as episodic, i.e. based on actual and visible 
episodes of behaviour producing empirically observable effects. Second, 
power is causal, i.e. A causes B to do something against B’s interests. Third, 
power is situational, i.e. A may have power over B in some but not necessarily 
in all situations (Fleming and Spicer, 2014). According to Lukes (2005), 
Dahl’s (1957) definition appears to be primarily influenced by the assumption 
of direct coercion. This coercion is based on the exercise of power, which is 
considered as a property of the powerful actor ‘A’, engaged in a situation of 
conflict with a dominated actor ‘B’.  
 
Parallels may be drawn between the conceptualization of Dahl (1957) and 
French and Raven (1960), as according to them power is the ‘potential ability 
of one group or person to influence another within a given system’ (p. 609). 
Based on this definition, it can be argued that the theorization of French and 
Raven (1959, 1960) also conceptualizes power mainly as a property of actors. 
In a similar way to Dahl (1957), French and Raven consider that these actors 
(individuals or groups) are generally conceived as able to exercise their powers 
51 
 
independently from the countering influences of the other actors or the 
limitations imposed by the structures in which they are interacting. As a result 
of the underlying assumptions, Clegg (1990) draws an analogy between Dahl’s 
(1957) notion of power and classical notions of mechanics that are 
characterized by the assumption that bodies may perform their operations 
independently from any external influences. Dahl’s (1957) viewpoint, 
therefore, may be considered as highly mechanical and static, as it is largely 
based on the assumption of power as a property of particular actors whose 
actions are not influenced by the limitations imposed by other actors or by the 
structural settings.  
 
Based on these underlying assumptions, Dahl’s empiricist view of power is 
subject to several criticisms. First, this coercive approach tends to depict 
power as a quantitative commodity held by the actors (Crozier, 1972). In this 
approach power is generally considered to exist only in observable and overt 
actions. This behavioral approach may deflect attention from analyzing the 
relatively subtle forms of power that are generally exercised behind the scenes 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). Furthermore, the assumption of coercion largely 
depicts a negative view of power, deflecting attention from its productive 
aspects. Finally, a coercion-based approach may constrain the focus to the 
intended consequences of the exercise of power. This may result in the 
potential oversight of many unintended consequences related to the exercise of 
power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Wrong, 1968). For instance ‘a managerial 
decision may aim to force employees to work harder, but also impact on their 
family and private lives’ (Fleming and Spicer, 2007, p. 16). Summarizing this 
view of power, Lukes (1974, 2005) argues that Dahl’s (1957) theorization is 
one-dimensional as it is largely based on the sole dimension of coercion i.e. 
getting the other person to do something that he or she would not have done 
otherwise. 
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2B.3 Bachrach and Baratz’s two-dimensional view of power – 
manipulation 
Unlike the one dimensional view (Dahl, 1957) based only on exercise of 
power in situations of observable conflict and confined to the domain of 
decision making, Bachrach and Baratz (1962) posit that power is associated 
not only with direct decisions but also with non-decisions in terms of 
manipulating the background rules of the game. Without rejecting the 
importance of the exercise of power in situations of observable conflict, 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1970) emphasize the less visible face of power, 
which keeps some actors and their interests excluded from the decision-
making processes. According to them, power is not only exercised: 
 
when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power 
is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing 
social and political values and institutional practices that limit the 
scope of the political process to public consideration of only those 
issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. 
(Bacharach and Baratz, 1962, p. 948)  
 
According to Fleming and Spicer (2014), the manipulative power posited by 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963) comprises three processes, which 
systematically eliminate some issues from the political discourse. First, the 
anticipation of the results: this is when actors anticipate the possible 
expressions of power in future and, therefore, comply with what they consider 
as aligned with the desires of the powerful. Second, the mobilization of bias: at 
this stage, some issues are organized into decision-making activities while 
others are organized out. In other words, those issues that do not concur with 
the interests of the dominant groups are dismissed from the deliberation 
process. The third and final process is institutionalized rule-and-norm making, 
rendering some issues as non-decisions. This occurs when certain issues are 
prevented from surfacing because they counter the established and taken-for-
granted rules and specifications. This practice ultimately results in the 
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exclusion of perfectly feasible propositions and options that do not conform to 
the established rules and norms.  
 
Bachrach and Baratz (1970) argue that power relations generally lead to 
conflict between actors. For them, if ‘there is no conflict, overt or covert, the 
presumption must be that there is consensus on the prevailing allocation of 
values, in which case non-decision- making is impossible’ (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1970, p. 49). The conflict according to them is between the interests of 
those who are excluded from a hearing within a political system and those who 
are engaged in non-decision-making. They further emphasize that in a 
situation of consensus (i.e. absence of conflict) it is not possible ‘to determine 
empirically whether the consensus is genuine or instead has been enforced 
through non-decision-making’ (Bacharach and Baratz, 1970, p. 49).  
 
At this point, a limitation can be noted in the notion of Bachrach and Baratz. 
Their conceptualization is mainly based on the dimension of non-decision-
making in addition to the previously discussed dimension of decision-making 
by Dahl (1974). However, it is very difficult to analyze their key assumption 
of non-decision-making if there is no conflict, because it is not possible to 
know whether this consensus is genuine or imposed by the powerful. Bachrach 
and Baratz (1970), acknowledging this limitation, posit that ‘the analysis of 
this problem is beyond the reach of a political analyst and perhaps can only be 
fruitfully analyzed by a philosopher’ (p. 49).  
 
The manipulation view of power of Bacharach and Baratz (1962) develops our 
understanding beyond mere coercion. However, it is very challenging to 
empirically and logically support the two-dimensional approach (Fleming and 
Spicer, 2014). This argument is consistent with the emphasis of Merelman 
(1968) and Wolfinger (1971) that, as manipulation drives us away from the 
directly observable behaviours, it is, therefore, difficult to empirically 
investigate Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962) conceptualization of power. Lukes 
(1974, 2005) also makes several criticisms of the manipulation view of power. 
Power, according to Bachrach and Baratz (1962), is explained in terms of 
decisions and non-decisions. They argue that the inclusion of non-decisions 
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adds another dimension to the conceptualization of power by moving the 
analytical focus beyond the behaviouralist approach based only on the 
dimension of decision-making. However, Lukes (1974, 2005) argues that 
Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962) approach is also based on behaviouralism 
(modified behaviouralism) because preventing some issues from being 
included in the decision-making process (non-decisions) is itself a form of 
decision. Lukes (1974, 2005), therefore, asserts that the issue of non-decisions 
remains largely unresolved in the discussion of Bachrach and Baratz.  
 
Lukes (2005) goes on to argue that the view of power as manipulation largely 
focuses on the behaviour of the powerful actors while ignoring the broader 
structural issues. Finally, the manipulative approach to power considers the 
absence of grievance in a similar way as the absence of conflict. This largely 
stems from the processes that structure our wishes so that we may not even 
desire to communicate our grievances, which ultimately result in preventing 
conflict from arising in the decision-making processes. Lukes (1974, 2005), 
however, argues that, rather than preventing conflict from arising in the first 
place, power is more concerned with the domination of the preferences of the 
powerful actors.  
 
2B.4 Lukes’ third dimension of power – domination 
Dahl (1957) conceptualizes power as direct coercion, while Bachrach and 
Baratz (1962) consider power as manipulation. In comparison, Lukes (1974, 
2005) identifies power as domination. While acknowledging the theorization 
of Dahl (1957, 1961) and Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963, 1970) as key 
conceptual dimensions for the analysis and understanding of power, Lukes 
(1974, 2005) attempts to develop another dimension, which, he argues, is 
neglected in the work of these theorists. For him, this dimension of power 
shapes actors’ attitudes and preferences in a way that is counter to their own 
interests.  
 
Lukes (2005) defines the notion of domination as ‘the ability to bring about 
significant outcomes ... whenever it furthers, or does not harm, the interests of 
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the powerful and bears negatively on the interests of those subject to it’ (p. 
86). He emphasizes that decision making and non-decision making are not the 
most important issues in the exercise of organizational power. Rather, for him, 
power is embedded in the development and imposition of paradigmatic 
frameworks within which decision-making is defined (Brown, 1988). These 
paradigmatic frameworks largely result in the development of wants and 
preferences in the dominated actors that are antithetical to their own interests 
(Fleming and Spicer, 2014; Ranson et al., 1980).  
 
Lukes’s (1974, 2005) third dimension of power is largely based on challenging 
the assumption that actors can determine and express their real interests. Lukes 
claims that, due to the influence of institutional practices and social forces, 
actors may develop a false consciousness. This false consciousness may 
restrain actors’ minds in such a way that they may hardly be able to recognize 
(let alone communicate and struggle for) their real interests. Lukes (2005) 
further explains his viewpoint as 
 
is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent 
people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their 
perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept 
their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or 
imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural or 
unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and 
beneficial.  
(p. 24) 
 
The third dimension of power by Lukes (1974, 2005) extends our 
understanding of power relations in organizations beyond coercion (Dahl, 
1957) and manipulation (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) in several ways. First, it 
brings into focus not only the manifest or existing conflict but also highlights 
the issue of potential or latent conflict. This resonates with one of the most 
insidious patterns of politics, ensuring that conflict does not arise in the first 
place. According to Lukes (1974, 2005) conflict does not arise because we are 
so deeply immersed in a particular view of the world that we see nothing 
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illegitimate or wrong with it. Second, it draws attention to how some topics are 
legitimized (generally through shaping ideologies and mental schemas) while 
others are not even considered. Finally, Lukes emphasizes that power involves 
situations in which, although individuals are in a position to make their 
decisions freely, nonetheless their interests may be betrayed. For him, under 
the influence of this third dimension of power as domination, individuals may 
act in a manner that is antithetical to their own real interests.   
 
It is important to highlight that, in the Lukes’ notion of power, the absence of 
actual conflict is not equivalent to a genuine consensus. Lukes argues that 
conflict would still continue to exist but in the form of latent or potential 
conflict. According to him, there would remain a contradiction between the 
interests of the powerful actors exercising power and the real interests of the 
dominated actors. The dominated actors are, however, unable to identify their 
real interests because their preferences, perceptions and cognitions are shaped 
by the powerful actors through broad social forces. This largely results in the 
development of a false consciousness which prevents the dominated actors 
from identifying their real interests. If, at a later stage, these dominated actors 
are somehow able to discover their real interests, they may recognize that their 
real interests are being unmet in the current order. Consequently, these now 
enlightened actors would be able to discern their real interests accurately, 
express them publicly and ultimately change their policy preferences. At this 
stage, after the discovery of their real interests by the dominated actors, the 
(until then) potential or latent conflict would transform into an actual conflict.  
 
The domination approach of Lukes (1974, 2005) makes a significant 
contribution to the debate on power. However, it is not immune to several 
criticisms. First, although the assumption of real interests is at the core of 
Lukes’ theorization, it is at the same time the source of problems within this 
theory. For him, determination of real interests is something beyond the scope 
of analytical explanation, as they will differ according to whether one is 
investigating power from a liberal, a reformist, or a radical perspective. To 
circumvent this ambiguity, he further argues that the identification of the real 
interests generally depends on the empirically supportable or rejectable 
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hypothesis. However, he does not go further to explain his viewpoint by giving 
an example of such a hypothesis (Fleming and Spicer, 2014). Lukes (1974) 
also acknowledges that the assumption of real interests is susceptible in terms 
of its possible misuse as a ‘paternalist license for tyranny’ (p. 37). Second, as 
also recognized by Lukes (2005), his view of power is based mainly on 
inaction rather than observable action. It is, therefore, very difficult to 
empirically investigate the power relationships among the actors.  
 
Third, as Clegg (1989) emphasizes, we need to be wary of the assumption of 
objective interests because it fails to acknowledge that interests are politically 
contingent and divergent within groups. This implies that the researcher can 
identify real interests and distinguish them from distorted or the fake interests. 
Fourth, this view of power ignores the productive aspects of power by 
focusing only on the negative dimensions such as prohibiting, repressing and 
constraining (Fleming and Spicer, 2014). Consequently, this guides us towards 
a view of power in which the powerless participate in the process of their own 
subjugation (Knights and Willmott, 1989). Finally, the underlying assumption 
of power remains unchanged i.e. A affecting B in a way that is contrary to B’s 
interests. Lukes’ notion of different dimensions focuses on different ways in 
which one actor affects the other; however, the locus of analysis as A affecting 
B largely remains unchallenged among all these views. Power, by the end, still 
remains a property of the actors and is largely explained in individualistic 
terms (Clegg, 1989, 2006). 
 
 
 
2B.5 Overlapping nature of Lukes’ notion of power 
Isaac (1987) argues that Lukes’ ‘similarities with his predecessors outweigh 
his differences’ (p. 13). Similarly, Ribeiro (2003) posits that, although Lukes 
(1974, 2005) asserts the distinct nature of his view of power, the notions of 
power by Dahl (1957), Bachrach & Baratz (1962) and Lukes (1974) share 
some fundamental underlying assumptions. First, all of them are based on the 
effects that are caused by the exercise of power rather than the nature of power 
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itself. Lukes (1974) acknowledges that the three dimensions of power ‘can be 
seen as alternative interpretations and applications of one and the same 
underlying concept of power, according to which A exercises power over B 
when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests’ (p. 30). According to 
Clegg (1989), even though there are differences in terms of whether the power 
is associated more with a particular agent (for pluralists and elitists) or with a 
broader system (Lukes) and also in context of whether power is exercised 
more visibly (for pluralists) or less visibly (for elitists and Lukes), the focus in 
all three dimensions is on the effects caused by the exercise of power.  
 
The second common feature among the three dimensions of power is the 
assumption that power is or can be located in a particular entity. According to 
Clegg (1989), it is possible to identify the location of power for all three 
dimensions in a certain entity. For pluralists (Dahl, 1974), power can be 
located in the visible, sovereign and diversified interest group (e.g. individuals, 
human aggregates, governments, nation-states etc.) which prevail in situations 
of observable conflict. In the case of elitists (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962), 
power appears to be located among the relatively less visible minority of elites, 
who prevail by preventing the topics of conflict from becoming a part of the 
political discourse. In the case of Lukes, power can be located among the 
society’s ruling class, which prevails by preventing conflict from arising in the 
first place through shaping the ideologies of the subjugated classes.  
 
The third common feature among all three dimensions is the emphasis on the 
negative view of power. According to this view, actor A generally exercises 
power over actor B in a way that is ‘contrary to B’s interests’ (Lukes, 1974, p. 
30). This highlights the underlying assumption of the notion of ‘power over’ in 
all three dimensions. Furthermore, this promotes the zero-sum 
conceptualization of power in which the interests of one actor are achieved 
through the losses of the other actor. This win–lose scenario is manifest in all 
three dimensions. In the case of pluralists, a plurality of powerful actors 
generally wins on the basis of the losses of the plurality of powerless actors. 
For elitists, a minority elite wins by excluding the interests of the majority 
from the decision–making process. Finally, in case of Lukes (1974), the ruling 
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class of the society wins by shaping the ideologies of the other classes and 
preventing conflict from arising in the first place.  
 
2B.6 Lukes’ (re)conceptualization of power 
Lukes’ (1974) notion of power is subject to several criticisms based on its 
noticeable similarities with the prior work of Dahl (1957) and Bachrach and 
Baratz (1962). As a result, Lukes made some corrections in his 2005 work. He 
acknowledged that his previous work was based on ‘a very partial and one-
sided account’ of the notion of power (Lukes, 2005, p. 64). Consequently, he 
offered three modified perspectives (i.e. power as a capacity, negative view of 
power and location of power) in his later book, which are discussed below.  
 
2B.6.1  Power as a capacity 
First, Lukes (2005, p. 109) acknowledged that in his previous work he 
mistakenly committed the ‘exercise fallacy’, i.e. power exists only if it is 
exercised. Lukes (2005) reconsidered his viewpoint and argued that power is 
‘an ability or capacity, which may or may not even be exercised’ (p. 109). 
Therefore, Lukes (2005) advanced his conceptualization from the assumption 
of power over (i.e. power of an actor ‘A’ which is exercised over the other 
actor ‘B’) to the notion of power to (i.e. as a capacity to achieve some effects). 
The notion of power as a capacity, however, depicts the essence of power from 
a realist perspective. This realist perspective ultimately recommends following 
a deterministic stance in which power as a capacity ensures certain pre-
determined outcomes (Fleming and Spicer, 2014).  
 
This determinism underlying the realist notion of power as a capacity to 
achieve certain pre-determined outcomes, has been criticized in the social 
sciences. For example, Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998) argue that ‘actors 
may have intentions concerning outcomes, and may mobilize resources or 
engage in the management of meaning with the idea of achieving them, but 
pulling these “strings” of power does not necessarily produce these desired 
outcomes’ (p. 458, quotation marks in original). Similarly, Ribeiro (2003) 
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argues that in the social world ‘powers are not covered by [universal, physical] 
laws, but rather are fixed in and through rules that are enacted by individuals 
who participate in social relations. But individuals, unlike inert materials, may 
always choose to respond otherwise – that is, by reference to different sets of 
rules’ (p. 63).  
 
2B.6.2  Negative view of power 
In addition to the exercise fallacy, Lukes (2005) considered the predominantly 
negative view of power as a second limitation in his previous work. Rather 
than assuming power from a zero-sum perspective (Lukes, 1974), he later 
conceptualized power as a positive, non-zero sum game which ‘may 
sometimes favour, or at least not disfavour, the interests of those who are 
subject to it’ (Lukes, 2005, p. 84). Therefore, power can be facilitative and 
positive in terms of promoting the interests of the other actors. Clegg et al. 
(2006), however, argue that the view of power as positive or facilitative is 
strictly contingent as ‘for some people the effect may be positive while for 
others it will be negative’ depending on ‘the contingent position of the agents 
involved in the relation’ (p. 191). Clegg et al. (2006) further explain this 
viewpoint as, for example the power to overthrow tyrants will be certainly 
considered as negative by the former tyrants but as positive by those liberated.  
 
2B.6.3  Location of power  
Finally, Lukes (2005) attempted to distance himself from the view that power 
can be located in particular agents (i.e. As that have power in comparison to 
Bs). Clegg et al. (2006), however, argue that, even though Lukes (2005) 
further developed his conceptualization by focusing on the effects of a broad 
system rather than particular agents (i.e. As and Bs), he still views power as 
being in one single location i.e. the society’s ruling class. Therefore, the issue 
of the location of power is not radically revisited, as the location is still 
determinable in the society’s ruling class. Lukes (2005) conceptualization also 
lacks the critical assumption of power as a relational phenomenon, necessary 
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to deal with the interdependency, complexity and unpredictability inherent in 
social relations. 
 
Clegg et al. (2006) also highlight the issue of the lack of relational dimension 
in Lukes’ (2005) conceptualization because of its predominant focus on the 
assumption of power as a phenomenon which can be located in particular 
agents. For them ‘power should not be seen as concentrated in particular 
organizations, institutions or the resources they have available to them’ 
because ‘power is above all a relational effect, not a property that can be held 
by someone or something’ (Clegg et al., 2006, p. 223). This emphasis is 
consistent with the argument of Allen (2003) that power emerges as a 
relational effect of social interaction. Thus, the notion of power (rather than as 
a resource or a capacity of particular agents) can be considered as a relational 
phenomenon embedded in the relationships between the agents (Clegg et al., 
2006). Clegg et al. (2006, pp. 221–2) further argue that Lukes’ (2005) notion 
of power is rather static and supports the ‘structural view of organizations in 
their timelessness and motionlessness ... so we need to move towards a more 
relational view of power ... in which structure regulates the relations (and their 
settings) that produce–reproduce–transform such structures.’  
 
 
2B.7 Hindess’s critique of the dimensional view of power 
Hindess (1982) also makes a critical evaluation of Lukes’ (1974) dimensional 
view of power. According to him, the main issue is the assumption of power as 
a capacity. He argues that the dimensional view has interpreted power not only 
as a simple capacity, but also as a quantitative capacity that can be 
apprehended by the particular actors. This view promotes ‘a sense of 
determinism’ in conceptualizing power as a physical force (e.g. military 
power) suggesting that, in the event of conflict, the actors with more power 
will always prevail over the less powerful actors (Hindess, 1996, p. 138). He 
denies the idea that, in the social world, power has the ‘capacity to secure’ 
because ‘first the means of actions of agents are dependent on conditions that 
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are not in their hands. Secondly, the deployment of these means of action 
invariably confronts obstacles, which often include the opposing practices of 
others. Success in overcoming those obstacles cannot in general be 
guaranteed’ (Hindess, 1982, pp. 500–01).  
 
Hindess (1996) then argues that the dimensional view discusses power and its 
consequences as counterfactuals, i.e. it makes some actors do something that 
they otherwise would not have done, or it prevents some actors in a power 
relationship from doing or thinking what they otherwise might have done or 
thought. For him, the conception of power as a mere capacity does not help us, 
as this approach is largely confined to the view of realizing an actor’s will at 
the expense of the will of other actors. According to him, this approach to 
power as a capacity does not allow for the emergence of unpredictable conflict 
(Hindess, 1996). As a result, this further inhibits the recognition and analysis 
of the associated strategies and tactics deployed by the actors in order to cope 
with that (unpredictable) conflict. Consequently, even though this dimensional 
view of power, ensuring predictability, is unable to offer prediction because of 
its inability to acknowledge the unpredictable conflict. Hindess (1996), 
therefore, argues that the quantitative view of power as a capacity does not 
have the analytical and predictive capabilities it claims.  
 
Lukes (1974) posits that ‘power is one of the concepts which is ineradicably 
value-dependent’ (p. 26). Hindess (1976), however, argues that the appeal to 
values leads to a serious theoretical weakness in the Lukes’ (1974) 
conceptualization of power. This is because the analysis of the power relations 
will: 
 
therefore depend not only on the situation of action but also the values 
of the investigator. One would need to be extraordinarily fortunate in 
one’s choice of values for the consequences of one’s action to bear any 
relation to one’s value-laden estimate of those consequences.  
 
(Hindess, 1976, p. 330).  
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Based on this assumption, the investigations of power relations are not only 
dependent on the conflict but are also influenced by the idiosyncratic values of 
the investigator. The findings of these investigations, therefore, ‘cannot be 
evaluated on theoretical and empirical grounds’ and would largely be 
considered as ‘ad hoc empirical generalizations' that will be of ‘little value’ 
with ‘no practical utility’ (Hindess, 1976, pp. 330, 331).    
 
Hindess (1996) argues that the assumption regarding real interests as 
something that may or may not be recognized poses another serious theoretical 
challenge to the Lukes (1974) view of power. Lukes (1974) insists ‘on the 
empirical basis for defining real interests. The identification of these [the 
interests of B] is not up to A, but to B, exercising choice under conditions of 
relative autonomy and, in particular, independently of A’s power – e.g. 
through democratic participation’ (p. 33). Hindess (1976), however, argues 
that Lukes’ (1974) view of power has little practical implications as it invokes 
‘a utopian state of democratic participation in which people really know their 
real interests’ (p. 330).  
 
Hindess criticizes the term ‘real’ as used in relation to interests. For him, 
interests (as objectives or concerns of the agents), rather than being based on 
relative autonomy and democratic participation, are shaped by the conditions 
in which the actors are engaged in the ongoing struggles (Hindess, 1982). 
Therefore, the interests, rather than being considered independently of the 
particular conditions of the struggle (as implicit in Lukes’ dimensional view of 
power), are largely developed and changed in the course of the struggle. Based 
on this argument, Hindess (1996) emphasizes that the capacity–outcome 
conceptions of power, conceived independently of the conditions of struggle, 
are fundamentally mistaken. For him, ‘it is rather a matter of the successful 
deployment of resources and means of action in the context of particular 
conditions of struggle, not all of which are in the hands of the agent in 
question’ (Hindess, 1982, p. 509).  
 
In summary, Hindess (1976, 1982, 1996) argues that the notions of power to 
and power over are both based on the single conception of power as a 
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quantitative capacity, i.e. the capacity to achieve certain desirable outcomes by 
the sovereign powerful actors. For him, power should not be viewed as a 
capacity that unproblematically promotes the interests and objectives of the 
powerful actors. Rather than assuming it to be a mechanical and static 
phenomenon (i.e. power possessed by certain actors, which they can exercise 
independently of the constraints imposed by their conditions of struggle), 
power needs to be conceived in dynamic structural arrangements as an 
ongoing struggle on different levels between particular agents (i.e. interests, 
objectives, individuals, groups etc.) interacting through relational 
interdependencies.  
 
2B.8 Foucault’s view of power – subjectification 
Generally considered as the fourth dimension of power, ‘the notion of 
subjectification suggests that power may run deeper than ideology’ (Fleming 
and Spicer, 2014, p. 267). Mainly attributed to the influential work of Michel 
Foucault, the notion of subjectification is largely based on producing voluntary 
compliance from the subjects of power. Rather than focusing on coercion or 
decision–making (as well as non-decision–making), or preventing conflict 
from arising in the first place, the subjectification view of power emphasizes 
the ‘constitution of the very person who makes decisions’ (Fleming and 
Spicer, 2007, p. 23). According to Foucault (1977), subjectification operates 
through defining the structural conditions that determine how we experience 
ourselves as people.  
 
For him, ‘power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects 
and rituals of truth. The individual and knowledge that may be gained of him 
belong to this production’ (Foucault, 1977, p. 194). Foucault (1977) further 
argues that productive power relations are entrenched in the micro-political 
techniques that are diffused throughout society in different forms of 
knowledge. As a result, ‘power reaches into the very grain of individuals, 
touches their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives’ (Foucault, 
1980, p. 39). Foucault, while explaining his notion of power, focuses on the 
role of the technologies through which voluntary compliance is achieved. For 
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him these structures of control producing voluntary compliance stem from the 
codified knowledge that ensures disciplinary effects.  
 
Based on Foucault’s view, Deetz (1992a) argues that discipline is ‘a 
configuration of power inserted as a way of thinking, acting and instituting. 
The disciplined member of the organization wants on his or her own what the 
corporation wants’ (p. 42). Advancing his discussion of subjectification, 
Foucault refers to the notion of governmentality, which is ‘the conduct of the 
conduct: a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of 
some person or persons’ (Gordon, 1991, p. 2). This leads to a process of self-
government, in which the exercise of external power is not required. Rather, 
the individuals maintain control of themselves through auto-monitoring 
behaviours (Fleming and Spicer, 2014).  
 
Foucault (1977) identifies the critical role of dominant discourses in the case 
of subjectification. Discourses may be defined as ‘the structured collection of 
texts embodied in the practices of talking and writing (as well as a wide 
variety of visual representation and cultural artefacts) that bring 
organizationally related objects into being as these texts are produced, 
disseminated and consumed’ (Grant et al, 2004, p. 3). These discourses are 
critical as they are subjectively absorbed by the workers, influencing their 
thinking about themselves and their co-workers (Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992). 
According to Fleming and Spicer (2007), the vital issue is the ‘internalization 
of surveillance, so that employees monitor themselves and peers’ (p. 24). This 
results in the creation of individualized employees from the constant scrutiny 
of a panopticon gaze, which reaches the core of every member’s subjectivity, 
developing an environment which ensures self-management (Sewell and 
Wilkinson, 1992).  
 
Foucault’s work contributed to the notion of power by shifting the focus of 
researchers from the macro to the micro aspects of the power relationships in 
organizations. However, there are several criticisms of the subjectification 
approach by Foucault. Foucault places a disproportionate emphasis on the all-
encompassing nature of power, while ignoring the issue of human freedom and 
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agency (Fleming and Spicer, 2014). This ultimately downplays how the 
subjects of power, in the Foucault’s conceptualization, act against the 
disciplinary practices and dominant discourses (Ackroyd and Thompson, 
1999). Consequently, the relevant research, with an approach of the complete 
subordination of the workers, generally ignores the notion of human agency 
emerging from employees’ attempts of independent sense making and 
resistance (Beirne et al., 2004; Callagan and Thompson, 2001). While not 
applicable to all investigations based on Foucault’s conceptualization, the 
subjectification approach generally downplays the issue of resistance in 
organizations (Wray-Bliss, 2002). For example, Dick and Cassell (2002), 
Alvesson and Willmott (2002), and Thomas and Davies (2005) in their 
investigations found that employees, through constructing counter-discourses, 
may develop alternative notions of self in order to resist the attempts of 
complete subjectification by the employer. 
 
Hindess (1996) argues that Foucault’s treatment of power is parallel to ‘the 
work of Weber’ (p. 146). Fleming and Spicer (2014, p. 272) raise a similar 
concern that the notion of subjectification ‘frequently relies on a coercive 
backdrop in order to function ... through laying down the background rules of 
the game’ that the subjects of power must abide by. Another criticism of the 
fourth dimension of power as subjectification is the reduction of all the aspects 
of social life to the technology driven structures in terms of social engineering. 
Consequently, ‘there is little room for reflections about a future emancipatory 
freedom in this cold vision of organization’ (Fleming and Spicer, 2007, p. 26).  
 
2B.9 Emerson’s theory of mutual dependence 
The work of Richard Emerson is also considered as a significant contribution 
to the conceptualization of power (Cook et al., 2013; Molm, 2010). Extending 
the discussions of prominent researchers in the context of social exchange (e.g. 
Homans, 1961; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959 and Blau, 1964), Emerson (1972a, b) 
published his work as the power–dependence theory. Based on his earlier work 
in 1962, Emerson emphasized the notion of mutual dependence in the 
relationship among the exchange actors. Emerson’s work can be 
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acknowledged for two major contributions to the notion of power. First, in his 
theory ‘power is treated explicitly as relational, not simply the property of a 
given actor’ (Cook et al., 2013, p. 64). Second, in contrast to the assumptions 
of ‘power to’ and ‘power over’, Emerson (1972a, b) conceptualizes power 
from the perspective of ‘actors’ mutual dependence’ (Molm, 2006, p. 31).  
 
In his conceptualization of power, Emerson originally focused on the dyadic 
relations i.e. the A – B dyad (Molm, 2010). Realizing this limitation, he later 
extended the focus to larger social networks, comprising different structures 
based on relations between the actors (Cook et al., 2013). The concept of 
exchange networks beyond dyadic exchanges ‘allowed power–dependence 
theory to bridge the gap between micro and macro levels of analysis more 
successfully than its predecessors’ (Molm, 2006, pp. 31–2). According to 
Emerson (1972a), all the exchange relations in larger networks are developed 
within the structures of mutual dependence, i.e. between actors who are 
dependent on one another.  
 
Emerson (1972a, b) further emphasized that the more balanced (imbalanced) 
the actors’ dependencies are on each other, the more equal (unequal) will be 
the distribution of benefits for the actors in that exchange relationship. 
Moreover, since actors in exchange relationships are motivated to maximize 
their benefits and minimize their losses, conditions of power among the actors 
are rarely stable (Emerson, 1972b). Emerson also argued that it is not only the 
actors but also the structures (comprising the exchange relationships 
characterized by actors’ mutual dependence) that enable or constrain the 
specific types of exchange between the actors (Cook et al., 2013).  
  
According to Molm (2007, 2010), Emerson’s (1972a, b) work on power–
dependence relations made several contributions to the concept of exchange. 
First, it emphasized the relations among the actors, rather than the actors 
themselves. Second, it shifted the focus from dyadic relations to the exchange 
structures, ultimately bridging the gap between the dyadic interaction and the 
macro-structures. Third, in addition to the issue of reciprocal exchanges 
(prominent in Blau’s (1964) work), it also highlighted the notion of negotiated 
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exchanges, in which the actors bargained the terms of agreements on the basis 
of their mutual dependence. Finally, the theory established the notion of power 
(from the viewpoint of mutual dependence) as a major issue in the domain of 
exchange theory. 
 
 
2B.10 Power conceptualization for the current study 
The above section described different conceptualizations of power. As noted 
earlier, ‘the concept of power is, in consequence, what has been called an 
‘essentially contested concept’ – one of those concepts which, inevitably, 
involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users’ 
(Lukes, 2005, p. 30, quotation marks in original). It is very challenging to 
provide an all–encompassing definition of power. However, it is necessary to 
explain the key dimensions of the notion of power used for the current study.  
 
Based on the above detailed discussion, power is conceptualized in this study 
as a relational phenomenon that is embedded in the dynamic interdependent 
relationships between different actors (individuals, groups, organizations etc.) 
Kotter (2010) defines the notion of interdependence in organizations as ‘a state 
in which two or more parties have power over each other, because they are, to 
some degree, dependent on each other’ (p. 11). Kotter’s (2010) definition is 
consistent with Beirne’s (2006) viewpoint that, rather than as a quantitative 
capacity or as a resource that can be deployed by particular actors to 
unproblematically achieve their objectives, power emerges from the ongoing 
struggles between particular actors who are interacting through relational 
interdependencies. This viewpoint negates the static, mechanical and 
deterministic conceptualization of power in which powerful actors are able to 
exercise their sovereign power over powerless actors in order to 
unproblematically achieve their predetermined objectives.  
 
Conceptualizing power as a quantitative capacity or a resource rules out any 
unpredictable outcomes of the interaction between the interdependent actors. 
The recognition of the issue that power relations may lead to unpredictable 
69 
 
consequences is critical as it supports the bi-directional view of power in 
which all the actors are able to make agentic interventions in their 
interdependent relationships. These agentic interventions, rather than being 
necessarily exercised in an expected or predetermined manner, may be 
unexpected as well. This is because (unlike the static view of power which 
assumes absolute compliance from the dominated actors in a predetermined 
manner) all the actors in interdependent relationships can exercise their agency 
and can (or can at least attempt to) act according to their own interests and 
preferences.  
 
In other words, no actor in an interdependent relationship will be absolutely 
compliant and therefore the outcomes of the interdependent relations cannot be 
determined in advance (due to the possible unexpected agentic interventions 
from the interdependent actors). Finally, even though all the actors can make 
agentic interventions, the nature and intensity of the influence of these 
interventions will largely be determined by the actor’s level of dependence on 
the other actors in that mutually interdependent relationship. Consistent with 
other researchers, it can be argued that the existence of power asymmetry or 
disproportionate interdependence may possibly result in differential gains for 
the interdependent actors (e.g. Blau, 1964; Cook et al., 2013; Molm, 2010). 
 
2B.11 The agency and structure debate 
The notion of power in the current study is based on the assumption of 
interdependent relationships among actors. The actions of these actors are, 
however enabled and constrained by the structure in which they operate 
(Fleming and Spicer, 2014; Kotter, 2010; Tjosvold and Wisse, 2009). This 
notion inevitably leads us to the agency–structure debate, a recurring issue in 
the intellectual development of social and organization theory for more than a 
century (Wolin, 2004; Reed, 2003, 2008). In this debate, at one extreme, 
human agency is reduced to be being entirely determined by the external, 
coercive structure (i.e. structuralism), and at the other extreme, the structure is 
merely reduced to the actions of human agents (i.e. individualism). Both of 
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these reductionist approaches have been criticized for underplaying the 
dynamic interaction between agency and structure.  
 
According to Reed (2008), both agency and structure, rather than being 
connected through a causal relationship, create mutual influences through 
acting upon each other. This view is based on Roy Bhaskar’s notion of critical 
realism focusing on the ‘Transformational Model of Social Action: TMSA’ 
(discussed in detail in the methodology chapter). According to this view, all 
human actions take place within the contextual circumstances of a social 
structure, which enables or constrains the actions of these agents. In terms of 
research philosophy (discussed in detail in the methodology chapter), this key 
notion of critical realism is distinct from both the assumptions of determinism 
in positivism (i.e. human actions are largely determined by the environment 
and the structures in which they operate) and voluntarism in interpretivism (i.e. 
human actions are largely independent of the environment and the structures in 
which they operate).  
 
The TMSA argues that structures are not fixed as they are largely influenced 
by ongoing human agency. This does not imply that structure is a mere 
creation of individual human actors. Rather, structure is both a condition and a 
consequence of human agency as ‘individuals draw upon existing social 
structure as a typically unacknowledged condition for acting, and, through the 
action of all individuals taken in total, social structure is typically 
unintentionally reproduced’ (Lawson, 1997, p. 169). This viewpoint highlights 
that, on the one hand, social structures are continuously reproduced and 
transformed as an outcome of human actions, and, on the other hand, these 
human actions are in turn conditioned (i.e. enabled and constrained) by the 
social structure.  
 
The notion that structure is both a condition and a consequence of human 
action refers to the dual feature of social structure. Giddens’ (1984) theory of 
structuration is significant in relation to this viewpoint. According to him, 
structure has a dual nature as both the ‘medium and the outcome of the social 
practices they recursively organize’ (Giddens, 1984, p. 25). For him, structure 
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not only shapes social practices but also, in turn, is reproduced and 
transformed by these practices. While emphasizing the notion of the duality of 
structures, Giddens (1984) argues that the process of structuration always 
leaves margin for social transformation as structures are influenced by the 
complex interaction of social actors who are constantly negotiating and 
struggling in order to advance their interests. Danermark et al. (2002), 
however, argue that Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory: 
 
implies that agent and structure constitute one another in such a way 
that the one cannot be separated from the other; they can be 
conceptualized only in relation to each other. The structures are 
instantiated by the actions of the agents and beyond that they only have 
a ‘virtual’ existence; when they are not employed in social practices 
they only exist as ‘memory traces’ in people.  
 
(pp. 179–80).  
 
In comparison to Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory emphasizing the notion 
of the duality of structure, Archer (1995) argues that the assumption of duality 
effectively conflates structure and agency (see also Vandenberghe, 2005). 
Similarly, Parker (2000, p. 73) argues that social structures have emergent 
characteristics, i.e. they are the ‘outcomes of agency which “emerge” or pass a 
developmental threshold, beyond which they exercise their own causal powers, 
independently of the agency which produced them’. In contrast to the 
Giddens’ (1984) assumption that society exists because of the people here 
present, Archer (1995) argues that social structure pre-exists individuals. In 
this way, Archer’s (1995) argument implies that social structure can exist at a 
given time regardless of the agency of the social actors (King, 1999, 2007).  
 
Archer (1982, 1995) emphasizes an analytical dualism between structure and 
agency. According to this viewpoint agency and structure can operate over 
different periods of time. In order to explain her viewpoint of the temporal 
interplay between agency and structure, she presents a morphogenetic process 
comprising a three–stage cycle (Archer, 1995). The first stage of structural 
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conditioning is based on the consequences of past action. This stage of 
structural conditioning has causal influence over the subsequent phase of 
social interaction. Although social interaction may be structurally conditioned, 
it is not structurally determined because of the exercise of agency by the 
actors. This social interaction leads to structural elaboration which may 
possibly modify the previous structural properties and introduce new ones. 
Archer (1995) further argues that structural elaboration is generally an 
unintended outcome, resulting from conflict and negotiation between 
individuals and groups, and may result in consequences that nobody had 
anticipated. 
 
The morphogenetic approach offers a rich theoretical explanation of the 
internal working of the agency–structure relationship. However, some 
researchers – notably King (1999, 2007) – have acutely criticized Archer’s 
(1995) viewpoint. According to him, the assumption of structure, as an 
ontologically prior or autonomous realm, independent at some point from 
individual knowledge or activity, emerges as a metaphysical concept. 
Consequently, such ‘notion of an objective social structure becomes 
unsustainable’ (King, 1999, p. 200). He further argues that Archer (1995) has 
failed to prove the priority and autonomy of social structure and, therefore, she 
‘commits herself unknowingly to sociological metaphysics at crucial moments 
in her argument’ (King, 1999, p. 216).  
 
Reed (1997) argues that the assumption of ontological dualism, as emphasized 
by Archer (1995), cannot be sustained as it represents a ‘highly static, 
mechanistic and deterministic ontology’ (p. 24). This is consistent with the 
viewpoint of Chia (1996) that ‘reality is in perpetual flux and transformation 
and hence unrepresentable through any static conceptual framework or 
paradigm of thought’ (p. 46). Considering the dynamic and messy nature of 
reality, Knights (1992) also argues that social analysis, therefore, generally 
focuses on a highly disordered, fragmented and contingent view of reality. 
Based on the arguments of these researchers, King’s (1999, p. 199) critique is 
highly persuasive that the concept of ontological dualism presented by Archer 
(1995) is ‘contradictory’. 
73 
 
 
Researchers (e.g. King 2010; Stones 2001; Varela 2007) including Archer 
(1996) herself, however, have argued that morphogenesis and structuration can 
be integrated because of the similarities between the two notions. Archer 
(1995), despite her rejection of Giddens’ (1984) mediation of structure and 
agency, nonetheless acknowledges his fundamental social ontology. King 
(2010), therefore, argues that it is not difficult to align structuration theory and 
morphogenetic social theory for two major reasons. First, for both Archer and 
Giddens, the social structure (irreducible to the individual) is changed and 
reproduced by conditioned individual action. Second, both theories of 
morphogenesis and structuration imply three moments of social reproduction: 
structural conditioning, social interaction and structural elaboration for Archer; 
and system, structure and structuration in the case of Giddens.  
 
According to King (1999), the underlying similarities between Archer and 
Giddens became increasingly evident in the 1990s as Archer’s 
conceptualization came under the influence of Bhaskar. Archer (1995) 
emphasized a very high similarity between her own morphogenesis theory and 
Bhaskar’s critical realism (pp. 135–41, 157). Bhaskar (1993) in turn explicitly 
acknowledged a very close connection between his ‘Transformational Model 
of Social Activity’ and Giddens theory of structuration (p. 154). Therefore, as 
a result of Bhaskar’s recognition of Giddens’ structuration theory, the 
conceptualizations of three major British social theorists can be considered to 
have broad family resemblance as ‘by aligning herself with Bhaskar, she 
[Archer] also unwittingly signaled a rapprochement with Giddens’ (King, 
2010, p. 255).  
 
2C.1 Integrating parts A & B of the literature review 
The above discussion of the literature review comprised two major parts (A & 
B). The first part (A) highlighted the underplayed implications of power in 
relation to the psychological contract. The second part (B) focused on the 
critical evaluation of the different views of power before presenting the 
conceptualization of power selected for the current study. Integrating these two 
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parts together, the psychological contract may be considered as the ongoing, 
dynamic and complex exchange between employees and the different agents 
of the organization. While power is embedded into the ongoing, dynamic and 
complex relational interdependencies between employees and the different 
representatives of the organization. As noted, the employment relationship is 
principally influenced by the power dynamics between employees and the 
organizational agents. However, the psychological contract literature largely 
underplays the implications of these power dynamics. Based on this line of 
argument, the primary aim of the current study is to investigate the 
implications of these power dynamics in relation to the psychological contract. 
In other words, the complex relational interdependencies (power relations) that 
influence the ongoing, dynamic and complex exchange (psychological 
contract) between employees and the organizational representatives are 
investigated in this research.   
 
2C.2 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented a detailed critical review of the relevant literature for 
the current study. The chapter was organized into two parts. The first part (A) 
focused on the critical evaluation of the psychological contract literature. The 
discussion in this part commenced with highlighting the issues regarding the 
assumptions underlying the notion of the psychological contract. In the next 
section, the discussion focused on the divergence in the different definitions of 
the psychological contract. The discussion highlighted different key terms (e.g. 
expectations, aspirations, obligations, beliefs, promises, perceptions, implicit 
contracts etc.) emphasized by the researchers in order to conceptualize the 
notion of the psychological contract. However, it was argued that, among these 
different conceptualizations based on a variety of key terms, a common 
element of ‘expectations’ could be partially traced in almost all definitions of 
the psychological contract.  
 
The discussion then focused on the issue of the conceptualization of the 
psychological contract either as a mental schema or an exchange model. It was 
argued that the psychological contract should be seen as an exchange model. 
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This is because the notion of the psychological contract is fundamentally 
conceptualized as an exchange agreement or a contract between two actors 
(i.e. employee and employer). Therefore, in order to ascertain the viewpoint of 
both exchange actors, the concept needs to be explored from the bilateral 
perspective of social exchange. The missing implications of social exchange 
theory in the relevant literature were also highlighted. It was argued that, even 
though the psychological contract literature generally acknowledges the notion 
of social exchange, nonetheless it has largely ignored its primary features of 
interdependence and power asymmetry in exchange relationships. 
 
The discussion then focused on the three constituent elements (i.e. mutuality, 
reciprocity and agency) of the psychological contract. Concerning mutuality, 
the discussion began by highlighting the use of rhetorical language with a 
managerialist orientation. It was argued that the assumption of mutuality 
largely ignores the issue of power asymmetry in employment relationships. 
The researcher emphasized the importance of exploring the notion of the 
psychological contract from a pluralist rather than a unitarist viewpoint. The 
discussion emphasized that it is very challenging to bring about mutuality (not 
only implicitly but also explicitly) because of the potential inconsistency of the 
messages communicated by different agents of the organization.  
 
Finally, the discussion focused on the limitations of the four drivers of 
mutuality posited by Rousseau (2001). Because of the highly explicit 
orientation of the first two drivers (i.e. shared information and objective 
accuracy in perceptions), it was argued that it is very challenging to maintain 
the implicit nature of the psychological contract. Similarly, the researcher 
highlighted the limitations of the last two drivers (having the power to demand 
things and having the power to consent to or reject the terms of the contract), 
as only a small category of employees (e.g. managerial, professional, 
knowledge or technical workers) has sufficient bargaining power to actively 
demand things, or consent to or reject the terms of the contract.  
 
On reciprocity, the discussion highlighted the incompatibility of Gouldner’s 
(1960) notion of reciprocity with the psychological contract literature. The 
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linguistic issues associated with the use of the term ‘reciprocity’ were 
elaborated on. The discussion also emphasized the issue of power asymmetry 
in employment relationships. Consistent with its dictionary meanings and the 
conceptualization of Gouldner (1960), the notion of reciprocity projects 
employees in a position with comparable bargaining power to their employers. 
Therefore, the assumption of reciprocity has limited relevance in the domain 
of the psychological contract. This is because the notion of power symmetry is 
generally not valid for the larger category of lower level employees. 
 
On agency, the discussion began with the choice of the bilateral rather than the 
unilateral approach to the notion of the psychological contract. The researcher 
emphasized that the psychological contract cannot logically be considered as a 
contract if it is conceptualized unilaterally as an individual employee’s mental 
schema. It was argued that the unilateral mental schema approach, focusing 
only on the employee’s perspective, inevitably leads to the issue of biased or 
subjective mutuality. The issue of whether the psychological contract is 
established between employees and the organization or among employees and 
the different agents of the organization was also elaborated on. The discussion 
then focused on the notion of the representation of the organization through its 
different agents (e.g. supervisors, immediate managers, senior managers etc.) 
and the development of breach perceptions among employees as a result of the 
diverse representation of the organization. Finally, the ignored implications of 
the notion of power asymmetry in the domain of agency were elaborated on.  
 
The discussion in the first part (A) of the literature review mainly focused on 
the critical analysis of the psychological contract literature. However, it was 
argued that, despite all these critical issues, the concept should not be 
abandoned. Similarly, other researchers, despite all their critiques, recognize 
the increasing popularity of the concept (e.g. Conway and Briner, 2009; 
Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; Guest et al., 2010; Shore et al., 2012). Finally, 
the discussion focused on the issue of the relevance and applicability of the 
psychological contract literature for the current study.  
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The second part (B) of the literature review focused mainly on the concept of 
power as in the first part (A), the notion of power was generally discussed 
from the perspective of its underplayed implications in the psychological 
contract theory. The discussion began with a critical evaluation of the 
dimensional views of power of Dahl (1957), Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and 
Lukes (1974), highlighting the overlapping nature of Lukes’ (1974) three-
dimensional notion of power with Dahl’s (1957) one-dimensional and 
Bacharach and Baratz’s (1962) two-dimensional view.  
 
The discussion then considered Lukes’ (1974) re-conceptualization of power 
from three major perspectives (i.e. power as a capacity, negative view of 
power and the location of power). It focused on the Hindess critique of Lukes’ 
view of power. The conceptualization of power by Foucault (1977) and 
Emerson (1972a, b) were also analyzed. Based on a detailed discussion of all 
these notions of power, the researcher presented the conceptualization of 
power chosen for the current study. Finally, the last section of part B 
highlighted the issue of the relationship between structure and agency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter critically evaluated the conceptual underpinnings of the 
notion of the psychological contract. The discussion highlighted the issue of 
the missing implications of the concept of power in the psychological contract 
literature. This chapter discusses the methodological details of the research. 
The current study follows a critical realist research philosophy. The discussion 
highlights why critical realism, as opposed to positivism or interpretivism, is 
considered as a suitable choice for the current study. After the discussion of 
the research philosophy, the next section focuses on the research strategy. 
Based on a detailed discussion of the relevance and suitability of different 
research strategies, a case study strategy is finally selected for the current 
research.  
 
Before moving to the details of the data collection, the discussion also 
highlights the particular context of the current study i.e., the call centre 
industry, followed by a perspective on Pakistan. For the purpose of data 
collection, 43 semi-structured interviews were conducted. Semi-structured 
interviews allow the researcher to remain focused on the major research issues 
while also facilitating the management and further exploration any 
unanticipated responses from the research participants. The discussion then 
proceeds to describe the sampling procedure used in the current study in order 
to locate the research participants. The next section illustrates the ethical issues 
related to the research. The discussion then highlights the different strategies 
followed in order to try to minimize any bias in the research findings. Finally, 
the discussion illustrates the details of the analysis template used in the study.  
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3.2 Research philosophy 
Research philosophy discusses the development of knowledge and the 
different ways in which people view their world (Bryman, 2008). Hughes 
(1994) argues that it is the philosophy that helps us gain a better understanding 
of ‘human intellectual affairs’ (p. 43). Hatch and Cunliffe (2006) further posit 
that different research philosophies assist a researcher to study the research 
problem in a variety of ways. According to Saunders et al. (2009), one 
particular research philosophy should not be categorized as superior to others 
as the choice of philosophy will largely depend upon the ‘research question(s) 
you are seeking to answer’ (p. 109). In this context, Gill and Johnson (2010) 
highlight the importance of the researcher’s judgment regarding the choice of a 
particular research philosophy.  
 
According to Blaikie (2000), a researcher, based on his/her own orientation of 
knowledge or reality, may have an affinity with a particular research 
philosophy. However, James and Vinnicombe (2002) caution that the 
philosophy selected by the researcher must be capable of addressing the key 
research problem. If the research philosophy is not coherent with the research 
problem, it will raise serious questions about the findings of the research. 
Denzin and Lincoln (2003) further emphasize that these issues have more 
currency in the field of social sciences, as their humanistic features induce an 
additional level of complexity which is less likely to be encountered in the 
natural sciences.  
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) highlight that a clear research philosophy at the 
start of any research activity will enable the researcher to make an appropriate 
evaluation of the different research methodologies on the basis of their 
compatibility with the overall research objectives. In addition, an unambiguous 
philosophical viewpoint will also shape the research strategy in terms of what 
type of data is to be collected for research, where to collect it from and how to 
analyze the collected data (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Consistent with the 
viewpoint of these researchers, the following section is based on a detailed 
81 
 
discussion of different research philosophies. The discussion begins with a 
critical overview of positivism and interpretivism. Based on this critical 
evaluation, the next section discusses the concept of critical realism, the 
research philosophy opted for in the current study.  
 
3.2.1  Positivism 
Positivism considers the social world as an objective reality which exists 
independently of human interpretations. Based on an empiricist epistemology, 
positivism argues that a researcher can objectively examine a particular social 
phenomenon and can precisely represent it on the basis of scientific theories 
and concepts (Blaikie, 2009). The positivist research philosophy underpinned 
by ‘faith in the power of reason and rationality’ (Filmer et al., 1998, p. 25), 
assumes that social science research methods are similar to those of the natural 
sciences. This assumption is based on viewing knowledge of social reality in a 
similar way to knowledge of observable events in closed systems that can be 
verified through scientific principles.  
 
The historical roots of this perspective are in the notion of enlightenment, 
when theological descriptions of the natural world were rejected and 
subsequently replaced with descriptions based on observable facts and laws of 
nature (Filmer et al., 1998; Henn et al., 2009). In this context, Comte (1853) 
argues that ‘true’ knowledge should be based on empirical observation and 
needs to be free from any influence of metaphysical preconceptions (e.g. mind 
or spirit) that cannot be investigated through the methods of science. Largely 
driven by this approach, positivism, predominantly used in the natural 
sciences, focuses on testing hypotheses in order to accept or reject a new or 
existing postulation.  
 
In addition, positivism seeks objective findings that can be generalized to other 
similar situations (Hatch and Cunliffe, 2006; Saunders et al., 2009). According 
to Slife and Williams (1995), in order to draw out these objective findings, the 
researcher needs to be free from any personal and social influences. The basic 
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argument of positivism, therefore, is that knowledge should be based on an 
objective reality that is measurable and discernible; any other knowledge 
which does not meet these criteria should be rejected (Comte, 1853). This 
emphasis of the positivists is influenced by their motivation to disqualify any 
subjective or speculative viewpoints from the domain of knowledge, which 
may not be empirically supported.  
 
In terms of the five major assumptions (i.e. ontology, epistemology, axiology, 
methodology and human nature), positivism is based on realist ontological 
assumptions emphasizing that the social world exists independent of human 
consciousness or understanding of it (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). In terms of 
epistemology, positivism aims to explain and predict the social world by 
searching for regularities and causal relationships (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
From an axiological perspective, positivism purports to be value-free research 
i.e. the research needs to be free from any influences of the researcher’s 
values. In terms of methodology, positivism emphasizes the nomothetic 
approach. This approach is generally based on large samples and principally 
involves hypothesis testing through employing standardized research methods 
such as surveys. Finally, from the perspective of human nature, positivism is 
based on determinism i.e. the belief that human actions are determined by the 
environment and the structures in which they operate.  
 
3.2.2  Interpretivism 
For critics, positivism’s major emphasis on empirical regularities is unable to 
capture and reflect the complexities of the social world. In comparison to 
positivism, interpretivism focuses on the subjective aspects of the social world 
and the drawbacks of taking the complexities of the social world for granted 
(Schwandt, 2003). In other words, rather than focusing on causal explanations 
and empirical regularities, interpretivism emphasizes a contextual 
understanding of the social world. Generally linked with the work of Max 
Weber, interpretivism underlines the notion of Verstehen (i.e. the empathetic 
understanding of human behaviour) rather than Erklären (i.e. mere 
83 
 
explanation) which focuses only on the issue of causality, as evident in the 
domain of the natural sciences (Crotty, 1998, p. 67).  
 
The major difference in the viewpoints of positivism and interpretivism is, 
therefore, based on their different assumptions about the social world. 
Positivists argue that reality exists objectively and independently of the 
perceptions of human beings, while interpretivists assert that reality is 
subjective and comprises the perceptions of individuals. These subjective 
perceptions necessitate an in depth understanding of the different contextual 
factors which underpin an individual’s interpretation of the social world 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). According to Hughes (1994), the realities of the 
social world do not exist in a vacuum; rather, they depend upon their different 
contexts and, therefore, many versions or interpretations of the same 
phenomenon are possible.   
 
Furthermore, interpretivist researchers ‘seek insight rather than statistical 
analysis. They doubt whether social “facts” exist and question whether a 
“scientific” approach can be used when dealing with human beings’ (Bell, 
1999, p. 8, quotation marks in original). Gall et al. (1999) exemplify the 
interpretivist research philosophy with an interesting analogy. For them ‘any 
social phenomenon, such as a high school football game, does not have any 
independent existence apart from its participants, rather, it will have different 
meanings for the individuals who participate in the phenomenon’ (Gall et at, 
1999, p. 289). The viewpoint of Gall et al. (1999) echoes the emphasis of 
Blumer (1966) that individuals subjectively interpret and respond to the 
symbolic meanings of the society in which they interact. Based on this 
assumption, interpretivism principally focuses on the meanings people 
associate with their world. Interpretivists, therefore, deny the assumption of 
any objective knowledge that exists apart from the subjective human 
interpretation.  
 
In terms of ontology, interpretivism is based on nominalist ontological 
assumptions, conceptualizing the social world in a way very different from 
realism (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Nominalism argues that the social world 
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cannot be separated from the perceptions of the human beings. In terms of 
epistemology, interpretivism rejects the notion of creating objective 
knowledge through observing behaviour. Rather, knowledge about any 
particular phenomenon can only be understood from the perspective of the 
individuals experiencing that phenomenon (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). From 
an axiological perspective, interpretivism is based on value-laden research, i.e. 
the research cannot be free from the influences of the researcher’s values. In 
terms of methodology, interpretivism emphasizes the ideographic approach. 
This approach is largely based on the detailed contextual observation of a 
particular phenomenon, rather than hypothesis testing. Finally, in the context 
of human nature, interpretivism is based on the assumption of voluntarism, i.e. 
considering human actions as largely autonomous and possessing free will.  
 
3.2.3  Critical realism 
Critical realism is a philosophical perspective that is conceptualized between 
the two extremes of positivism and interpretivism (Bankins, 2011; Houston, 
2001; McEvoy and Richards, 2003; Mingers, 2006). Danermark et al. (2002, p. 
202) argue that, although critical realism is a third way between these two 
radical views, ‘it is not a conflation of, or a compromise between, these 
perspectives; it represents a standpoint in its own right’. Critical realism argues 
that, even though there exists an external world independent of our 
conceptions, nevertheless we gain the knowledge of this world based on our 
cognitions and perceptions. In this sense, critical realism is ontologically 
realist and epistemologically relativist, negating any possibility of the 
development of absolute truth. For the critical realists, the ultimate objective of 
any research study is not to develop generalizable laws (positivism) or to 
determine the lived experience, or the perceptions and interpretations of the 
social actors, regarding a particular phenomenon (interpretivism). Rather, 
critical realism focuses on the deeper levels of understanding and explanation 
of the research problem under investigation.  
 
Critical realists argue that theoretical progress is achieved on the basis of the 
intransitive dimension of reality. This intransitive dimension of reality is ‘the 
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realist element in critical realism [which] assumes that an external reality 
exists, independently of our conceptions of it’ (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 
200). The intransitive dimension serves as a point of reference, on the basis of 
which the researchers can develop and subsequently test their theories 
(Bhaskar, 1978). However, critical realists also argue that it is not possible to 
be completely aware of reality, as our understanding of the external world is 
based on our theoretical knowledge, which is fallible. Sayer (2004) 
nevertheless argues that, although our knowledge may not be considered as the 
ultimate truth as it is ‘always mediated by and conceptualized within available 
discourses, we can still get a kind of feedback from the world [which is] 
accessible to us’ (p. 6).  
 
From a critical realist viewpoint, there are two major issues with positivistic 
approaches. First, they focus exclusively on observable events in terms of 
cause and effect relationships (Olsen, 2002). Second, positivism tends to 
investigate social relationships in isolation. With a similar approach to natural 
sciences, there is a tendency to treat the social relationships in a closed system 
as though they are independent of any external influences and without any 
consideration of the context in which they operate (Bankins, 2011; Collier, 
1994). In contrast, critical realism conceptualizes the real world as a multi-
level open system. Rather than following a pre-determined order in which the 
outcomes are predictable, unpredictable outcomes may emerge from the 
complex interaction between phenomena located at different levels of reality 
(discussed in detail in the next section). Critical realists also raise concerns 
about the issue of the ontic fallacy in the domain of positivism. The ontic 
fallacy (reducing epistemology to ontology) results in the ontologization of 
knowledge in such a way that it becomes de-contextualized and a-historical 
(Meyer, 2007).  
 
Critical realism recognizes the importance of interpretivism because of its 
emphasis on human perception, discourse and motivation (Bhaskar, 1989). 
However, critical realism also raises issues about the approach of the 
interpretivists, who focus exclusively on these human actions without any 
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consideration of the restraints imposed by social structures (Granovetter, 
1985). Williams (2003) highlights the significance of these structures as they 
may enable or constrain the actions of individuals. In the context of 
interpretivism (totally relying on the research participants’ descriptions), 
critical realism acknowledges the possibility that the descriptions from the 
research participants may be partial or even misguided (Potter and Lopez, 
2001).  
 
In addition, ‘interpretivists deny the possibility of knowing what is real ... 
They can only provide their own interpretation. What is not clear in the 
interpretivist approach is by what standards one interpretation is judged to be 
better than another’ (Easton, 2010, p. 118). Finally, critical realists also raise 
concerns about the epistemic fallacy in the domain of interpretivism. The 
epistemic fallacy (reducing ontology to epistemology) results in the 
epistemization of being so that reality is reduced to our knowledge of it 
(Meyer, 2007). In other words, statements about being are reduced to the 
statements about knowledge.  
 
3.2.3.1  Some critiques of critical realism 
It is important to mention that critical realism is also subject to criticism from 
both positivists and interpretivists. Positivists criticize on the basis of the 
possible ‘danger of bias’ resulting from the acknowledged influence of the 
values stemming from the critical realists’ emphasis on human emancipation 
in the research endeavour (Hammersley, 2009, p. 7). Critical realists, however, 
respond by arguing that values underpin all research endeavours, whether they 
are acknowledged or not. In this context, critical realists further emphasize the 
role of the researcher’s creative reasoning in order to understand and explain 
the research problem in a novel way. 
 
On the other hand, interpretivists challenge critical realist philosophy in terms 
of how the notion of a multi-layered ontology can be argued with any certainty 
as, according to critical realists, our knowledge about reality is provisional and 
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contestable (DeForge and Shaw, 2012). Critical realists, however, respond by 
emphasizing that the deeper layers of ontology are real because their effects 
(in the empirical domain) are real. Therefore it is incumbent on researchers to 
explore them as comprehensively as possible, while acknowledging that they 
are generative rather than definitive mechanisms. Finally, critical realism is 
criticized because of the risk of overstating the role of structure at the expense 
of agency because of the emphasis that social structures shape as well as 
constrain the opportunities for agency. Reed (2008, p. 72), however, argues 
that ‘this implicit risk can be counteracted if the dynamic and creative tension 
between them [structure and agency] is kept at the very centre of our 
organizational research and analysis as critical realists’.  
 
3.2.3.2  Critical realist ontology and epistemology 
From an ontological perspective, critical realism views the world independent 
of human conceptions. However, critical realism also recognizes that 
knowledge about this world is shaped by human perceptions and cognitions. 
Based on this assumption, Reed (2005) argues that critical realism prioritizes 
ontology over epistemology because of the view that the way the world exists 
(ontology) will significantly influence or shape the different ways in which we 
try to understand and explain it (epistemology). Similarly, Potter and Lopez 
(2005) note that critical realism (in comparison to positivism and 
interpretivism) presents a very detailed and in depth view of the ontological 
issues, as the observable events and our experiences of them (producing our 
knowledge of reality i.e. epistemology) are unable to exhaust the constitution 
of (social) reality (Reed, 2008).  
 
This underlying assumption of critical realism is crucial from the perspective 
of the psychological contract, as if humans (in this case particularly employees 
and the agents representing the organization) have been able to determine 
reality exhaustively or comprehensively on the basis of their knowledge of it, 
there would be very limited possibility of contract breach as every aspect 
associated with the employment relationship would have been identified and 
subsequently discussed. In other words, as emphasized by critical realism, it is 
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human inability to exhaustively and accurately determine reality (which exists 
independent of our conceptions) that results in the development of different, 
rather inconsistent, psychological contracts (by employees and organizational 
representatives) ultimately leading to the perceptions of contract breach. 
 
As noted, events and our experiences of them are unable to provide an 
exhaustive knowledge of reality. This is because events and experiences are 
generated by underlying mechanisms that ‘are not directly accessible to sense 
experience or reducible to events and activities’ (Reed, 2008, p. 70). The 
assumption of these underlying mechanisms brings us to the notion of 
stratified social ontology in critical realism. As explained by Bhaskar (1978, p. 
56), three ontological domains (i.e. the empirical, the actual and the real) can 
be identified in the context of stratified social ontology.  
 
The empirical domain comprises what we experience either directly or 
indirectly. The actual domain is where all events occur whether we experience 
them or not. The third, deeper domain (i.e. the real domain) comprises the 
underlying structures or mechanisms which produce events in the world. It is 
pertinent to mention that the term ‘mechanism’ may imply a deterministic 
cause and effect relationship. The researcher, however, as argued by 
Danermark et al. (2002) uses this term ‘metaphorically’ (p. 20) in order to 
minimize any confusion resulting from the wider use of this term in critical 
realist discussions.   
 
According to Reed (2008), these underlying mechanisms, which generate 
events in the actual domain, ‘possess inherent powers or tendencies that may 
or may not be mobilized’ (p. 70). It is, however, important to highlight that 
causality in critical realism should not be regarded as leading to a regular 
succession of events. As emphasized by Sayer (2000), the assumption 
regarding causality involving regularities or repeated occurrences is misguided 
as ‘what causes something to happen has nothing to do with the number of 
times we have observed it happening’ (p. 14). Similarly, Reed (2008) 
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maintains that, rather than explaining regularities, causality is more concerned 
with the identification of causal mechanisms and discovering how they work.   
 
The critical realist ontology highlights the underlying generative mechanisms 
(the real) as the source of change in the actually occurring events (the actual) 
and the different ways in which these events are perceived in terms of 
everyday experience (the empirical). In this way, critical realism is an anti-
reductionist social ontology, as it argues that none of these ‘levels of being’ 
can be reduced to the other (Reed, 2008, p. 69). Moreover, it is also an anti-
determinist social ontology, as it contends that the distinctive objects, entities 
or phenomena positioned at any one of these levels cannot be derived or 
programmed from those located at any other level (Reed, 2008).  
 
This relates critical realist social ontology to the notion of emergence. 
According to Sayer (2000), emergence is the complex interaction between 
objects or entities positioned at different levels of reality which results in 
innovative or emergent phenomena that cannot be derived or programmed 
from objects or entities positioned at any one particular level. It is this 
complex interaction between objects or entities located at different levels of 
reality and the emergent phenomena that it generates which enables critical 
realism, with its distinctive focus in terms of conceptualizing how the social 
world operates, why it operates in the way it does and what its consequences 
are for the people inhabiting that social world (Reed, 2008).  
 
From the epistemological perspective, Sayer (2004) argues that our data or 
facts are always theory-laden. This is because we do not experience the events 
directly, as claimed in empiricist research. Rather, all our data about any event 
is based on different theories developed by us. According to Bhaskar (2013), 
these are the transitive objects of science (i.e. theories) which connect science 
with the external world (i.e. the intransitive dimension of reality) that exists 
independent of our conceptions of it. Theories are considered as transitive 
because they are based on our knowledge, which is fallible. According to 
Danermark et al. (2002), ‘theories in science can only be regarded as the best 
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truth about reality we have for the moment. It is no ultimate knowledge’ (p. 
23). New scientific investigations may highlight that prior knowledge was 
false or partial, and therefore the current theories can always be replaced with 
new theories.  
 
3.2.3.3  Abduction 
The assumption of stratified social ontology (in which the complex interaction 
between phenomena located at different levels of reality results in the 
generation of emergent phenomena in unpredictable ways) characterizes 
critical realism with a mode of inference other than induction or deduction 
(Collins, 1985; Habermas, 1974). Generally referred to as abduction, this 
mode of inference focuses on the theoretical re-description or re-
contextualization of the problem under investigation (Kapitan, 1992). In other 
words, a researcher with an abductive orientation attempts to re-describe 
structures and relations in a new context of ideas. Abduction, therefore, aims at 
different theoretical explanations and interpretations that ‘can and should be 
presented, compared and possibly integrated with one another’ (Danermark et 
al., 2002, p. 110). 
 
According to Habermas (1978), abduction differs from deduction as it 
highlights how something might or possibly be, while deduction emphasizes 
how something must or definitely be. In research based on deductive logic, a 
particular notion is proved or disproved. However, the findings beyond the 
initial theoretical frame may largely remain unanalyzed (Mingers, 2004). In 
comparison, abduction focuses on discerning relations that are not otherwise 
obvious or evident (Curry et al., 2009). Furthermore, abduction differs from 
induction as, rather than starting with a blank mind, ‘we start from the rule 
describing a general pattern’ (Danermark et al., 2002). Peirce emphasizes that 
induction ‘infers from one set of facts another similar set of facts, whereas 
[abduction] infers from facts of one kind to facts of another’ (Peirce, 1986, in 
Jensen 1995, p. 150). Similarly, Collins (1985) posits that abduction is neither 
logically rigorous like deduction, nor is it a purely empirical generalization 
like induction.  
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Based on these underlying features of re-description and re-contextualization, 
the abductive mode of inference is considered as highly suitable for the current 
study. This is because the current study does not focus on proving/disproving 
something (deduction) nor does it set aside the already existing theory 
(induction). Rather, the current study, acknowledging the relevant theory, re-
contextualizes the phenomenon of the psychological contract in relation to the 
notion of power. The abductive mode of inference is, therefore, very helpful in 
order to discover the relations and connections in this re-contextualization of 
the phenomenon of the psychological contract. According to Danermark et al. 
(2002), neither inductive nor deductive logic can inform such discoveries, as 
deductive inference is analytical and ‘says nothing new about reality’ while 
induction focuses on general inference as ‘a generalization of properties 
already given in particular, observed data’ (p. 89).  
 
It is, however, pertinent to mention that discovery does not imply finding new 
events that nobody has considered before. Rather, ‘what is discovered is 
connections and relations … by which we can understand and explain already 
known occurrences in a novel way’ (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 91). According 
to Jensen (1995), this novelty is mainly based on the imagination and creative 
reasoning of the researcher. Fleetwood and Ackroyd (2004), however, posit 
that, even though new and innovative, the ideas based on abductive inference 
are, nevertheless, fallible. Habermas (1974), therefore, argues that abductive 
logic does not provide ultimate truths, not even in combination with deduction 
and induction.  
 
3.2.3.4  Retroduction 
According to Danermark et al. (2002), retroduction helps us to recognize the 
characteristics of the general structures from which we begin in abduction. For 
them, retroduction is a thought process through which researchers can 
visualize structures and connections not directly observable in the empirical 
reality. According to Olsen and Morgan (2005), in retroduction ‘events are 
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studied with respect to what may have, must have or could have caused them. 
In short it means asking why events have happened in the way they did’ (p. 
25). Echoing the viewpoint of Olsen and Morgan (2005), McEvoy and 
Richards (2006) argue that retroduction, therefore, helps researchers both in 
terms of understanding and of explaining a particular phenomenon.  
 
In retroduction, counterfactual thinking or reasoning plays a significant role. 
According to Danermark et al (2002), ‘in counterfactual thinking we use our 
stored experience and knowledge of social reality, as well as our ability to 
abstract and to think about what is not, but what might be. [for example] Could 
one imagine X without...?’ (p. 101). In other words, the counterfactual 
thinking encourages the researchers to shift their focus from ‘what happens to 
be associated with what’ towards ‘could these associations have been 
otherwise?’ (Reed, 2008, p. 71). Sayer (2000), while discussing retroduction, 
also argues that this counterfactual thinking is critical in order to identify the 
internal aspects of phenomena and the relations between them.  
 
In association with counterfactual thinking, Danermark et al. (2002) further 
discuss the notion of transfactual (transcendental) argumentation. For them, 
transfactual argumentation helps us to go beyond what is empirically 
observable, i.e. the transfactual conditions. These transfactual conditions help 
the researcher to identify the basic prerequisites for a phenomenon to exist. For 
example, ‘if we call this phenomenon X, we may formulate our question thus: 
What properties must exist for X to exist and to be what X is? Or, to put it 
more briefly: What makes X possible?’ (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 97). From 
the perspective of the current study, this transfactual argumentation appears to 
be very helpful. For example, the current study, as one area of its investigation, 
attempts to identify the basic prerequisites for the phenomenon of mutuality to 
exist. In other words, what makes mutuality possible in employment 
relationships? 
 
3.2.3.5  Intensive research design 
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Critical realism is more aligned with intensive rather than extensive research 
design (Blaikie, 2000; Sayer, 2000). Causal explanation in critical realism, 
rather than looking for statistical generalizations, is more concerned with the 
internal causal powers of the mechanisms and ‘the complex ways in which 
these internal powers and relations interact and combine with other 
mechanisms to generate specific outcomes’ (Reed, 2008, p. 71). According to 
Clark (2000), while extensive research designs are focused on highlighting 
empirical regularities, the intensive research designs are more concerned with 
what makes some things rather than others happen in a certain context. The 
feature of intensive research design in critical realism is very pertinent as the 
current study, rather than looking for regularities in the phenomena of 
mutuality, reciprocity or agency, is more concerned with what makes these 
phenomena exist in certain contexts.  
 
3.2.3.6  Transformational model of social action 
Underpinning the key elements of critical realism highlighted above is 
Bhaskar’s (1989) transformational model of social action (see also Archer, 
2003). As this model is generally discussed in the context of the agency–
structure debate, it is pertinent to first highlight the approach of critical realism 
towards this issue. According to Layder (1994), critical realism develops a 
distinctive line of argument on the agency–structure issue, which is based on 
the central question of ‘how creativity and constraint are related through social 
activity – how can we explain their co-existence?’ (p. 4). Reed (2008) argues 
that the answers to this question are pivotal in terms of mapping out the 
conceptual and philosophical ground on which we develop our theories 
explaining the issues of social/organizational reproduction and transformation.  
 
According to Emirbayer and Mische (1998), in this context critical realism 
develops an approach which they refer to as the double constitution of 
structure and agency. Explaining this notion, they argue that both the creative 
and the constraining dimensions of structure and agency need to be 
simultaneously incorporated into the analytical framework in critical realism. 
According to them, ‘it is the constitution of such orientations within particular 
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structural contexts that gives form to effort and allows actors to assume greater 
or lesser degrees of transformative leverage in relation to the structuring 
contexts of action’ (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 1004).  
 
Endorsing the notion of double constitution of agency and structure, Reed 
(2008) argues that Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) assumption regarding the 
issue of agency and structure ‘is consistent with Bhaskar’s ‘transformative 
model of social action’ (TMSA) insofar as they both argue that agency and 
structure need to be ontologically and analytically separated if we are to 
understand how they interact and combine with each other’ (p. 72, quotation 
marks in original). The TMSA proposes that the causal powers of existing 
structures are always mediated through human agency (Bhaskar, 1998). Reed 
(2008) further posits that while social structures pre-exist and constrain the 
social action that consequently transforms and reshapes them, they are also the 
outcomes of the agentic interventions of previous generations of individual 
actors and corporate agents that originally produced them.  
 
While explaining the underlying conceptualization of TMSA, Bhaskar (1989) 
argues that the socio-historical contexts in which human agents operate are 
already structured in different ways before they enter them. This pre-
structuring process will in turn generate pressures for elaboration, reproduction 
and transformation that will impinge on human agents differentially located 
within such social structures (Bhaskar, 1989). It is from these pressures that 
the individual and/or corporate agents ‘creatively respond to their existing 
conditions and strive to improve their “lot” by whatever means are available to 
them in that particular place and at that particular time’ (Reed, 2008, p. 71). 
 
This creative response to the existing structural conditions and the pressure for 
change from these agents will in turn structure the socio-historical contexts 
that are inherited by the upcoming generations of human agents. Therefore, the 
TMSA focuses on the ways in which social structures are established, 
reproduced and transformed. This emphasizes that, within a socio-historical 
context, human agents will be dealing with a pre-existing social structure. This 
will be subject to elaboration, reproduction and transformation based on the 
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creative social actions of human agents in order to change the context and the 
conditions under which they are operating. 
 
The above section constitutes a detailed discussion of the issues related to the 
research philosophy. In addition to the comparison with positivism and 
interpretivism, the discussion highlighted the suitability of the underlying 
assumptions of critical realism for the current study. The following section 
focuses on the research strategy selected for the current study.  
 
3.3 Research Strategy 
A research strategy is largely ‘determined by the kind of question that the 
research study hopes to answer’ (Frederick and Lori-Ann, 2006, p. 148). Based 
on the researcher’s philosophical assumptions and the key research question, a 
research strategy provides guidelines on how to collect the data and how to 
analyze it (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). Though different research strategies 
may be considered for any research (Yin, 2003), the choice depends upon the 
research objectives, research questions and the available time and resources 
(Bryman, 2008). Saunders et al. (2009), concurring with the argument of 
Bryman (2008), therefore argue that ‘no research strategy is inherently 
superior or inferior to any other. Consequently, what is most important is not 
the label that is attached to a particular strategy, but whether it will enable you 
to answer your particular research question(s) and meet your objectives’ 
(p.141). The following discussion provides a critical review of the different 
research strategies in order to opt for a research strategy suitable for the 
purpose of the current research. 
 
Firmly rooted in natural sciences, an experiment strategy is generally 
employed to investigate the causal relationships between dependent and 
independent variables (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). The experiment strategy 
comprises a control group (i.e. the group with no systematic or planned 
intervention) and an experiment group (i.e. the group with a systematic 
intervention). After conducting the experiment on both groups, typically in a 
laboratory-based environment, the results are analyzed in order to empirically 
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explain the relationship between the dependent and the independent variable 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Considering its positivistic, laboratory-based and 
intervention-oriented nature, the experiment strategy may not be appropriate as 
a suitable research strategy for this study.  
 
Survey, another research strategy, is largely used to answer the where, who, 
how many or how much questions (Bryman, 2008). With a deductive 
orientation, surveys are generally employed to collect data from large samples 
in a relatively economical manner (Saunders et al., 2009). Largely quantitative 
in nature, survey data is used for the purpose of statistical analysis and 
generalization (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). The survey strategy, despite its 
capability of collecting large volumes of data in an economical manner, is, 
however, not a suitable choice for this research. The current research requires 
a research strategy capable of managing the un-anticipated responses of the 
research participants. This necessitates a research strategy which allows the 
respondents to express their beliefs and perceptions in an unrestricted and 
unpredictable manner. Surveys, on the other hand, restrict the respondents to 
certain pre-determined options or responses, inhibiting the emergence of any 
unpredictable data.  
 
Ethnography, an important research strategy, is generally employed to study 
societal patterns in order to discover the internal world of any particular 
community (Hochschild, 1979). The roots of ethnography can be traced to the 
discipline of anthropology in the work of Malinowski (1922). With an 
inductive orientation, researchers gain a deeper understanding of the 
participants’ world through their extensive presence and active participation as 
a member of the community (Arnould and Wallendorf, 1994; Elliott and 
Elliott, 2003). Though ethnography provides the researcher with significant 
opportunities to investigate a phenomenon, it is, however, not deemed a 
suitable research strategy in the discipline of business because of the issue of 
gaining access to the research participants (Saunders et al., 2009).  
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Grounded theory is another research strategy proposed by Glaser and Strauss 
(1967). According to Collis and Hussey (2003), in grounded theory a 
phenomenon is explored without any pre-existing theory. The early 
researchers of grounded theory i.e. Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggest that in 
order to explore a phenomenon, the researcher needs to abandon any 
influences from existing theories. In comparison, other researchers emphasize 
the importance of existing theory as a basis for new emerging theory and also 
for the purpose of creative analysis (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). Grounded theory, like the research strategies 
discussed above, may not be considered suitable for this research as it 
critically ignores any previous theoretical and empirical findings regarding a 
phenomenon, while the current study seeks to incorporate the prior theoretical 
and empirical work in the domain of the psychological contract. Moreover, 
according to Suddaby (2006, p. 640) grounded theory is ‘messy’ as it is not 
only time consuming but also requires ‘considerable experience, hard work, 
creativity and occasionally, a healthy dose of good luck.’  
 
 
Theory development is a core activity in organizational behaviour (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2008). There are, however, challenges involved in this process 
when ‘current perspectives seem inadequate because they have little empirical 
substantiation, or they conflict with each other or common sense’ (Eisenhardt, 
1989, p. 548). Lynham (2002) suggests employing case studies in these 
situations as they do not rely extensively on past theory and empirical 
evidence. Table 3.3 summarizes the major steps in conducting a case study. A 
case study is ‘a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical 
investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context’ (Robson, 2002, p. 178).  
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Table 3.1 Process of Theory Development in Case Study Research 
Step Activity Reason 
Getting started Definition of research question 
Possibly a priori constructs  
Neither theory nor hypotheses 
Focuses efforts 
Provides better grounding of construct 
measures  
Retains theoretical flexibility 
Selecting 
cases 
Specified population 
Theoretical, not random sampling 
Constrains extraneous variation and 
sharpens external validity 
Focuses efforts on theoretically useful 
cases 
Crafting 
instruments 
and protocols 
Multiple data collection methods 
Qualitative and quantitative data 
combined  
Multiple investigators 
Strengthens grounding of theory by 
triangulation of evidence 
Synergistic view of evidence 
Fosters divergent perspectives and 
strengthens grounding 
Entering the 
field 
Overlap of data collection and 
analysis including field notes 
Flexible and opportunistic data 
collection methods 
Speeds analyses and reveals helpful 
adjustments to data collection 
Allows investigators to take advantage 
of emergent themes and unique case 
features 
Analyzing 
data 
Within-case analysis 
Cross-case pattern search using 
divergent techniques 
Gains familiarity with data and 
preliminary theory generation 
Forces investigators to look beyond 
initial impressions and see evidence 
through multiple lenses 
Enfolding 
Literature 
Comparison with conflicting 
literature 
Comparison with similar 
literature 
Builds internal validity, raises 
theoretical level, and sharpens construct 
definitions 
Sharpens generalizability, improves 
construct definition, and raises 
theoretical level 
Reaching 
closure 
Theoretical saturation when 
possible 
Ends process when marginal 
improvement becomes small 
Source: Adapted from Eisenhardt (1989, p. 533) 
 
For Stake (1994) case studies are not a methodological choice; rather, they 
help in a clear demarcation of the focus and boundaries of the research. A case 
study strategy is important for the current research, as it helps in gaining an in-
depth perspective of the research problem (Robson, 2002). This key feature of 
case studies is consistent with the basic underlying assumption of critical 
realism, emphasizing an in-depth analysis of the research problem (Potter and 
Lopez, 2001). Furthermore, case studies allow the development of ‘converging 
lines of enquiry’, as they support the use of multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 
2003, p. 98). This results in increased credibility for the findings of the study 
as they are supported by multiple sources of data.  
 
Saunders et al. (2009) mention that case studies support theory development 
on the basis of an intensive rather than extensive degree of examination. This 
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feature of case studies is further aligned with critical realism, which focuses on 
the intensive rather than the extensive research design (Blaikie, 2000; Reed, 
2008). Moreover, case studies, in addition to theory development, also excel in 
theory refinement on the basis of ‘the juxtaposition of contradictory or 
paradoxical evidence’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 546). The conceptual refinement 
through empirically supported contradictory evidence is significant as it 
obliges researchers to seek more innovative, framebreaking and challenging, 
rather than reconciling, descriptions of the research problem (Eisenhardt, 
1989). This feature of case studies echoes the notion of counterfactual thinking 
in critical realism. As mentioned by Reed (2008), counterfactual (rather than 
associational) thinking or reasoning encourages the researchers to shift their 
focus from ‘what happens to be associated with what’ towards ‘could these 
associations have been otherwise?’ (p. 71).  
 
The current research adopted a multiple case study strategy (Yin, 2003), as 
three organizations operating in the call centre industry were selected. The 
relevant research is dominated by studies based on multiple cases as their 
results are considered more robust in comparison with the findings of studies 
based on a single case (Eisenhardt, 1989; Saunders et al., 2009; Stake, 2000). 
As the choice of a research strategy is critically important in any study 
(Saunders et al., 2009) the researcher further scrutinized the decision of 
choosing a case study strategy on the basis of the different criteria given by 
Sarantakos (2005) in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 Criteria for selecting a Case Study strategy 
Case study feature Research feature Compatibility 
Studies the phenomenon in its 
holistic form. 
Explores psychological 
contract of individual 
employees on the basis of 
their global mental schemas.  
Yes 
Assumes research participants 
as experts in their individual 
domains. 
Analyzes psychological 
contracts of individual 
employees, assuming that 
they have a unique and 
proficient understanding of 
their contracts.  
Yes 
Challenges, further explains 
and proceeds towards a more 
agreeable conceptualization of 
a notion. 
Re-examines the strong 
underlying assumptions of 
psychological contract 
theory. 
Yes 
Research is conducted on the Explores psychological Yes 
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basis of different units. contracts of employees with 
an assumption of their 
individual contracts as 
distinct from those of others.  
   
Source: Adapted from Sarantakos (2005) 
 
The limitations of case studies, however, need to be considered. From a 
qualitative perspective, the findings of case studies are only ‘generalizable to 
theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes’ (Yin, 1994, p. 10). 
As statistical generalization is not an objective of the current study, Mitchell 
(1983) and Yin (2003), in the context of case studies, posit that, rather than 
generalization, research needs to be more concerned about the generation of a 
robust theory from its findings, a key objective of the current research. 
Furthermore, the case study findings of the current research, even though they 
may not serve the purpose of statistical generalization, nevertheless are 
amenable for the purpose of analytical generalization, i.e. the findings from the 
case study may be employed to represent or illustrate the theory (Yin, 2003). 
Eisenhardt (1989) argues that the findings of research based on a case study 
strategy largely result in the generation of a theory that ‘describes a very 
idiosyncratic phenomenon’ (p. 547). The concern of Eisenhardt (1989) may 
represent a limitation in other studies but for the current study, this serves as 
an advantage rather than a limitation due to the highly idiosyncratic nature of 
psychological contracts.  
 
Another criticism of case studies is the generation of high volumes of data 
(Yin, 2003) resulting in a massive document ‘which is overly complex’ 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 547). This may result in relatively rich findings, which 
are, however, lacking the simplicity to make them easily understandable. Kelle 
(1997), nonetheless, argues that with contemporary development in the data 
processing capabilities of computers, the problem of management of data can 
be easily handled. The development of computer software packages such as 
nVivo and Atlas.ti, support researchers to easily manage huge volumes of data. 
There are also concerns about the lack of guiding principles for implementing 
a case study strategy. Stake (1995), however, argue that it is unusual to expect 
standardized guiding principles as established in the pure sciences. It is, rather, 
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the nature of the research problem to guide the protocols of the case study 
strategy for data collection and data analysis. Saunders et al. (2009, p. 147) 
also discuss the apparently ‘unscientific feel’ of case studies but also mention 
that ‘a well-constructed case study strategy’ may help the researcher to 
overcome this limitation. On the basis of the suggestions of Saunders et al. 
(2009) and the guidelines provided by Yin (2003), the current study employs 
multiple sources of evidence and engages key informants when reviewing the 
findings in order to ensure validity and rigour.  
 
The above discussion focused on the methodological details of the current 
study from the perspectives of research philosophy and research strategy. The 
next section explains the context of the current study, i.e. the call centres, 
followed by a description of the data collection methods, the sampling frame, 
the ethical issues and the data analysis procedure.  
 
3.4 The case of call centres 
The development of call centres has introduced critical changes in the services 
industry (Hastings, 2011; Russell, 2008). Beginning in the 1990s, the call 
centre industry has experienced exponential growth (Hannif et al., 2008; 
Thompson et al., 2004). According to Lewig and Dollard (2003), call centres 
have a tremendous worldwide growth rate of 40 percent. Taylor and Bain 
(1999) explain it as the Taylorization [i.e. scientific management] of white-
collar employees with an ‘assembly line in the head’ (p. 101). Jackall (1978) 
argues that employees in the services industry often work under the strong 
influence of management. Similarly, other researchers posit that the use of 
excessive surveillance and control along with a powerful bureaucratic style of 
management generally leads to increased stress levels among call centre 
employees (Batt and Moynihan, 2002; Deery and Kinnie, 2002; Hastings, 
2011).  
 
Holman (2002) argues that excessive monitoring and control create a feeling 
of powerlessness among call centre employees. While referring to the 
Taylorisitc style of management in call centres, Zapf et al. (2003) posit that 
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this perception of powerlessness ultimately results in employees’ low trust in 
management. The deteriorated employee well-being, due to this low trust in 
management, is found to be significantly associated with employees’ 
psychological contracts (Hannif et al., 2008; Guest et al., 1996). Consistent 
with this view, Cross et al. (2008) argue that the psychological contracts of call 
centre employees are generally transactional rather than relational due to their 
low trust in management.  
 
Mckeown (2005) indicates the relatively high stress levels among call centre 
employees due to their perceptions of low power or control in the employment 
relationship. Broek (2002) argues that teams are formed in call centres with the 
purpose of establishing and further enhancing the normative control of 
management by promoting competition among the group members. Russell 
(2008), in agreement with Broek (2002), mentions that ‘call-centre work is not 
dependent upon integrated work teams for the fulfillment of assignments’ (p. 
198). It can be inferred from the viewpoint of these researchers that an 
individualistic orientation to the employment relationship is encouraged by 
management in call centres with the underlying objective of keeping the 
balance of power in favour of the organization.  
 
The literature refers to this management approach as working in ‘teams 
without team-work’ (Broek, 2002, p. 197). This view is supported by other 
researchers who call for improved union arrangements for a better 
representation of call centre employees (Russell, 2008; Taylor and Bain, 
2006). Call centre positions, therefore, are a distinct representation of the 
lower level clerical jobs of the past (Glucksmann, 2004) performed in 
circumstances of ‘asymmetries of power’ (Harvey and Randles, 2002, p. 11) 
under the strict control of management, with limited union arrangements 
rendering almost negligible powers to employees (Van den Broek, 2008).   
 
However, as argued by Beirne et al. (2004), ‘yet prisoners rebel and riot, 
workers resist and react, and they do so in reflective, even purposeful ways’ 
(p. 101). Similarly, other researchers posit that, despite rigorous bureaucratic 
controls in call centres, employees resist and make efforts against the 
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disciplinary practices and dominant discourses (e.g. Hastings, 2011; Rajan-
Rankin and Tomlinson, 2013; Russell, 2008). The argument of these 
researchers gains currency due to three key rationales. First, it negates the 
assumption of call centre workers as ‘passive subjects’, who are reduced to the 
employment structures characterized by the techno-bureaucratic controls and 
who serve the interests of the organization without any resistance and 
independent sense-making (Hastings, 2011; Taylor and Bain, 2000, p. 7). 
Second, this view is consistent with the notion of power that is embedded into 
the complex and dynamic relational interdependencies between employees and 
employers.  
 
Third, this view provides support in overcoming the prevailing theoretical 
preoccupation with monitoring and surveillance issues in call centre research. 
This theoretical preoccupation, emphasizing ‘internalized policing and control’ 
through monitoring and surveillance mechanisms, has marginalized or 
excluded other important issues related to employee resistance and workplace 
struggles (Beirne et al., 2004, p. 101). This argument is supported by Hastings 
(2011), who noted that, despite strict techno-bureaucratic controls in call 
centres, employees resist and react to the management’s efforts to ensure 
workers’ complete subordination. Therefore this research, rather than 
assuming call centre workers as passive subjects, adopts an approach in which 
they are considered to be actively involved in workplace struggles to influence 
their interdependent employment relationships with employers.  
 
3.5 A perspective on Pakistan 
As the current study is based on the call centre industry in Pakistan, it is 
pertinent to highlight the position of employees in relation to union 
arrangements within a Pakistani context. Malik et al. (2011, p. 191) point 
towards the limited role of trade unions in Pakistan by mentioning that ‘only 
0.6% of total workers are organized in trade unions’. For them, this is mainly 
the result of the continuous government interventions to curb the influence of 
trade unions. In 1952, the Pakistan Essential Services Act (PESA) was 
implemented, which gave the government the right to restrict the activities of 
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any trade union in any industry (Candland, 2007). Later on, in 1955, the first 
labour policy was announced by the government regarding the role of trade 
unions. However, this labour policy was largely vague and ineffective, as no 
proper legislation was formulated by the then government (Somavia, 2008).  
 
In 1958, martial law was imposed by General Ayub Khan and the first labour 
policy was abolished. In 1959, a second labour policy was announced by the 
military regime of General Ayub Khan. This labour policy also restricted the 
role of trade unions by allowing the government to intervene directly in the 
resolution of labour disputes (Malik et al., 2011). These restrictions were 
abolished by the later democratic government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who 
considerably supported the role of trade unions in the country (Bawa and 
Hashmi, 2010). However, in 1977, General Zia imposed martial law again and 
strictly banned any trade union activity in Pakistan. These bans were partially 
lifted by the later democratic governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz 
Sharif. In 1999, the government of Nawaz Sharif was overturned and martial 
law was again imposed by General Pervez Musharraf. From the beginning of 
his regime, General Musharraf ‘implemented several strict laws such as the 
Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002, the Removal from Service (Special 
Powers) Ordinance, 2000 and other anti-labour laws to limit activities of 
unions’ (Malik et al., 2011, p. 188).  
 
The later democratic government of Gillani announced it would amend the 
Industrial Relations Ordinance Act (2002) in order to lift the ban on the 
activities of trade unions. However, no appropriate legislation has been passed 
to sanction the activities of trade unions (Shah, 2010). According to Irfan 
(2008), because of these continuous interventions by the military regimes and 
the democratic governments, the role of trade unions in Pakistan has largely 
remained ineffective. Irfan’s (2008) viewpoint echoes the argument of 
Rehman (2003) that, as a result of the perceived ineffectiveness of the trade 
unions in Pakistan, employees generally tend to avoid actively participating in 
their activities. For them, in addition to the perceived low benefits of 
becoming a trade union member, there is also the likely result of victimization 
from the employer (Rehman, 2003).  
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Similar to other industries, the call centre industry in not an exception. 
Working under the government regulatory body of Pakistan 
Telecommunication Authority (PTA), most of the industry comprises private 
sector organizations (Akhtar, 2009). As a result of ineffective government 
regulations and the strict policies of private sector organizations, the role of 
trade unions in this industry is even more limited. In addition to these two 
factors, Rehman (2003) attributes the limited role of trade unions to the lack of 
required skills among their leadership. Malik et al. (2011), while endorsing the 
viewpoint of Rehman (2003), posit that, despite constant growth for the last 
two decades, the employment conditions in this industry are not very different 
from those in other industries. For him, in a similar way to other industries, 
this is largely the result of the authoritarian policies of the privately owned 
organizations that discourage any activity of the trade unions.  
 
3.6 Rationale for data collection in Pakistan 
The decision to collect the data in Pakistan was based on several 
considerations. The first issue was that a clear majority of call centre research, 
published in peer reviewed journals, is based on the context of western 
countries, despite the fact that most of the companies operating in these 
countries are off-shoring their major call centre operations to non-western 
countries e.g. India, the Caribbean, the Philippines, Malaysia etc. (ACA 
Research, 2003). The issues related to linguistics (e.g. accents, dialects, 
fluency, colloquialisms etc.) and culture (e.g. popular TV soaps, favourite 
sports, holidays, rituals etc.) are considered highly relevant in a call centre 
environment (Taylor and Bain, 2005). My origins will be significantly helpful 
in the data collection and interpretation process because of my native 
acquaintance with the language and culture of the call centre workers 
interviewed in the current study. Polit and Hungler (1991) argue that the prior 
knowledge of the researcher regarding the issue under investigation may 
improve the quality of the research. Consistent with this viewpoint, my 
background in the call centre industry in Pakistan will be significantly helpful 
in the current study. In addition, my background call centre experience in 
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Pakistan will support the current study in terms of gaining access to the 
companies and respondents at the different stages of the research.  
 
3.7 Specific contact organizations in Pakistan 
In terms of the specific contact organizations, the current study is based on the 
call centres of the three major companies (pseudonyms A, B and C) in 
Pakistan. According to the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA, 
2012), these organizations which have been established for 19 (A), 10 (B) and 
6 (C) years, collectively capture approximately more than 80% of the cellular 
customer market in Pakistan. With an employee strength of about 400 (A), 180 
(B) and 205 (C) front end customer service representatives, working in three 
shifts each of eight hours a day and with operations in all the major cities of 
Pakistan (e.g. Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, Quetta, Peshawar, Multan, 
Faisalabad etc.), these companies provide a rich source of data based on their 
variety of established departments (e.g. customer services, corporate and retail 
sales, technical support, operations, human resources, quality enhancement, 
commercial, administration etc.) In addition to these features, the selection of 
these organizations for the current study was also based on my personal 
contacts, providing considerable support in terms of negotiating access to the 
research participants.  
 
3.8 A perspective on Indian call centres 
Before moving to the details of data collection, it is pertinent to highlight the 
call centre insights from India. The perspective on Indian call centres is 
imperative as India has emerged as ‘the most significant “destination”’ for the 
migration of call centre services from the US, UK and Australia (Taylor and 
Bain, 2008, p. 132, quotation marks in original). Similar to Pakistan, the 
influence of trade unions in the Indian call centre industry is very limited. 
Taylor and Bain (2008) maintain that ‘despite strong traditions in telecoms and 
banking, there is only embryonic union presence’ in Indian call centres. 
Comparing this to the UK, they posit that ‘UK unions, can be encouraged that, 
although facing real threats to members’ jobs and pressures to make 
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concessions to employers, since relocation is not inevitable and labour not 
automatically sustainable, their position is stronger than commonly 
understood’ (Taylor and Bain, 2008, p. 149).  
 
Peetz (2002) attribute the modest presence of trade unions in Indian call 
centres mainly to the ineffective policies of successive Indian governments, 
industry opposition and the anti-union strategies of the employers. According 
to Noronha and d’Cruz (2006), employers emphasize the ideological message 
that apparently resonates with employees’ aspirations that unionization will 
lead to job insecurity and will damage industry growth by undermining the 
confidence of the clients to offshore. Examples exist of companies attempting 
to minimize any influence of trade unions by dismissing employees who voice 
their concerns regarding employee representation (Taylor and Bain, 2008). 
Similarly, Ramesh (2005) reports companies ‘nipping out any sprouts of 
organization in the bud’ by forcing their agents to quit ‘who are vocal against 
management decisions’ (p. 17). This tendency among employers is evident in 
the interview response of Kiran Karnik, president NASSCOM (India’s 
National Association of Software and Service Companies) that in the industry 
‘the grievances of the workers are addressed promptly and the wages are good 
so there is no need for unions…’ (http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/ 
oct/17bpo.htm).  
 
However, despite these anti-union strategies, arguments that organizations 
have captured the minds and hearts of their employees are immensely 
exaggerated (Noronha and d’Cruz, 2006). Research highlights the dissonance 
experienced by employees due to these employers’ practices (Batt et al., 
2006). Consequently, ‘significant numbers do leave call centres … for more 
stimulating employment, or to continue academic study’ (Taylor and Bain, 
2008, p. 146). However for others - who continue working with call centres 
due to lacking employment opportunities with other potential employers - 
negative psychological consequences have been reported. Deb (2004) argues 
that the distinctive issues associated with the particular nature of work in 
Indian call centres, further aggravate the stressful work experience of 
employees.  
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One of these issues is the ‘synchronization of work times with overseas 
customers’ hours’ resulting in evening and night working which employees 
report ‘as the most disliked aspect of their job’ (Taylor and Bain, 2008, p. 
146). In addition, understaffing, long shifts of 9-10 hours and the change of 
shifts at very short notice contribute as other major factors (Deb, 2004). The 
strictly monitored breaks, and the fact that employees in some companies have 
to wave coloured flags when they need to visit the toilet, further highlight the 
highly demanding work experience in Indian call centres (Datta, 2004). 
Another issue is the restrictions imposed by employers on the free movement 
of employees (NASSCOM, 2005a). In order to secure employment in other 
organizations, most employees need a relieving or leaving certificate which 
their employers may withhold (Ramesh, 2005).  In short, there is a ‘profound 
democratic deficit’ in Indian call centre industry and this represents a powerful 
case on ‘ethical, moral and democratic grounds for employee representation’ 
(Taylor and Bain, 2008, p. 148).  
  
3.9 Data collection – Interviews 
A number of different data collection choices are discussed in the literature 
(Bryman, 2008; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Marshall and Rossman, 1999; 
Robson, 2002; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). Saunders et al. (2009) posit that 
the choice may vary from the single data collection method to multiple 
methods (i.e. combining both qualitative and quantitative data collection 
methods in one study). Bryman (2008) argues that, although the use of a 
combination of different methods may enhance the quality of the research 
findings, the ultimate choice (to use either quantitative or qualitative methods 
or a combination of both) will largely depend upon the research objectives.  
 
The current study employs semi-structured interviews for the purpose of data 
collection for several reasons. Semi-structured interviews provide respondents 
with the freedom to express their responses in an unrestricted manner, while 
simultaneously allowing the researcher to manage any unanticipated 
dimensions of the research problem emerging from the interviewees’ 
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responses. This key characteristic is consistent with the research philosophy of 
the current study, i.e. critical realism. As emphasized by Curry et al. (2009), 
critical realism, rather than prohibiting any unanticipated issues or dimensions 
from emerging (e.g. as in positivistic research) allows unpredicted outcomes to 
emerge from the research process.  
 
As discussed earlier, psychological contracts are largely based on the highly 
subjective perceptions of employees (Conway and Briner, 2009; Shore et al., 
2012). In this context, interviewing appears as a considerably useful data 
collection method. Managing the highly subjective nature of psychological 
contracts, interviews may provide significant opportunities to the respondents 
to express their subjective perceptions, beliefs and emotions in freedom 
(Webb, 1995). This key characteristic of interviews is compatible with the 
critical realist research philosophy. Critical realism, even though 
acknowledging the existence of an external independent reality, also argues 
that this reality is not observer independent i.e. the understanding of this 
external reality is largely influenced by our subjective perceptions and 
cognitions (Danermark et al., 2002). Consistent with the critical realist 
research philosophy, interviews are considered as significantly helpful in 
investigating the subjective perceptions of the research participants regarding 
their psychological contracts.  
 
In addition, semi-structured interviews are considered as relevant for the 
current study because of the complex nature of the research questions. This 
complexity demands flexibility in the logic, order and wording of the 
questions as the interview proceeds and the interviewees express their beliefs 
and perceptions in an idiosyncratic manner. Jankowicz (2005) and Easterby-
Smith et al. (2008) also suggest employing interviews in such cases where the 
nature of the research questions is complex and the responses are 
unpredictable. Moreover, Berent (1966) and Hedges (1985) argue that 
interviews provide comprehensive and preferential information as a result of 
the unusual feeling of empowerment in conjunction with anonymity they 
provide, motivating the interviewees to answer the interview questions from 
their own rather than the interviewer’s perspective.  
110 
 
 
There are, however, some complexities associated with the use of interviews. 
Saunders et al. (2009) suggest that the issue of reliability may emerge in semi-
structured interviews as a result of their lack of standardization. According to 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) and Silverman (2007), reliability ensures that 
other researchers will draw similar conclusions, while following the same 
research procedures. In response to this apparent weakness of the interviewing 
method, the researcher, nonetheless, argues that ensuring reliability in the 
findings is not an objective of the current study. This is because of the fact that 
the psychological contracts of employees (even working in similar 
circumstances) are often different, not only because they change over time, but 
also because of their highly idiosyncratic, complex and dynamic nature 
(Conway and Briner, 2009).  
 
According to Marshall and Rossman (1999), researchers employing such non-
standardized qualitative methods need to assume this lack of reliability as a 
strength rather than a weakness of these methods, resulting from their 
capability of providing a contextual rather than a positivistic description of the 
research problem. Previously, more than 90% of empirical investigations of 
psychological contracts employed quantitative data collection methods (e.g. 
questionnaires), primarily ensuring reliability (Conway and Briner, 2009). The 
immense divergence in their different conceptualizations, however, points 
towards the issue of the incompatibility of these data collection methods with 
the nature of the phenomenon. The researcher, consistent with the argument of 
Conway and Briner (2009), focuses on qualitative data collection methods in 
order to investigate the phenomenon of the psychological contract.  
 
Sorrell and Redmond (1995) raise the concern that interviews place the 
researcher in the position of a data collection instrument and this may possibly 
lead to interviewer bias while conducting interviews. This may be due to non-
verbal behaviour, leading questions or the comments of the interviewer, which 
may give clues to the interviewee to modify their responses. Easterby-Smith et 
al. (2008) argue that the influence of interviewer bias may also extend to the 
stage of data analysis, if the assumptions of the interviewer are strong enough 
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to influence the analysis and interpretation of data from his or her own 
perspective rather than the perspective of the interviewee.  
 
This caution of Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) has intuitive resonance and, if 
ignored, may be detrimental to any research findings resulting in ‘superficial 
exchange of information’ (p. 144). As far as the risk of bias at the interviewing 
stage is concerned, I managed these issues by drawing on my previous 
experience of conducting interviews for my MBA and MSc dissertations. The 
skills acquired in the MSc advanced course designed specifically for the 
conduct of qualitative interviews were also helpful for this purpose. Based on 
the recommendations of Easterby-Smith et al. (2008), I also probed with open 
ended questions.  
 
Finally, McClelland (1965) mentions that there are conditions when the 
statements of respondents may not be completely trustworthy because of their 
intentions of portraying themselves in a more socially acceptable manner. 
Mangham (1986) explains that respondents may tell half-truths either on the 
basis of concealed motives or because sometimes people are themselves not 
completely aware of their own motives. Easterby-Smith et al. (2008, p. 146) 
suggest employing the technique of ‘laddering’ in such cases by asking the 
‘why type questions’. This helps the researcher to gain an accurate account of 
the phenomenon, as a result of the revelation of ‘the individual’s value base’ 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2008, p. 146). It is pertinent to highlight that this 
feature of interviews (acknowledging the possibility of biased or even 
misguided responses from the research participants) is compatible with the 
underlying assumptions of critical realism. In comparison to interpretivism 
(relying extensively on the respondents’ descriptions), critical realism 
acknowledges that the responses from the research participants may be biased 
or even misguided (Potter and Lopez, 2001). 
 
In addition to interviews, focus groups, also known as ‘focus group interviews’ 
(Saunders et al. 2009, p. 347) emerged as another important choice during the 
evaluation of different methods for data collection. Carson et al. (2001) define 
a focus group as a group interview, exploring a particular issue on the basis of 
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an interactive discussion among different research participants. Focus groups, 
despite their capability of generating more information as compared to 
individual interviews in the same time (Holloway and Wheeler, 2002), are, 
however, not suitable for the current research. This is because psychological 
contracts are largely based on highly idiosyncratic beliefs and perceptions 
pertinent to a particular individual (Guest, 2004a). In contrast, focus groups 
are principally employed to gain multiple and diverse opinions regarding a 
phenomenon from a variety of individuals (Saunders et al. 2009).  
 
I argue that employing focus groups in the current research would have 
resulted in contaminating rather than enriching the data. In addition, there are 
some other issues which restrict focus groups as an appropriate choice for this 
research. As mentioned by Fern (1982), although, focus groups generate more 
information from interviews in equivalent time, the quality of information per 
respondent is relatively inferior as compared to interviews. Furthermore, 
Bryman (2008) mentions that the researcher probably has less control over the 
proceedings of focus groups as compared to interviews. Considering the 
complex nature of the investigation, it would already be difficult to manage the 
flow of discussion even in individual interviews; employing focus groups in 
such a case would be more challenging. Finally Madriz (2000) mentions that, 
in focus groups, participants may not be comfortable expressing their personal 
views regarding an issue in the presence of others. This may result in 
fabricated and probably more culturally accepted rather than the truthful 
responses, hindering the emergence of information portraying the genuine 
picture on the research problem (Morgan, 2002).  
 
3.9.1  Details of interviewees and interviewing process 
For the current study, 43 semi-structured interviews were conducted during the 
data collection process. The detailed profile of the interviewees (anonymised) 
is presented in table 3.3. Of the 43 interviewees, 37 respondents were non-
managerial level employees (13 from company A, 13 from company B and 11 
from company C), while 6 participants belonged to the managerial category (2 
from each company A, B and C). The interviews lasted between 35 and 80 
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minutes, depending on the time availability of the interviewee and any 
emerging themes that could potentially add richness to the findings of the 
study and therefore required additional probing. All the interviews were 
conducted in the offices of the participating organizations.  
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Table 3.3   Profile of research participants 
Company’s 
pseudonym 
Participant’s 
Pseudonym 
Job title Age Gender Education level Full-time / Part-time 
Time employed with 
the  current company 
No. of previous jobs 
Total years of 
experience 
A Participant 1 Sales officer 23 Male Undergraduate degree Full-time 2 years 0 2 
A Participant 2 Customer services officer 26 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 1 year 1 3 
A Participant 3 Sales officer 23 Female Postgraduate degree Full-time 1 year 0 1 
A Participant 4 Sales officer 27 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 2 years 2 4 
A Participant 5 Customer services officer 24 Female Postgraduate degree Full-time 1 year 0 1 
A Participant 6 Customer services officer 25 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 3 years 0 3 
A Participant 7 Customer services officer 26 Male Postgraduate degree Part-time 2 years 1 3 
A Participant 8 Customer services officer 26 Female Postgraduate degree Full-time 3 years 0 3 
A Participant 9 Customer services officer 28 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 4 years 1 5 
A Participant 10 Regional sales manager 39 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 7 years 4 15 
A Participant 11 Shift supervisor 31 Male Undergraduate degree Full-time 5 years 2 10 
A Participant 12 IT maintenance officer 27 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 3 years 1 4 
A Participant 13 Customer services officer 26 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 2 years 1 3 
A Participant 14 Customer services officer 28 Male Undergraduate degree Part-time 2 years 2 7 
A Participant 15 Asst. manager corporate sales 29 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 4 years 2 6 
B Participant 16 Sales executive 26 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 2 years 1 3 
B Participant 17 Customer care executive 28 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 3 years 1 4 
B Participant 18 Sales executive 25 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 2 years 0 2 
B Participant 19 Customer care executive 27 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 3 years 1 4  
B Participant 20 Customer care executive 24 Female Undergraduate degree Full-time 1 years 1 2 
115 
 
Company’s 
pseudonym 
Participant’s 
Pseudonym 
Job title Age Gender Education level Full-time / Part-time 
Time employed with 
the  current company 
No. of previous jobs 
Total years of 
experience 
B Participant 21 Sales executive 28 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 1 year 3 5 
B Participant 22 Customer care executive 25 Female Postgraduate degree Full-time 2 years 0 2 
B Participant 23 Customer care executive 27 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 3 years 1 4 
B Participant 24 IT executive 24 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 1 year 1 2 
B Participant 25 Senior human resource manager 41 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 8 years 3 17 
B Participant 26 Customer care executive 31 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 4 years 1 7 
B Participant 27 Customer care executive 27 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 2 years 1 5 
B Participant 28 Customer care executive 30 Male Postgraduate degree Part-time 3 years 2 6 
B Participant 29 Customer care executive 25 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 2 years 1 3 
B Participant 30 Team leader 31 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 4 years 2 7 
C Participant 31 Client services advisor 25 Male Postgraduate degree Part-time 2 years 0 2 
C Participant 32 Sales advisor 25 Male Postgraduate degree Part-time 1 year 1 2 
C Participant 33 Client services advisor 28 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 3 years 1 5 
C Participant 34 Sales advisor 24 Male Undergraduate degree Full-time 2 years 1 3 
C Participant 35 Senior sales manager 44 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 6 years 4 20 
C Participant 36 Client services advisor 27 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 2 years 1 3 
C Participant 37 Client services advisor 24 Male Postgraduate degree Part-time 2 years 0 2 
C Participant 38 Senior officer technical support 29 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 2 years 2 5 
C Participant 39 Client services advisor 26 Female Postgraduate degree Full-time 2 years 1 3 
C Participant 40 Operations manager  36 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 4 years 2 12 
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Company’s 
pseudonym 
Participant’s 
Pseudonym 
Job title Age Gender Education level Full-time / Part-time 
Time employed with 
the  current company 
No. of previous jobs 
Total years of 
experience 
C Participant 41 
Client services advisor 
(probation) 
24 Male Postgraduate degree Full-time 6 months 0 6 months 
C Participant 42 Client services advisor 25 Female Undergraduate degree Full-time 1 year 1 3 
C Participant 43 Sales advisor 24 Male Postgraduate degree Part-time 1 year 1 2 
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In addition, some of the interviewees were contacted after the interview (through 
email or telephone) in order to confirm their viewpoint in the case of any 
confusion or to gain additional information regarding a theme that emerged during 
the process of data analysis. A copy of the plain language statement, which 
mentioned the associated details of the interview (e.g. anonymity, confidentiality, 
the voluntary nature of participation, contact details for further information etc.), 
was sent to each respondent along with the invitation to participate in the study. 
The interview date, time and venue were decided in advance. Only those 
participants who agreed to the audio recording of the interview were interviewed.  
 
As an additional precautionary measure, the purpose of the study and the 
participants’ role in it were again read to every interviewee at the time of the 
interview. Before the interview commenced, all participants were reassured that 
their anonymity and confidentiality will be carefully maintained (Kvale, 1996). 
Pseudonyms rather than the actual name of the research participants were used for 
this purpose. The language of the interview was informal and any technical jargon 
was avoided (Davey, 2008). I also paid significant attention to ensuring that no 
question was vague, had a double meaning or was leading. In order to minimize 
any research bias, open-ended questions were posed in a probing rather than in a 
prompting manner (Flick, 2002). This allowed the data to emerge on its own 
without any guiding influence (Arksey and Knight, 1999).  
 
As recommended by Rubin and Rubin (1995), the interviewees were given the 
opportunity to express their opinions and beliefs without any influence. I worked 
to ensure, however, that the topic of discussion centred on the research problem. 
Nonetheless, any unanticipated responses that could add further insight to the 
findings were encouraged and probed further (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The 
audio recorded interviews were later fully transcribed. Kvale (1996) suggests that 
‘transcribing the interviews from an oral to a written mode structures the 
interview conversations in a form amenable for closer analysis’ (pp. 168-169). 
The transcription was verbatim in format except for repeated or unclear words. 
This form of verbatim transcription, in addition to adding to validity, also helps 
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the reader to focus on the actual content without any distraction (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987).  
 
3.10 Sampling procedure 
Research sampling has largely been divided into two broad categories i.e. 
probability sampling (basic random sampling, cluster sampling, systematic 
sampling and stratified random sampling) and non-probability sampling (quota 
sampling, accidental sampling and purposive sampling). Because of the highly 
qualitative and idiosyncratic nature of psychological contracts and taking into 
account the guidelines of Hycner (1985) that the procedural details of data 
collection should be based on the nature of the research problem, the current study 
employs the purposive sampling procedure. Powell (1997) explains the rationale 
of purposive sampling as, ‘at times, it may seem preferable to select a sample 
based entirely on one’s knowledge of the population and the objectives of the 
research’ (p. 69).  
 
Although purposive sampling is helpful in qualitative studies, there are limitations 
to this method. Like other qualitative sampling techniques, purposive sampling 
does not explicitly specify the size of the sample of research participants. This can 
be seen as a weakness of the qualitative sampling, as in quantitative sampling 
there is an explicit discussion of the sample size needed in order to make an 
appropriate representation of the whole population (Marshall and Rossman, 
1999). A deeper investigation of the dynamics of qualitative sampling as set out 
by researchers (e.g. Gerson and Horwitz, 2002; Hussey and Hussey, 1997; 
Jankowicz, 2005; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Powell, 1997; Welman and Kruger, 
2001), however, explains the issue of the lack of an explicit discussion of sample 
size.  
 
Unlike quantitative studies, the findings of a qualitative study are not meant for 
the purpose of generalization to the larger population. Rather, a qualitative study 
explores an issue which is largely unique in its nature due to its associated 
context. On this basis, the sample size in a qualitative study cannot be ideally 
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determined. This raises another question of when to finish data collection in a 
qualitative study, as there is no clear guideline for determining the size of the 
sample. The current research, therefore, followed the guidelines of Guba and 
Lincoln (1985), who identified four criteria for when a researcher should finish 
data collection.  
 
1. Saturation of categories: the researcher is getting no additional data from 
the respondents to develop new emerging categories.  
2. Emergence of regularities: the researcher finds visible patterns or strong 
consistencies in the data, enabling the identification of the clear emergence 
of regularities.  
3. Exhaustion of resources: the researcher assumes that the available data 
sources (e.g. key informants, gate keepers, documents) are exhausted and 
no information can be further gained from them.  
4. Overextension: new information is still available but is not relevant to the 
core research objective and makes little contribution to the development of 
any other relevant categories.   
 
Following these guidelines, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a 
sample of 43 research participants. The sample consisted of two groups of 
managerial and non-managerial respondents. There were 6 and 37 research 
participants in the managerial and non-managerial groups respectively. 
Interviewing these two groups allowed me to overcome the one-sided approach by 
incorporating the viewpoints of both managerial and non-managerial respondents. 
Diversity was sought within each group to avoid any possible bias because of the 
homogenous nature of the groups. In order to gain initial access to potential 
participants, I used personal contacts I had acquired on the basis of my previous 
career in the call centre industry. A snowballing strategy was then used in order to 
contact the other potential participants recommended by the respondents initially 
interviewed. 
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3.11 Ensuring rigour in research 
Saunders et al. (2009) emphasize the importance of rigour in any research. 
Validity, reliability and generalizability are largely discussed in the literature as 
the key indicators of rigour in any research. According to Bryman (2008), 
although these three terms are those predominantly used by researchers and 
practitioners, in qualitative research the notions of validity, reliability and 
generalizability should instead be referred to as dependability, transferability and 
confirmability. This is because of the key differences in the underlying 
philosophical assumptions, research approaches, research designs, data collection 
and analysis procedures between qualitative and quantitative research. The 
following section discusses the degree of rigour in the current research on the 
basis of these measures.  
 
The validity of the research has been the focal point of the discussion of the 
differences between quantitative and qualitative research. According to Creswell 
(2003) validity means the accuracy of the findings in a piece of qualitative 
research. Validity is, therefore, different from objectivity, as it means the 
capability of the research findings to represent an accurate picture of the research 
problem under investigation (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Guba and Lincoln 
(1998) emphasize that there are two stages in any research process that have 
consequential effects on validity: first, the stage of the selection of the research 
method for the data collection and second, the interpretation of the research 
findings. The current research paid significant attention to the argument of Guba 
and Lincoln (1998). First, the research method for this research was selected on 
the basis of the nature of the research problem. Second, the interpretation of the 
findings was based on the consideration of whether the interpretation was capable 
of providing a robust account of the research problem under investigation.  
 
Reliability has been conceptualized differently in quantitative and qualitative 
research. In qualitative research, the application of reliability is a complex issue as 
investigating human behaviour is not similar to investigating non-human issues. 
For Easterby-Smith et al. (2008), rather than the question of whether the findings 
of one study are similar to the findings of another study, the real issue in 
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qualitative research is whether the findings are consistent with the data collected. 
Guba and Lincoln (1985), therefore, recommend using the term consistency rather 
than reliability in qualitative research. Schwandt (2001), however, argues that, 
although reliability is not so much emphasized in the qualitative area as it is in the 
quantitative domain, yet a certain degree of reliability is important as it endorses 
the authenticity of any research.  
 
Bryman (2008), while discussing the issue of reliability, emphasizes the need for a 
meticulous approach, maintaining accuracy in the recording and precision in the 
interpretation and presentation of data. Following the guidelines of Bryman 
(2008) and Saunders et al. (2009), the interviews were carefully recorded, 
transcribed with accuracy and later analyzed in a precise manner. Moreover, 
member checking, a technique recommended by researchers, in order to enhance 
the level of consistency, was utilized in the current study by asking research 
participants whether, the transcription of the data collected from them was correct 
and also whether, the interpretations and conclusions made on the basis of their 
data appeared rational to them (e.g. Glesne, 1999; Merriam, 1998). Maintaining 
an audit trail, which is another technique suggested by researchers, was practised 
through careful record keeping and a detailed explanation of the procedures used 
to analyze data (e.g. Guba and Lincoln, 1985; Schwandt, 2001). All the 
procedures were periodically reviewed by supervisors, colleagues and other 
doctoral committee members, a process referred to as external audit by Glesne 
(1999) and as peer review by Merriam (1998). 
 
Generalizability refers to the degree to which the findings of any research can be 
applied to other similar situations beyond those investigated in the study 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Unlike quantitative research which places greater 
emphasis on the generalization of research findings, in a qualitative study the 
findings may not necessarily be appropriate for the purpose of generalization as 
the primary objective of a qualitative study is to develop an in-depth 
understanding rather than ‘finding out what is generally true of many’ (Merriam, 
1995, p. 57). Qualitative researchers are, therefore, not strongly concerned with 
speculation about how their results may be applied to other similar settings; rather 
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they are more concerned with the nature of their findings in relation to their 
particular context and from different perspectives. The current study is primarily 
qualitative in its orientation and is concerned with a context-rich rather than a 
generalizable explanation of the research problem.  
 
3.12 Ethical considerations 
In any research, the researchers have responsibilities not only towards the 
truthfulness of their findings but also towards the research participants (Saunders 
et al., 2009). The researcher needs to consider any harmful consequences the 
research process might have on their subjects, as data collection particularly in the 
social sciences may bring social, psychological or even physical harm to the 
research participants (Lipson, 1994). According to Guba and Lincoln (1989), 
ethical concerns in any research process are concerned with four aspects relating 
to the research participants: 
 
1. Protecting the research participants against any possible harm. 
2. Obtaining fully informed consent from the participants before their 
participation.  
3. Considering the anonymity and confidentiality of the subjects.  
4. Avoiding any attempt to collect data from participants in a deceptive 
manner.  
 
Individual in-depth interviews are the principal data collection method in the 
current research and in this regard need to be carefully conducted as they may 
cause psychological disturbance to the participants (Morrow and Smith, 1995). 
Gerrard (1995) refers to this unpleasant psychological state of the research 
participants, resulting from the interviewing process, as research abuse. The data 
collection for this research was preceded by gaining ethical approval from the 
college of social sciences. In addition, I paid significant attention to protecting 
participants against any harm by ensuring their anonymity and confidentiality 
(Kvale, 1996). All the information from the participants was stored in a personal 
computer in password protected files. Pseudonyms were used while making any 
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attributions to the subjects (Bryman, 2008). Before conducting any interview, 
informed consent was sought from all research participants. In this regard, an 
informed consent form, developed on the basis of Bailey’s (1996) 
recommendations, was emailed to all the participants. The informed consent form 
detailed:  
 
 The overall purpose of the research activity (without the key research 
question). 
 The procedures involved in the data collection process. 
 The voluntary nature of participation for the subjects.  
 The interviewee’s right to end the interview without any reason at any 
time.  
 The measures taken to protect the anonymity and confidentiality of the 
subjects.  
 
Only those participants, who agreed to the audio recording of the interview, were 
included in the research. These measures prevented any intentional or 
unintentional deception on the research participants. According to Bailey (1996), 
deception is generally counter-productive and may impede the quality of the 
findings, while truthfulness reduces any suspicion and encourages honest 
responses from the subjects. Bailey (1996), however, suggests that not mentioning 
the key research question in the informed consent form should not be considered 
as deception. As an additional precautionary measure, all participants were again 
read the informed consent form just before the commencement of the interview 
and their permission to audio record the interview was sought. In addition, the 
data collection process started only after formal approval by the college of social 
sciences’ research ethics committee.  
 
3.13 Strategies for data analysis 
Critical realism acknowledges the impossibility of gaining complete objectivity 
during the research process (Anastas, 2004). Guillemin and Gillam (2004), 
however, argue that there is a need to minimize the subjective influences of the 
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researcher stemming from his/her ideas, expectations and interests in relation to 
the research. Acknowledging these concerns, different strategies were used during 
the process of data analysis in order to minimize any biases in the findings. The 
first strategy, as recommended by Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988), is to 
highlight the similarities and differences between the different individual 
respondents within the same group. According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2008), 
this helps researchers to break any overly-simplistic frames presenting a biased, 
superficial or uni-dimensional explanation of the research problem.  
 
In addition to highlighting similarities, I looked for differences among the 
research participants. For example, some of the customer services representatives, 
in comparison with the majority of their coworkers, assumed that the employers 
tended to promote relational contracts. Rather than forcing similarity in the 
diverging viewpoints of the respondents, I looked for the underlying reasons 
promoting these differences in the perceptions of the research participants. This 
approach to data analysis helped me to investigate an issue from a variety of 
dimensions, based on the perspectives of different research participants.  
 
The second strategy, based on the guidelines of Eisenhardt (1989), is to look 
beyond individual similarities and differences and focus on the intergroup level. 
This may help the researcher to acknowledge and further explore dimensions 
other than those that are suggested by the existing literature or the research 
problem or that are anticipated by the researcher (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 
1988). Based on this viewpoint, the current study paid attention not only to the 
similarities but also to the differences arising at group level. For example, as 
emphasized in the relevant literature, it was anticipated that employees would tend 
to reciprocate the employers’ inducements on parity basis. The data collection and 
subsequent analysis, however, later modified this preconception by highlighting 
that (other than employees belonging to the small group which had scarce skills 
and critically important knowledge for their organization) the majority group of 
employees, because of their perceptions of the power asymmetry in the 
employment relationship, were not able to reciprocate the employers’ 
inducements on parity basis.  
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A third strategy, as suggested by Gersick (1988) is to divide the data on the basis 
of the data source. This tactic supports the researcher in acknowledging a variety 
of contrasting insights into the data that can only be available from different 
sources of data. According to Eisenhardt (1989), ‘when a pattern from one data 
source is corroborated by the evidence from another, the finding is stronger and 
better grounded’ (p. 541). Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) further argue that the 
differences in the evidence from the different data sources may prompt the 
researcher to gain a deeper and more multi-dimensional understanding of the 
research problem, as these conflicts may be a symptom of bias in the analysis of 
the problem. To respond to this concern and as recommended by Gersick (1988), 
the current research, in addition to looking for similarities and differences at the 
individual and the group level within the same organization, also looked for 
contrasting evidence at the level of the different sources of data (i.e. at the inter-
organizational level) in order to prevent any ‘spurious or random pattern, or 
biased thinking in the analysis’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 541).  
 
Another strategy to promote validity and reliability is to present the findings 
drawn from the interviews back to the research participants. Researchers argue 
that different analysts may develop different themes from the same data based on 
their past experiences (e.g. Bryman, 2008; Kvale, 1996). Bodgan and Biklen 
(2007), therefore, suggest that the impact of this inconsistency can be reduced by 
presenting the research findings back to the research participants in order to 
ensure that they consider the findings to be accurate, pertinent and a truthful 
representation of the phenomenon they are experiencing. Following the guidelines 
of these researchers, the emergent themes were presented to the research 
participants in the form of interview summaries in plain language. Any suggested 
modification or inconsistency highlighted by the interviewees was discussed with 
them and incorporated into the findings. The emerging themes were also 
discussed in the departmental thesis committee review meetings and with the 
research supervisors.  
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Finally in order to promote the validity and the reliability of research findings, 
three of my colleagues (three fellow faculty members of the department of 
management of my university in my home country) acted as independent 
assessors during the data analysis process. Each of these three independent 
assessors autonomously analyzed one of the three major areas of investigation in 
the current study (i.e. mutuality, reciprocity and agency). Later, a comparison was 
made between the codes I had developed and the codes developed by the three 
independent assessors in their corresponding areas (i.e. mutuality, reciprocity and 
agency). Any disagreement or variation in the conceptualization and formulation 
of these codes were discussed and reconciled as necessary.  
 
3.14 Template analysis 
The above section highlighted the different strategies I followed in order to 
minimize any bias during the process of data analysis. The following discussion 
highlights the operational details in terms of the data analysis techniques I 
adopted. The analysis of the data was based on the technique of template analysis. 
King (2004) posits that template analysis supports qualitative research, as ‘it is a 
more flexible technique with fewer specified procedures, permitting researchers to 
tailor it to match their own requirement’ (p. 257). The technique of template 
analysis has been used in a number of qualitative studies based on the critical 
realist research philosophy and case study approach (e.g. Au, 2007; Biedenbach 
and Müller, 2012; Carter, 2012).  
 
In particular, in the domain of the psychological contract, researchers following a 
critical realist research philosophy have used the technique of template analysis 
for the analysis of their study findings (e.g. Kenny and Briner, 2013; McDowall 
and Saunders, 2010). According to Chell (1998), the initial template comprises the 
researcher’s preconceived codes developed on the basis of the research question 
and the review of the literature. Parzefall and Coyle-Shapiro (2011), in their study 
of psychological contract breach, further explain that these initial codes should be 
‘organized hierarchically, with groups of similar codes grouped together to 
produce more general, higher order codes’ (p. 16).  
127 
 
 
Gibbs (2007) argues that the researcher will need to amend the list of these codes 
‘during analysis as new ideas and new ways of categorizing are detected in the 
text’ (p. 45). Therefore, the key feature of template analysis is its amenability to 
constant revision as the analysis process continues. Following the guidelines of 
these researchers, the initial template was constantly modified by adding or 
deleting codes as the analysis of the textual data proceeded. When I observed a 
relevant issue that did not exist in or did not match any of the pre-existing codes, a 
new code was inserted in the template, providing additional detail to the overall 
analysis (King, 2004).  
 
Millward and Cropley (2003) argue that the robustness of the findings of any 
research study is largely influenced by the coding scheme developed for the 
purpose of data analysis. I attempted to develop a comprehensive coding scheme 
based on both the relevant empirical evidence and the emergent data. The coding 
was carried out at three levels.  
 
3.14.1  Level 1 – Substantive coding 
Stern (1980) refers to the first level of coding as substantive codes because they 
add substance to the data largely on the basis of the key words used by the 
research participants. At this stage, I scanned the interview transcripts in order to 
develop a better understanding of the emerging themes (Wainwright, 1994). 
Glaser (1978) explains this process as developing an awareness of the theoretical 
possibilities in the collected data i.e. developing theoretical sensitivity. 
Wainwright (1994) argues that this helps the researcher to avoid missing any other 
plausible interpretations of the data. An open coding system was adopted at this 
stage. The open coding system is characterized by scrutinizing the data on a line 
by line basis and identifying any unanticipated themes in the data (Streubert and 
Carpenter, 1995; Stern, 1980) and unpicking the complex concepts that may 
underpin these themes.  
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3.14.2  Level 2 – Theoretical coding  
At this stage, the codes developed at level 1 were grouped together to formulate 
different categories. Through constant comparative analysis of the data, the level 1 
codes were assigned to different categories or clusters (Stern, 1980). The 
assigning of these codes to different categories was carried out after comparing 
each level 1 code to every other code (Streubert and Carpenter, 1995). Later, each 
formulated category was compared to every other category in order to ensure that 
these categories were mutually exclusive. Glaser (1978) refers to this process as 
theoretical coding and, according to Beck (1996), these theoretical codes 
determine how the level 1 substantive codes are related to each other. The 
constant comparison method helped the researcher to check and recheck the 
consistency of the key themes emerging throughout the data. This also 
strengthened the validity of the findings i.e. whether the emerging themes were 
accurate in terms of providing a truthful and pertinent representation of the 
research problem (Smith, 2007). Other researchers also emphasize the importance 
of a constant comparison method in order to promote the reliability and the 
validity of the research findings (e.g. Wainwright, 1994; Strauss and Corbin, 
1990).  
 
3.14.3  Level 3 – Producing core categories 
Finally, I developed level 3 codes in order to produce the core categories by 
linking the data together. Following the guidelines of other researchers (e.g. 
Holloway and Wheeler, 1996; Hutchinson, 1986), the development of these codes 
was largely based on questions such as: what is the key focus of the study? What 
is the major concern/problem that is being faced by the research participants? 
What mechanisms are adopted by the research participants in order to manage that 
issue/problem? According to Hutchinson (1986), core categories assist in the 
development of a pattern that provides support in linking the variety of data 
together. Holloway and Wheeler (1996) argue that the core categories assist in 
explaining the variation in the data with implications for theory development. The 
core categories are usually determined near the end of the research (Holloway and 
Wheeler, 1996) and it may take longer to define their precise nature (Strauss, 
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1987). As the themes started emerging, additional data was collected for the 
purpose of theory development on the basis of these core categories. This process 
also helped to achieve saturation of the data.  
 
3.15 Chapter summary 
This chapter discussed the methodological details of the current study. A critical 
realist research philosophy was chosen. The discussion highlighted in detail why 
critical realism, in comparison to positivism or interpretivism, is more suitable for 
the current study. The next section critically analyzed different research strategies. 
After considering of the advantages and disadvantages of each, the case study 
strategy was finally selected for the current research. As discussed in detail, the 
decision to select the case study strategy was primarily based on the key research 
objective i.e. theory development. I opted for the qualitative research method and 
semi-structure interviews for the purpose of data collection. For Patton (1990), 
when a notion requires conceptual refinement, qualitative data collection methods 
are significantly helpful. The semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed me 
to remain focused on the key issues of the research while simultaneously 
managing and further exploring any unanticipated responses from the 
interviewees that could provide additional insights to the findings of the study.  
 
As the study aimed to explore the idiosyncratic views of the research participants 
regarding their own employment relationships, great attention was paid to ethical 
issues in order to avoid any unpleasant consequences from the research activity 
for them. In addition to gaining ethical approval from the college of social 
sciences, I gave all participants a detailed explanation of the objective of the 
research activity and the significance of their role in it. All the participants were 
assured of their anonymity and confidentiality at the time of interview. The 
discussion then highlighted the different strategies I followed in order to minimize 
any bias in the research findings. Finally, the discussion focused on the details of 
the template analysis, a technique used in the current study for the purpose of data 
analysis.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Findings 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the current study concerning the notions of 
mutuality, reciprocity and agency. The first section of the chapter focuses on 
issues related to the assumption of mutuality in the psychological contract 
literature. Undermining the assumption of implicit mutuality, the results highlight 
the notion of indeterminacy between employees and the employer. The findings 
also illustrate the employers’ tendency to guide employees’ perceptions of 
mutuality according to the objectives of the organization. The results further point 
towards different issues (e.g. employees’ concerns regarding training, and job 
flexibility) that encourage employees’ perceptions of a biased mutuality in their 
employment relationships. Consequently, employees make efforts to promote 
their employability prospects through enhancing their knowledge and skills. This 
enhanced employability ultimately supports employees by strengthening their 
bargaining power as, in addition to reducing their dependence on the current 
employer, it also increases the employer’s dependence on them. The final part 
focuses on the divergence in the perceptions of mutuality of employees and 
managers.  
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4.2 Mutuality 
 
4.2.1 Indeterminacy in employment relations 
In the context of mutuality, indeterminacy emerged as an important theme. 
Among employees, a number of factors (e.g. management’s reluctance to share 
information, different shift timings and busy working routines) strengthened the 
development of perceptions of indeterminacy rather than a consensus-based 
mutuality. A representative statement, illustrating the existence of indeterminacy 
as opposed to the frequently assumed notion of mutuality in the psychological 
contract literature, was: 
 
Talking about each and every thing and then agreeing with him 
[manager] is very difficult. It is not possible. When we begin our shift, 
we have to attend to the customer calls non-stop. There is hardly a 
proper lunch break till the end of the shift … We hardly have any special 
time to discuss our issues with the management and this is the daily 
routine.  
(participant 6) 
 
Theoretically, there is a noticeable emphasis on the notion of an implicit mutuality 
in the psychological contract literature. However, in actual employment 
conditions, employees have to face a series of difficulties while promoting 
mutuality even on an explicit basis. This is because, in addition to the reason of 
laborious working hours mentioned above, there are a number of other factors 
which promote indeterminacy between employees and their employers. According 
to another respondent: 
 
The main issue is the difficulty in understanding properly … Sometimes I 
have to rely mainly on the second hand information I get from my 
colleagues who are working in the shift before me, because I may not be 
able to talk face to face with my boss and sometimes this creates some 
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confusion between me and him … the boss says something and when it 
reaches me through other persons, it has changed a little bit.  
 
(participant 29)  
 
Irrespective of employees’ perceptions of, whether or not management is 
adequately addressing their concerns, this represents one of the factors (in this 
case, tension between work volume and finding time to discuss issues with 
management) that inhibit employees’ perceptions of mutuality by promoting 
indeterminacy in the employment relationships.  
 
In addition to the above mentioned factors associated with the operational issues 
of the organization, management practices appeared to play a significant role in 
promoting employees’ perceptions of indeterminacy rather than mutuality. This 
issue was manifest in one of the responses as: 
 
I am not sure when I will be permanent member of staff. I am still 
working on a temporary contract. I joined this company six months ago 
on probation and I was told that I would be on probation for three 
months. After that, they would make me one of the permanent staff, 
depending on my work … it has been more than six months. My 
probation period finished 3 months ago but they have still not 
confirmed my position … This is very frustrating and, honestly speaking, 
I cannot do my work properly.  
 
(participant 41)  
 
Prevalent among the other research participants, the notion of indeterminacy 
(based on employees’ assumptions regarding the organization not fulfilling its 
promises) appeared to be a major source of restraining their perceptions of 
mutuality in the employment relationship.  
 
 
134 
 
4.2.2 Implications of explicit communication 
The psychological contract literature, under the influence of Rousseau (2011), 
emphasizes the notion of mutuality, which is based on the assumption of 
implicitness. The findings of the current study, in contrast to the predominant 
emphasis in the relevant literature, however, empirically highlight the importance 
of clear, explicit and timely communication as a key mechanism to promote 
mutuality. As mentioned by one respondent: 
 
I try to find out what the manager is actually looking for ... I need to 
clearly tell my seniors about my requirements also. I run my computer 
shop in the evening as a part-time business. The most important thing 
for me is to be free from my job at that time so that I may give proper 
time to my business. I told my boss this in the beginning … I believe if 
anyone needs to convey something to the organization, he needs to tell 
his manager very openly. How can the boss understand my problems if 
he is not told about it?  
 
(participant 14) 
 
This interview response highlights the significance of explicit communication as 
employees’ expectations may not only vary from one individual to another but 
may also be hidden or not necessarily clearly stated.  
 
The responses of the other research participants similarly highlighted the 
importance of explicit communication in order to convey their expectations, rather 
than relying on the employer implicitly understanding their expectations. The 
response from an interviewee further illustrates this notion: 
 
It is important that we tell the management what we need … they 
[managers] do nothing even when we remind them several times. If we 
keep silent and look to them to do what we want without us telling 
them, it will give them a good excuse not to do it because most of the 
time they are not interested. 
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(participant 17) 
 
Other than the issue of explicit communication, this comment further illustrates 
that employees consider not only their organization but also themselves as 
responsible for promoting mutuality in the employment relationship.  
 
In addition, the assumption of considering mutuality on an implicit basis leads to 
conflict with another organizational behaviour construct i.e. leadership. The 
psychological contract literature typically refers to the construct of leadership in 
the context of the relationship between employees and organizational agents. 
However, in contrast to the assumption of implicitness in the psychological 
contract literature, effective communication is emphasized in the leadership 
literature as a means of reducing any ambiguity in the relationship. The findings 
of this study also highlight the importance of effective communication in the 
context of reducing ambiguity in employment relationships. According to a 
research participant: 
 
Discussion with the department manager is very helpful as this is the 
best forum, sorry person, to discuss in detail the different issues 
concerned with the job … My manager is a very capable person. He has 
recently entered this company but is doing very well. He is leading this 
department far better, as he listens to our problems, although all of our 
problems are not solved yet. 
 
(participant 32)  
 
The significance of explicit communication with immediate managers was evident 
in the response of another research participant: 
 
The boss is the most appropriate person to talk about the expectations 
the organization has of its employees … In call centres, we work on 
different projects and the nature of the service we are providing can 
change very quickly … today I am working in corporate sales, the next 
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day I can be transferred to customer services or the complaints section. 
For these reasons, it is very important that the manager is the right 
person in the organization to ask about the details of the product, the 
sales targets of the company. 
 
(participant 22) 
 
This issue of reducing ambiguity on the basis of explicit communication further 
relates to the notion of agency in the psychological contract literature (i.e. the role 
of explicit communication with organizational agents in order to comprehend the 
expectations of the organization) and will be discussed in greater detail in the later 
agency section.  
 
4.2.3 Employer-oriented mutuality 
Even if we ignore the notion of implicitness, another issue that emerged was the 
tendency among employers to promote mutuality based on their own interests, 
while ignoring their responsibilities towards employees. The following response 
from an interviewee provides a representative picture of this situation: ‘... 
generally the agenda of most of the meetings is how to promote a new upcoming 
product ... how we can increase customer loyalty, how we can attract other 
customers to our company ...’ (participant 23).  
 
Similarly, the responses of other research participants implied that organizational 
communication, apparently to promote mutuality, primarily focused on 
encouraging employees’ contributions to achieve efficiency in the organization’s 
operations. According to another participant: 
 
We have everything set out in our contract, the amount of pay and the 
bonuses, the annual increments and the minimum performance criteria 
… If somebody wants or thinks that he deserves more or extra reward 
for his performance, he may have a meeting with the manager to 
discuss this, but normally this practice is very rare because everybody 
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knows that it would make no difference to them. Instead they would 
become prominent to their managers in a negative way.  
 
(participant 27)  
 
Similarly, the other research participants, due to their perceptions of power 
asymmetry or disproportionate interdependence in the employment relationship, 
tended to avoid actively negotiating the terms of their contract with the employer. 
As representatively evident in the above response, this tendency was further based 
on the anticipation of an unwelcoming response from the employer.  
 
Based on this pattern, it can be argued that, in the context of mutuality, the 
employers are principally focused on employees’ contributions as a means of 
increasing organizational efficiency, while they ignore the equally important issue 
of promoting mutuality in terms of their responsibilities towards the employees. 
Under the major influence of the employers, who generally have an egocentric 
view of the employment relationship, these practices serve as a systematic 
hindrance to fostering employees’ perceptions of mutuality. The management 
philosophy of restricting or even discouraging employees’ participation in the 
organization’s decision-making processes may be considered as a prime factor in 
this context.  
 
The employer’s tendency to restrict or discourage employees’ participation in the 
organization’s decision-making process (ultimately hindering the development of 
employees’ perceptions of mutuality) was evident in the response of a research 
participant: 
 
Usually there are some guidelines. Mostly there are instructions given to 
us by the department manager, which all of us have to follow. We may 
discuss it with the manager, but most of the time the instruction is full 
and final and is decided by the senior managers and we already know 
about it … There is less chance of changing it … Sometimes there are, we 
have meetings with management and they say it very clearly that this 
meeting is to listen to our [employees’] issues but me and my other 
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colleagues have experienced that most of the time this is a formality 
and, as with most of the times when there are some issues raised by us, 
they are not taken up seriously by the management … After every six 
months or so there is a meeting like that but we just attend it as a 
formality because we know that nothing is going to happen. 
 
(participant 13) 
 
4.2.4 The issue of employability 
In addition to the concern of promoting mutuality largely from the employers’ 
perspective, the issue of rhetoric surfaces in the psychological contract literature. 
In this context, there is an assumption that organizations, in order to promote 
perceptions of mutuality and as compensation for not being able to provide job 
security as a reward for employee loyalty, tend to enhance their employability 
prospects by investing in employees’ training and development. In contrast to this 
assumption, the findings of this research highlight that organizations, rather than 
from the perspective of mutual gain, typically invest in employee training for their 
own benefits.  
 
According to one respondent: 
 
Most of the time, the training which we get from the company is 
basically on the new products the company is going to introduce in the 
future … We are told how to bring in new customers by demonstrating, 
by highlighting new features, how to show our prices as better in 
comparison with those of the other companies … There is some other 
staff training but it is very minor, kind of symbolic. The actual training is 
done at the time of the launch of a new product and it is compulsory for 
us to attend those training sessions so that we have the proper 
knowledge of the system requirements, specifications and the prices of 
the product. 
 
(participant 11) 
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This observation echoes the viewpoint of other respondents that the training 
provided by the employers, rather than promoting employees’ employability 
prospects, is largely aimed at achieving organizational profit. A representative 
response from one of the research participants highlights this issue as: 
 
The company is less concerned about maintaining our skills, which we 
need to keep updated for our own personal growth. Some of us need 
diplomas and certificates. We told the company collectively that we 
wanted to do this. It is helpful to us and, if we take the training for the 
company, we will get a discount in the training fee as we will be 
sponsored by the company, but I think that this is not a priority for our 
company. It is not beneficial for them. They are more concerned with 
the demands of the market, but from their point of view only.  
 
(participant 33)  
 
For other research participants, this practice on one hand reduced the risk of staff 
turnover for the employers and on the other hand (due to the lack of marketable 
skills and training) increased the risk of layoffs for the employees. This scenario 
ultimately resulted in a situation of dual disadvantage for the employees. In 
addition to reducing their employability with other potential employers, it 
increased their dependence on the current employer. From the perspective of 
power, the respondents, therefore, sought marketable skills and training as it 
supported them in their relational interdependence with the organization in a 
twofold manner. First, due to their increased employability based on marketable 
skills and training, it strengthened their bargaining power through reducing their 
dependence on the current employer. Second, these acquired skills and training 
further added to their bargaining power through increasing the employer’s 
dependence on them.   
 
There is another assumption that contemporary employees prefer the feature of 
employability over job security (Singh, 1998). The findings of the current study, 
however, indicated that modern employees strive for enhanced employability, not 
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as an alternative but as an additional feature to job security. According to a 
research participant: 
 
I would definitely like a permanent and a safe job but on the other hand 
I would also like to keep my options open … Just as my company has the 
right to keep the best employees, I also should have the opportunity to 
join the company which offers me the best package … I will not go for a 
company in which the salary is high but there is no job security and on 
the other hand I will also not go for any company in which the job is safe 
but there is no growth in terms of career and learning. Every employee 
who wants to grow will look for both options in his employment.  
 
(participant 18)  
 
The attraction of employability as an additional rather than an alternative feature 
to job security, however, increased employees’ expectations in terms of good 
career advancement prospects in addition to job security. This notion was evident 
in another response: 
 
I want to maintain a good living standard for me and my family and for 
this I need to ... move to a higher position with more salary and with 
more market exposure … I have good call centre experience from this 
company and if I get a very good job offer from another company, I will 
definitely switch … If my company wants they, my present company, 
may stop me by offering me the same package … Moving to the other 
company will include a better overall package and it will also give me a 
different experience in a different working environment with different 
knowledge … I will also look at the reputation of the company, how they 
treat their employees and also if it [the job] is secure or not. 
 
(participant 39) 
 
Another relevant theme highlighted that, although employees were concerned 
with employability in addition to job security, this trend was largely instigated by 
141 
 
the employment practices of the employers. Leaving aside the issue that modern 
employers face challenges in providing job security (due to either external market 
factors or for internal organizational reasons), job insecurity motivated employees 
to reduce their dependence on the employer by promoting their employability 
prospects. The response of an interviewee echoed this viewpoint: 
 
I have a good hands-on experience in different areas of different call 
centres. If by chance there is any downsizing – although the position of 
this company is very strong, nobody can ever be sure, as it happened 
recently in the IT industry in Pakistan and in other parts of the world as 
well – in that case, I am in a relatively safe position to find a reasonable 
job after a struggle because I can fit in to a variety of departments. 
 
(participant 21)  
 
The concern among employees regarding employment uncertainty was evident in 
the response of another research participant:  
 
The employment history of my previous company was not very good. 
There were some very serious problems with their management. I was 
under constant stress, because they fired one guy from my department 
and a few more from other departments without giving them any notice 
… I was under pressure that one day my company might call me and 
simply say they do not need me anymore or say good-bye as they had 
done to some other employees … The guy fired from my department 
was a friend of mine and I can still remember his face showing how 
tense he was … This was really frightening and I decided to leave that 
company as soon as possible … I managed to get a chance in this 
company. The salary in this company is almost the same but at least I 
can work here with peace of mind without any stress.  
 
(participant 14) 
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4.2.5 The issue of flexible employment contracts 
There is a general assumption that the employers, in order to promote employees’ 
perceptions of mutuality, offer employment contracts with flexible working days, 
hours, working locations. The researcher, however, argues that, even though the 
feature of flexibility appears as more beneficial from the employees’ perspective, 
contemporary organizations have largely opted for the notion of flexibility to 
primarily serve their own objectives of increasing efficiency and reducing 
operational costs.  
 
The observation of the researcher is echoed in the illustrative response of an 
interviewee as:  
 
The company claims to provide us with variable working hours according 
to our own choice but, as a matter of fact, our influence in deciding the 
number of hours is really much less than theirs … The company says that 
this depends on the requirements of the different projects they are 
covering and is not within their control. They cannot manage us 
according to our own choices … They do not understand that, like them, 
everyone has their own preferences, which they make very little effort 
to understand.  
 
(participant 9)  
 
This perception was evident in the response of another research participant:  
 
Sometimes, I am asked to do shifts which I cannot cover properly due to 
my other commitments and sometimes I want some extra hours and I 
am told that it is not possible because we [management] have to 
manage the other staff as well …. Last month, I had some family 
commitments and I was not able to come. I asked my manager to give 
me some relief, but he said that I have to do a minimum number of 
hours each week. One of my colleagues was even willing to cover my 
shifts. I had already talked to him and he said, I can easily do it for you … 
On the surface there are loose working hours for us but the final 
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decision is still within the hands of the management. I cannot tell them 
that I am free at this time and give me shifts this time. I have the option 
to choose only from the range of hours which they have decided and 
which may not always suit me. 
 
(participant 19)   
 
The above research theme indicates that the notion of flexibility is generally 
projected as an attractive feature, with employees having the liberty to choose 
from a specified range of alternatives. However, it is important to acknowledge 
that this range of alternatives is ultimately determined by the employers and may 
not necessarily be consistent with employees’ preferences. As noted in the above 
responses, employees typically regard their influence on flexible practices as 
relatively limited. For them, this lack of influence largely stems from the 
disproportionate interdependence or power asymmetry in the employment 
relationship, restraining them from actively negotiating different terms of a 
contract with the employer. Consequently, these perceptions of power asymmetry 
have implications not only at the perceptual level (i.e. perceptions of biased 
mutuality associated with issues such as flexibility, employability etc.) but also at 
the behavioural level in terms of employees’ behavioural responses towards the 
organization (discussed in detail in the next section on reciprocity).  
 
The notion of the limited influence employees perceive that they have on 
flexibility is evident in the response of another research participant: 
 
During that [orientation] time, we were told that the company has 
positions in the different departments and we would be moved to other 
departments of our choice based on our initial performance ... I was 
looking to join the corporate sales department … I formally made a 
request to the HR department, but they moved me to retail sales 
without any reason … After my hiring, another person who was hired 
after me was moved to corporate sales and when I asked about this with 
HR, the manager told me that he had the more relevant credentials. 
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(participant 34)  
 
This response further highlights that unlike the general assumption, flexibility in 
employment is not generally designed from the employee perspective as 
organizations tend to make use of this feature according to their own 
requirements.  
 
4.2.6 Promoting employees’ perceptions of mutuality 
Rousseau (2001) emphasizes that employees’ perceptions of mutuality can be 
fostered by providing them with the opportunity to accept or reject the terms of 
the contract without restrictions. This assertion is supported by the findings of the 
current study, as according to one respondent: 
 
Obviously it will increase employees’ level of confidence if they can 
openly discuss the contract details with the employer … If these things 
can be discussed freely with the company, it will definitely give a sense 
that the company considers its employees. It will also show how much 
the company is serious about treating us fairly and giving us a fair salary. 
 
(participant 28)  
 
Although a number of responses from the research participants supported this 
viewpoint that the opportunity to actively discuss the terms of the contract is 
helpful in promoting their perceptions of mutuality, nonetheless only a very 
limited number of respondents considered themselves to be working in such a 
liberal environment. Based on this observation, it can be argued that, even though 
Rousseau’s postulation has theoretical validity, however, it has limited relevance 
from a practical perspective. This is because employees (with the exception of 
managerial, professional, technical or knowledge workers) generally do not 
consider themselves to be in a position to accept or reject the terms of the contract 
without restrictions, due to their perceptions of power asymmetry in the 
employment relationship. One of the respondents explained this scenario as: 
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The company I am working for has a very friendly environment, but I 
also need to know that there are some limits. If I ask, start questioning 
each and every thing, it will create problems for me … some of us 
worked on the last Eid [Muslim festival] … We were paid only 50 per 
cent extra over the routine wage rate. It was really below our 
expectations … We were not very happy with this but we couldn’t force 
the company to pay us extra as it was decided by higher management 
and for them this is better than the market is paying. 
 
(participant 16)  
 
4.2.7 Divergent mutuality perceptions for managers and employees  
From the perspective of mutuality, visible differences between the perceptions of 
managerial and non-managerial employees were observed. For the lower level 
customer contact employees, the perceptions of mutuality were generally low as 
indicated by one participant:  
 
Apparently the management of the company says that they are ready to 
listen and take up our issues … but everybody knows that the reality is 
different from it, from what they say … There are heads of main 
departments, that’s sales and marketing, operations, human resource, 
administration and others and whatever they decide in their meetings, 
that is unchangeable. That is moved forward to us as a company 
decision and we have to accept it … I do not say that these decisions are 
totally wrong, unacceptable or unfair but still there are so many things 
which could be discussed with us. 
 
(participant 9) 
 
In contrast, for employees working at the managerial levels of the organization, 
the perceptions of mutuality were relatively high. As according to a human 
resource manager of one organization: 
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We want to keep our workers motivated as they are the main assets of 
this company … The company is investing in them on their recruitment, 
their training and tries to provide them with a good and relaxed working 
environment. These costs are not directly visible to the employees. They 
consider only the amount of salary given to them as the expenses of the 
company but the other expenses like taxes, property rent, insurance, 
which are invisible to the employees, are still there … We know that all 
the demands of each and every employee cannot be fulfilled. We have 
our own limitations but still we try our best to keep a balance … There 
are regular meetings with the employees in which they freely discuss 
their concerns with us and if any of their issues is genuine we not only 
listen to it but also take appropriate action on it.  
 
(participant 25) 
 
Similarly, the viewpoint of the other managerial respondents was that, even 
though they make serious efforts, it was nevertheless not possible for them to 
meet the expectations of every individual employee. In contrast, the employees 
perceived this as an excuse to justify the lack of effort and the non-seriousness of 
management to meet the needs of the workforce.  
 
While further probing the underlying reasons for the differences in the perceptions 
of mutuality between managerial and non-managerial employees, the implications 
of the previously discussed issue of timely and explicit communication in 
promoting mutuality re-emerged. The employees at the bottom of the 
organizational hierarchy did not perceive themselves to have sufficient bargaining 
power to negotiate access to the information sources, and this created a constant 
state of indeterminacy for them. For one research participant:  
 
An important issue is the company … never bothered to provide us with 
enough information on the projects which they are going to start in the 
future. If they gave us some clear information in advance, we might be 
in a better position to prepare ourselves for the projects and do better 
because our annual appraisals basically depend on it … When the 
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project is finally taken, then we are told about it at the last moment. At 
that time, we are busy with our existing assignments and at the same 
time we also have to undertake training for the new products and this 
creates problems for us most of the time. 
 
(participant 23) 
 
The response from another research participant presented a similar scenario from 
a different perspective as: 
 
There are temporary staff hired for that project, but they are not aware 
of whether they are going to continue in the company once the project 
is over or will be removed by the company … The company always tells 
them that they will be retained, just to keep these temporary 
employees motivated, but this doesn’t happen every time. The company 
makes a very simple excuse at the end that unfortunately the project 
has gone out of their hands and they are not in a position to manage the 
temporary staff now … There is lack of clarity and they do not know 
what is going to happen to them in the future. 
 
(participant 13)  
 
This finding again demonstrates the significance of information-sharing through 
clear and explicit communication. It also highlights the uncertainty in the 
employment scenarios of non-managerial employees. The employees belonging to 
this category, because of their limited bargaining power, generally had poor 
access to different information sources. Consequently, the uncertainty associated 
with this poor access to information resulted in the development of weak 
perceptions of mutuality in the psychological contracts of these employees.  
 
4.2.8 Summary of mutuality findings 
This section presented the research findings concerning the notion of mutuality. 
Undermining the assumption of mutuality, the existence of indeterminacy (due to 
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the lack of appropriate communication between employees and the employer) 
emerged as an important theme. In addition, the results highlighted the employers’ 
tendency to guide employees’ perceptions of mutuality according to the objectives 
of the organization. The research findings further illustrated different issues (e.g. 
employees’ concern regarding training and job flexibility) that promote 
perceptions of biased mutuality in employees’ psychological contracts. 
Consequently, employees attempted to enhance their employability prospects on 
the basis of their knowledge and skills. According to the respondents, these efforts 
supported them in strengthening their bargaining power as, in addition to reducing 
their dependence on the employer, it also increased the employer’s dependence on 
them. The final section focused on the issue of divergence in the perceptions of 
mutuality of employees and managers.  
 
 
4.3 Reciprocity 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
This section presents the research findings concerning the assumption of 
reciprocity in the psychological contract literature. The results indicate the 
prevalence of the perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity among the 
research participants. The study findings also highlight the general tendency 
among employees to perceive their psychological contracts as having been 
established on a non-reciprocal basis. The results further reveal that these 
perceptions largely stem from employees’ assumptions of power asymmetry or 
disproportionate interdependence in the employment relationship, inhibiting them 
from responding to the employer’s inducements on a reciprocal basis.  
 
In order to deal with the issue of a perceived inability to respond to the 
employer’s inducements on a reciprocal basis, the employees therefore opt for 
other possible alternatives (e.g. the development of negative attitudinal 
reciprocity, the withdrawal of positive discretionary behaviours etc.) The study 
findings further highlight that, even though employees tend to attribute the 
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employer reciprocity largely to their managers/supervisors, nonetheless they 
generally avoid balancing any perceived discrepancy with them. According to the 
respondents, this could result in further undesirable consequences for them. In 
such conditions, however, the respondents have a tendency to displace their 
negative reciprocity to the other junior members or the customers of the 
organization.  
 
4.3.2 Prevalence of perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity 
The research findings identified three categories of employees on the basis of their 
perceptions of the employer reciprocity. These perceptions of reciprocity were 
largely based on a comparison between the organizational rewards and the 
expectations of the respondents. The three categories of employees were, first, 
with a perception of high or balanced reciprocity, second, with a perception of 
low or unbalanced reciprocity and third, with a perception of no reciprocity (i.e. 
employees who perceived their organization as reciprocating to a negligible 
extent). According to employees in the third category, the employer did respond 
to their contributions. However, the extent of this reciprocation was considerably 
lower in comparison to their expectations, which were based on their perceived 
contributions to the organization. Among these three categories, a noticeable 
majority of the research participants belonged to the second group (i.e. employees 
with a perception of low or unbalanced reciprocity). Employees belonging to the 
first category (i.e. employees with a perception of high or balanced reciprocity) 
were relatively limited in number and there were only two research participants 
who belonged to the third group (i.e. employees with perceptions of negligible 
employer reciprocity).  
 
Regarding the second group comprising employees with perceptions of 
unbalanced employer reciprocity, the majority of the respondents were in the non-
managerial category. Although the employer reciprocated the efforts of these 
research participants to some extent, the level of this reciprocation was relatively 
low in comparison to their contributions. One research participant described this 
scenario:  
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We are appreciated for our efforts by them [the employer], but there 
are some issues that still need more attention … there is a little bit of 
under-appreciation in terms of the financial rewards. More could be 
done to make the employees feel better … the package the employees 
are getting in this organization is still good as compared to the package 
in other organization, but again I would say that, companies prosper due 
to the efforts of their employees and they need to take care of 
employees’ prosperity as well. 
 
(participant 27) 
 
The notion of unbalanced employer reciprocity was evident in the response of 
another research participant:  
 
This company has a very good financial position and it can afford to give 
us more than average annual increments. This would improve our 
morale and make us more happy to work for them … nobody has 
enough time to take up these matters and talk to the managers on 
behalf of others, even others are also, they would be at his back; 
everyone thinks, why put my own job at risk for the benefit of others. 
 
(participant 13)  
 
In addition to perceived unbalanced employer reciprocity, this response further 
representatively illustrates the issue that employees generally tend to avoid 
actively negotiating their issues with the employer. As is evident in the above 
response, this tendency is largely based on employees’ anticipation of undesirable 
consequences from the employer.  
 
The majority of the research participants in the first group of respondents with 
relatively high perceptions of employer reciprocity were individuals working in a 
managerial capacity. According to one respondent from this group: 
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[These companies] have to give a handsome package in order to retain 
the best employees; otherwise, if anyone has good experience, any 
other organization will hire him … In one sense these organizations have 
to give their employees a suitable reward for their efforts, otherwise 
they cannot compete in the market, and it is the same with this 
organization  
 
(participant 10) 
 
From the perspective of power or relational interdependence in employment 
relationships, the above response illustratively highlights that (due to their high 
employability) employees with specialist knowledge and skills are less dependent 
on their employers. Rather, the employers are more dependent in the employment 
relationship because of the skills and knowledge of these employees which are 
critical for the operations of the organization. The employers, therefore, have to 
provide attractive remuneration packages in order to retain these employees. This 
ultimately enhances the perceptions of reciprocity among this category of 
employees.  
 
As mentioned above, the tendency to develop high perceptions of employer 
reciprocity is largely associated with superior organizational rewards. According 
to this category of respondents, these rewards were largely the result of their high-
value services to the organization. Even though these employees valued the 
intrinsic rewards as well, the high perceptions of employer reciprocity among this 
category of respondents were largely based on the extrinsic rewards received from 
the organization. This notion is evident in the response of a corporate sales 
manager: 
 
Every employee in this organization is getting a salary exactly according 
to his contributions and all this depends on their educational 
background, their professional experience, their personal contacts in the 
market with other companies, the amount of business they can bring to 
this organization  ...  Since I joined, I increased revenue by more than 60 
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per cent and I do not have to say anything as my performance speaks 
for itself and therefore they give me a good overall package.  
 
(participant 35) 
 
This research finding regarding the high/low perceptions of employer reciprocity 
in managerial/non-managerial employees is also consistent with the previous 
observation of the strong/weak perceptions of mutuality in managerial/non-
managerial employees. As mentioned above, the individuals in managerial 
positions (unlike non-managerial employees) generally receive superior 
organizational rewards due to the high bargaining power stemming from the 
critical value of the services they provide to their organization. This ultimately has 
a positive influence, not only on perceptions of reciprocity but also on 
assumptions of mutuality, in the psychological contracts of this category of 
employees.  
 
Regarding the third group, comprising only two respondents with negligible 
perceptions of employer reciprocity, there is no discussion of relationships which 
lack reciprocity in the psychological contract literature. However, the writings of 
Gouldner (1960) manifestly acknowledge their presence as he posits that, despite 
their rare occurrence, relationships may exist with little or almost no reciprocity. 
In this context, when further probed by the researcher, the major reason these two 
respondents gave for continuing the employment with their current employer 
(despite their perceptions of negligible employer reciprocity) was the 
unavailability of suitable employment alternatives in the job market. In other 
words, these two respondents perceived their bargaining power to be very limited 
because of their disproportionately high dependence on their employer.  
 
4.3.3 Employees’ perceived inability to reciprocate  
Another theme concerning reciprocity was the prevailing tendency among 
employees to view their psychological contracts to be established on a non-
reciprocal basis. According to the majority of respondents, these perceptions 
largely stemmed from their assumptions of power asymmetry or disproportionate 
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interdependence in the employment relationship. For the research participants, the 
employers can easily find their replacement in terms of individuals with similar 
skills and knowledge, they are providing to the organization. However, for them, 
it is not easy to obtain a better or similar job because of the excess of individuals 
with those skills and knowledge. This view ultimately encouraged the perceptions 
of power asymmetry among employees, hindering them from viewing their 
psychological contracts as being established on the basis of reciprocity.  
 
The prevailing assumption of power asymmetry or disproportionate 
interdependence among employees in their employment relationship was manifest 
in the response of a research participant: 
 
There are too many graduates and even Masters degree holders with 
very high grades. They are looking for jobs … I have to be very careful in 
my job. The market situation for jobs is very tight and I cannot take a 
careless approach. If the job is not very good or the working hours are 
not very friendly, the staff has to abide by them. If someone complains 
too much about the salary or other things, they [the employer] may 
simply say, you know the market situation. This is the best the company 
can do for you. If you still think you deserve more, the market is open 
for you and if you can find a better opportunity in the market, please go 
for it. 
 
(participant 33) 
 
These perceptions of disproportionate interdependence in the employment 
relationship ultimately resulted in the reluctance of employees to respond to the 
employer’s inducements on a reciprocal basis. This notion was evident in the 
research finding highlighting the high tendency among the respondents to 
maintain their level of contribution, despite their perception of a lack of 
inducements from the organization. According to one interviewee: 
 
It happens nowhere that the employees start reacting to organizational 
things on the basis of whatever they think is right. The thing is, I am 
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their employee; they are not my employee. I am working for them; they 
are not working for me. Whatever diplomatic words may be used for it, 
this is a boss and subordinate relationship … Most of them 
[organizations] in Lahore [city name], are Seth [sole proprietor owned, 
autocratic] companies in which there is a one-man show, who is all in all 
because he [the owner] has invested in the business and he is the only 
one to take decisions. 
 
(participant 9) 
 
This response illustrates the general perceived inability among employees to 
respond to the employer’s inducements on a reciprocal basis. As already 
discussed, this perceived inability was largely based on their assumptions of 
power asymmetry or disproportionate interdependence in the employment 
relationship.  
 
The notion of the perceived inability of employees to respond to the employer’s 
inducements on a reciprocal basis was manifest in the response of another 
research participant: 
 
Sometimes when the company doesn’t give a good response to my 
efforts, I cannot just go to the boss’s office and start complaining … The 
only thing, that can be done is to try to convince or talk to the manager 
in a friendly way or if they do not listen then the better thing is to 
struggle harder in the career and look for other options.  
 
(participant 16) 
 
In a similar way to the other research participants, this interview response further 
highlights that, rather than necessarily responding in a passive manner, employees 
may also opt for different coping mechanisms (discussed in the later section) in 
order to deal with the issue of the employer’s unbalanced reciprocity.  
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4.3.4 Influences of employees’ internal motives 
The research findings further revealed that it is not only the perceptions of power 
asymmetry or disproportionate interdependence in the employment relationship 
but also the pursuit of internal motives which inhibit employees from responding 
to employers’ inducements on a reciprocal basis. The researcher observed that, in 
pursuit of their own benefits, the respondents generally tended to avoid negative 
reciprocity as it will hurt their interests by projecting a pessimistic reflection of 
their performance. An illustrative response from a respondent explained this 
prevailing tendency among the research participants:  
 
Disagreements can come between the employees and the company ... it 
doesn’t make any sense to make an abrupt move to take one’s 
frustration in a stupid way. This will affect one’s own image within the 
company and, let’s say, the boss may become more hostile, a promotion 
which is due may be postponed or, in the worst case, the organization 
may fire the employee with an excuse of bad or poor conduct … This is 
what I have learnt from my professional experience: that whatever 
happens, a man needs to control his feelings and emotions. 
 
(participant 37)  
 
The tendency among employees to avoid negative reciprocity, for their own 
reasons was evident in the response of another interviewee: 
 
My increment was due but I did not get it. As a matter of fact I got it 
very late … The staff hired after us was getting the salary higher than us 
because at their time of hiring the company revised the pay scale of 
sales advisors from 20000 per month to 24000 per month but we were 
hired at 20000. Our annual increment was also not given to us ... That 
was totally wrong but we couldn’t do anything … we waited for a while 
and raised the issue. We were told that they had this issue already 
under discussion and they are working on it already … Later on the issue 
was resolved. 
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(participant 13)  
 
The responses from the other research participants highlighted similar patterns, as 
employees, even in unfavourable employment conditions, tended to avoid 
responding to the employer’s inducements on a reciprocal basis. In addition to 
their perceptions of power asymmetry or disproportionate interdependence, this 
tendency largely stemmed from employees’ pursuit of their personal interests 
associated with the employment relationship.  
 
4.3.5 Development of negative attitudinal reciprocity 
As mentioned above, in addition to the perceptions of power asymmetry or 
disproportionate interdependence, employees did not reciprocate negatively for 
their own internal motives associated with the employment relationship. However, 
there were situations when employees (despite their perceived considerable efforts 
in comparison with the organizational inducements) were still not successful in 
achieving their objectives associated with the employment relationship. This 
failure in achieving the desired objectives consequently strengthened the 
perceptions of an unbalanced employer reciprocity among employees. Although a 
limited impact of these perceptions could be observed in employee behaviour due 
to the minimum performance requirements explicitly detailed in their formal 
employment contracts, this presumption strongly affected their attitude towards 
the organization. As a result, employees – although they had limited opportunity 
to reciprocate negatively on behavioural dimensions – developed a negative 
attitudinal reciprocity towards their organization.  
 
This negative attitudinal reciprocity was manifest in the response of a research 
participant: 
 
They [business owners] make good money from the workers’ efforts 
but, when it comes to benefits for the workers, all of a sudden there 
jump out a number of issues … I believed in these reasons for some time 
because at that time I had no idea of what was going on, but now I can 
see how big the volume of business is; the company is earning a lot of 
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profits from its business but they spend very little on us and say they are 
reinvesting in the company … it will not be going into my pocket. I am 
not interested at all in the reinvestment in the company because it is 
not going to serve me or benefit me even a little bit. 
 
(participant 36)  
 
The notion of developing a negative attitude towards the organization due to 
employees’ perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity was evident in the 
response of another research participant:  
 
I am as much attached to this company as this company is attached to 
me … The supervisors are very strict in terms of the work. They keep a 
close check on a daily basis on it but when I need something from them, 
they send me to HR. They say that this is not their area … HR has no 
power. They say, you need to make your application for holidays or a 
loan or anything else, it should be signed by your manager and then we 
will process it. It is a kind of a deadlock … The salary is not at all 
justifiable in comparison with the work. It comes into my bank account 
very late, almost at the end of the next month. For my work … they do 
not tolerate even a small mistake. I am required to be extremely 
punctual and honest and loyal to my work … They [other people] are not 
very happy with the attitude of the company but the company really 
does not mind. Their position is already very strong.  
 
(participant 18)  
 
In addition to the issue of the development of negative attitudinal reciprocity, the 
above response also highlights the implications of employees’ perceptions of 
power asymmetry in their employment relationships. Similar to the case of other 
respondents, these perceptions of power asymmetry generally prevent the 
progression of employees’ negative attitudinal reciprocity from entering into the 
behavioural domain. As noted in the previous findings, this tendency (of 
158 
 
developing negative reciprocity only on an attitudinal basis) largely stems from 
employees’ anticipation of undesirable consequences from the employer.  
 
4.3.6 Withdrawal of positive discretionary behaviors 
In addition to developing negative attitudinal reciprocity towards the organization, 
employees opted for withdrawing positive discretionary behaviours in response to 
their perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity. The psychological contract 
literature is generally based on the assumption that employees reciprocate 
negatively to the perceptions of breach. Extending this viewpoint, the findings of 
the current study highlight that employees are at liberty to exercise negative 
reciprocity without restriction only on an attitudinal basis. However, in the 
behavioural domain, employees (due to their perceptions of power asymmetry in 
the employment relationships) generally tend to withhold only those behaviours 
which go beyond the requirements of their formal job description (i.e. 
organizational citizenship or positive discretionary behaviours).  
 
The withdrawal of positive discretionary behaviours did not assist employees 
completely in coping with the issue of unbalanced employer reciprocity. 
However, it provided them with some relief by developing their perceptions of 
being able to reciprocate negatively to the employer to at least some extent. One 
of the research participants expressed this issue as: 
 
They [new-comers] are looking for some senior person to help them. It 
is very difficult to grab everything in the orientation period in the first 
two weeks. We as seniors of the department can help them a lot … In 
the beginning, I used to help and guide these new-comers very 
enthusiastically, although it was not a part of my duties. Now I do not do 
it because it is not my responsibility … Why should I spend my time and 
energy on these things when I do not get, my company never gave me, 
any positive response for all these things, for all my efforts. 
 
(participant 9) 
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Another respondent expressed the issue of withdrawing positive discretionary 
behaviours in response to the perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity 
from a different perspective: 
 
There are different packages for pre-paid and post-paid. They are 
emailed to us one or two months in advance … We may tell the 
customers before the package is advertised in newspapers or in the TV, 
because the package is finalized and we already have the information 
about it … We may not tell them [customers] until we get formal 
notification from the management to tell the customers about it. If we 
want, we can do it easily without any problem and the company won’t 
mind; instead they will be happy as we know very well, but why [should 
we do it]? There is no appreciation for it and, if something goes wrong, 
then the employee is in trouble so it is better to remain silent … I just do 
the work which is required from me. Why should I try to become overly 
smart? They are not concerned about the issues, about the problems I 
am facing.  
 
(participant 26) 
 
4.3.7 Additional efforts to promote reconciliation 
In addition to developing negative attitudinal reciprocity and withdrawing positive 
discretionary behaviours, making additional efforts to promote reconciliation 
appeared as another alternative selected by employees to deal with the issue of 
unbalanced employer reciprocity. According to one research participant: 
 
We have raised the issue a number of times that we need more staff in 
the support team because there is only one man for each shift. He can 
work on only one system at a time. We sometimes receive more 
complaints at the same time especially at the peak time during the 
evening shifts, but for our company the IT staff do nothing … [according 
to the company] they [the IT staff] do not need any extra staff but this is 
not correct … many times it happens that I have to stay late after my 
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shift timings. I do this because there are some complaints pending. I 
have to work with my colleague in the next shift. Sometimes they also 
come early on my request when I need an extra man … Our company 
doesn’t pay us anything extra for these extra hours. We have to do it 
because, they have a perception that the IT staff are being paid without 
doing any work but as I said the situation is not like that. 
 
(participant 12)  
 
The research findings further revealed that employees in this situation made these 
additional efforts to promote reconciliation, largely from a self-interest rather than 
a mutual-interest perspective. This notion was manifest in the response of another 
research participant: 
 
He [manager] believes that I am doing politics against him. I talk to other 
people in a negative way about him. He is often very harsh, very 
humiliating to me in front of other people … I want to know who tells 
him things like this. I never did that … I am only trying to save my job 
because I need to survive. Why would I create problems for myself? I 
have tried to clear up this image of me. I talked to the manager and I am 
doing extra work, but still he has some misunderstandings.  
 
(participant 19)  
 
From the perspective of organizational agents, employees in similar situations 
attempted to strengthen their exchange relationships primarily with the managers. 
The employees focused on the managers because of their perceptions that these 
organizational representatives were the key exchange agents, who were capable of 
maximizing the returns in their psychological contracts established with the 
organization.   
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4.3.8 Ignoring the discrepancy 
In addition to extended efforts to promote reconciliation, doing nothing and 
forgiving were two other alternatives chosen by employees to deal with the issue 
of unbalanced employer reciprocity. The first alternative, to do nothing or to 
ignore the discrepancy, was largely opted for either when the discrepancy was of a 
minor nature or when, despite all efforts, employees were not successful in 
promoting reconciliation with the employer. One of the research participants 
expressed this situation: 
 
The new manager has not had experience of these pieces of equipment 
… the issue is that this organization doesn’t promote its existing staff to 
higher ranks who have the knowledge and experience of their 
equipment and who can work for them at a lower cost. They will hire 
someone from outside who not only charges them more as compared to 
their own staff but also takes more time to understand their system … I 
tried to give some suggestions to my manager because I have worked on 
this equipment for the last two years. He did not welcome my help at all 
… We have delays and interruptions in the service … The senior 
management in head office is very angry but this situation is beyond my 
control. I cannot bypass my boss. I cannot talk to the regional technical 
manager and tell him that these are the real problems as my boss, who 
already doesn’t like me, would not like that at all … I cannot go on for 
long in this way as the problems are constantly coming and, as a senior 
team member, I am also responsible for providing the service without 
any interruption ... The only option in this case is to just wait. I hope the 
senior management will come to understand this situation themselves. 
 
(participant 38)  
 
4.3.9 Forgiving the harm-doer 
The notion of forgiveness surfaced as another alternative pursued by employees to 
manage the issue of unbalanced employer reciprocity. Used by a very limited 
number of research participants, the notion of forgiveness did not appear 
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individually as a stand-alone phenomenon, as employees generally opted for 
forgiveness in association with their efforts for more reconciliation. One of the 
three research participants who discussed the notion of forgiveness expressed his 
viewpoint: 
 
Last week, my colleague who makes fortnightly and monthly sales 
graphs couldn’t come due to some reason. He called the manager and 
the manager told him to ask me to make the graphs for this week, but 
he forgot to tell me … the next day the graphs were not given to the 
manager as I was supposed to have made them but I got no message 
from him. The manager became very annoyed … I told him that I 
received no message from my colleague. He was not satisfied with this 
and said that it showed my poor communication with other staff 
members … I couldn’t do anything in that situation. My colleague did 
not do it on purpose. He apologized to me later on as he had had some 
emergency … I think, in such situations, one can only ignore or forgive 
the person. The graphs were very important and he [manager] had to 
discuss them with the GM sales but in the morning he had nothing. 
 
(participant 33) 
 
In a similar way, the researcher noted in the case of the other two research 
participants that employees (due to their perceptions of power asymmetry) 
generally opt for forgiveness in order to avoid further undesirable consequences, 
particularly when the wrongdoer has a higher status in the organization.  
 
4.3.10 Exercising deviant behaviour 
The exercise of deviant behaviour was also observed among the research 
participants in response to their perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity. 
Although this was not completely helpful as employees practised the deviant 
behaviour in an apparently unnoticeable manner, it provided them with a certain 
level of relief from their grievances with the organization. The employees did not 
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openly exercise the deviant behaviour as, according to them, it could potentially 
result in further undesirable consequences.  
 
One of the research participants with the perceptions of unbalanced employer 
reciprocity explained this notion: 
 
I know a colleague who left the company; in fact his contract was 
terminated. Most of us think that it was totally not his fault … What he 
used to do was he became angry or argue with the customers. 
Sometimes hang up the phone … a customer talked about this issue to 
them [quality control staff]. They take this issue very seriously … They 
listened to the conversation. The company maintains logs of all the 
voice recordings for 10 days. It was clear that his behaviour was wrong 
with the customer and he was immediately fired from the company … 
instead of learning something from it, the company became more strict 
… The employees had thought that the company would look into the 
matter so this increased employee anger. They know other ways to take 
out their anger without being caught and without putting themselves 
into danger. This is not good for the employees and not good for the 
company. 
 
(participant 36) 
 
The notion of deviant behaviour was evident in the response of another research 
participant:  
 
What others [employees] normally do in this case is they make wasteful 
use of the printer. They will waste printer paper by printing documents 
which are not required, which are basically unnecessary just in order to 
increase the expenses of the company and waste its resources … They 
will spend more time in the lunch-breaks. Some will not help the 
customers as much as they can. The customer will not know about this 
but definitely will not be happy with the quality of the service. 
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(participant 34) 
 
From the perspective of power, the above responses highlight that as a result of 
their perceptions of power asymmetry, employees generally tend to exercise 
deviant behaviour in a covert manner, mainly to avoid undesirable consequences 
from the organization.  
 
4.3.11 Attributing employer reciprocity to managers 
The above discussion highlighted different alternatives followed by employees in 
response to their perceived inability to respond to unbalanced employer 
reciprocity. As previously mentioned, this perceived inability largely stemmed 
from employees’ perceptions of power asymmetry and the anticipation of 
undesirable consequences from the organization. Another theme which emerged 
in the findings of the study is the high tendency among employees to attribute 
employer reciprocity largely to their immediate managers or supervisors. 
Irrespective of the perceptions of reciprocity being balanced or unbalanced, a 
visible majority of the research participants ascribed the reciprocal practices of the 
employers to their immediate managers or supervisors. For one research 
participant: 
 
I report for everything to him [manager] … they [the employers] do not 
know me … whatever good or bad happens to me in this organization, it 
is decided by my boss … I listen to him because I need to know about my 
actual work for the company. It will give me a clear idea of the things on 
the basis of which my performance will be judged … a worker has to 
know what he is supposed to do. He will also expect something from the 
organization on behalf of the same person. 
 
(participant 6) 
 
The notion of attributing employer reciprocity to immediate managers or 
supervisors was evident in the response of another research participant: 
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I cannot talk to the HR manager about the things related to me … The 
way it works in this organization is that, at the end of the year the 
performance evaluation form which is the basis for getting annual 
increments or any other thing, this form is completed by the 
department manager. Based on this form, he makes recommendations 
to the personnel department … Anything which is decided by him 
[manager] is followed by them [personnel department]. 
 
(participant 29) 
 
 
4.3.12 Avoiding balancing acts with the managers 
Relevant to the above finding (i.e. employees considering their managers 
responsible for both balanced or unbalanced organizational reciprocity), another 
pertinent theme was that employees tended to avoid balancing any discrepancy 
with their managers. According to the research participants, paying back to the 
managers on a parity basis could result in further undesirable consequences due to 
the highly probable backlash from the managers. The employees in this case, 
however, displaced their reciprocation to other more vulnerable members of the 
organization (e.g. junior coworkers, apprentices etc.) 
 
One of the research participants explained this scenario: 
 
If the service link is down, the customers start calling and complaining. 
Sometimes they even call in the middle of the night on the managers’ 
personal cell numbers … we are in trouble as he calls us very unhappy 
and says ... What are you doing or why they are calling me at this time? 
If I have to attend the customers’ call at this time at my number then 
why is the company paying you? ... No matter how much we tell him 
that this problem is from the technical side, he will say that’s why you 
are in customer services, to handle the customers when the service is 
down or there is any other problem … There is extreme tension at that 
time. We cannot say anything to the manager and the customer is also 
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not willing to listen to anything … At that time the only thing we can do 
is to take our frustration out on the tea boy or on junior colleagues or by 
pressing the technical staff to solve the problem quickly … When this 
takes too long and the customers keep on calling again and again and 
use very bad language, the only option is to make the telephone line 
engaged. 
 
(participant 37) 
 
Another respondent explained the rationale for displacing their aggression onto 
the other members of the organization rather than their manager: 
 
In Pakistan do you think that the employee can go against his boss? I do 
not have any bad relationships with my boss but let’s say there is 
something between me and him, then definitely I cannot do anything. 
The reason is very clear. He is more powerful than me and this power is 
given to him by the organization. 
 
(participant 31) 
 
From the perspective of power, the above responses highlight the issue that 
employees tend to avoid balancing any discrepancy with their managers. This 
viewpoint stems from the general perception of the research participants that the 
managers are ‘more powerful’ (participant 31) in the employment relationship and 
attempting to balance any discrepancy with the managers could possibly result in 
further undesirable consequences for them.  
 
4.3.13 Lower tendency to develop perceptions of unbalanced 
employer reciprocity among managers 
The findings of the research further revealed a lower tendency to develop the 
perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity among managerial, as compared 
to non-managerial, employees. For the managerial staff, the perceptions of 
employer balanced reciprocity were stronger due to the extrinsic as well as the 
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intrinsic rewards they received from the employer. According to the managerial 
respondents, they deserved these rewards and benefits because of the high value 
of the services they were providing to the organization. For them, these high value 
services were largely dependent on the skills and experience which they have 
gained after a long struggle. According to these managerial respondents, the 
organizational rewards were high as compared to non-managerial employees 
because their skills were the major source of profit for any organization and were 
therefore in high demand in the market. From the perspective of power, these 
managerial respondents (due to their services being in high demand) had 
considerable bargaining power to negotiate superior rewards from the 
organization. These superior rewards in turn strengthened the perceptions of high 
employer reciprocity among this category of respondents.  
 
According to one managerial respondent: 
 
I have good established links in the market … I did not have these right 
from day one. It took me a long period of time to develop these links, 
which are now helping me during my work and these also contribute to 
the business goals of the organization. 
 
(participant 10) 
 
The perceptions of a sales manager were similar: 
 
There is huge pressure on me throughout the month, particularly at the 
end of the month when the sales for the whole month are closing … I 
have to manage them [franchises] in my region and make sure that all of 
them achieve their targets … as a department head, the responsibility 
lies with me. In both cases, whether we achieve the monthly targets or 
not, the senior management will talk to me. They will question me, not 
my subordinates, as I am heading this department and this makes me 
responsible for all of its outcomes ... if it goes well, my team and I will be 
appreciated but if not then it will be only me who will be seen as 
responsible. 
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(participant 35) 
 
 
4.3.14 Higher tendency to develop perceptions of unbalanced employer 
reciprocity among lower level employees  
In contrast, for the lower level employees, the perceptions of balanced employer 
reciprocity were relatively low. According to them, they had made significant 
contributions to the organization’s operations due to their critical role of direct 
contact with the customers. Despite this, the organization did not reward them in 
line with their efforts. One customer-contact employee expressed this perspective 
as: 
 
They [customer services employees] are the face of any organization. It 
is they who all day long listen to the customers’ complaints ... We have 
to listen to them with patience and complete the call in a very polite 
way, no matter how much rubbish they talk … My relationship with my 
family is affected due to the nature of this job … sitting for more than 8 
hours and constantly looking at the monitor screen, while wearing 
headphones and listening to customer complaints, is not an easy job … 
they [managers] do not have to face this terrible situation daily … their 
working environment and benefits are far better than ours. 
 
(participant 27) 
 
This prevalent view among the lower level employees was manifest in the 
response of a customer services officer: 
 
At the end of the month, after having overtime and everything, I get 
around 28,000 or at the maximum I touch 30,000, which - comparing my 
work for the whole month - is not sufficient … If I talk about the 
managers, … they are paid 5 times more than the average customer 
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service officer. In some departments such as sales it is even more than 
10 times which is really demotivating … These people definitely have 
their own responsibilities but our hard work and difficulties must not be 
ignored.  
 
(participant 13) 
 
From the perspective of power, these lower level employees (in comparison with 
the managerial employees with critical skills and knowledge) generally had less 
bargaining power, as the services they were providing to their organization were 
readily available in the market. Consequently, these employees did not consider 
themselves to be in a position to negotiate organizational rewards according to 
their demands. This perceived inability to actively negotiate organizational 
rewards ultimately strengthened the perceptions of unbalanced employer 
reciprocity among this category of lower level employees.  
 
4.3.15 Implications of perceptions of low job mobility 
In addition to employees’ positions in the organizational hierarchy, the 
presumptions of job mobility (i.e. employment prospects in the external job 
market) further influenced employees’ perceptions of reciprocity. The findings of 
this research highlight that the presumptions of low job mobility strengthened 
employees’ perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity, ultimately leading to 
assumptions of breach. This generally resulted from frustration when employees 
who had a pessimistic perception of their psychological contracts were also not 
able to foresee other attractive employment prospects in the external job market. 
Due to the presumption of low job mobility, these employees perceived 
themselves as more dependent in the employment relationship. These perceptions 
of disproportionate interdependence in the employment relationship ultimately 
strengthened the assumptions of power asymmetry among these employees.  
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According to one customer service representative: 
 
They [company] cannot afford me anymore. They can get the same 
work for almost half of the salary they are paying to me. I am very 
expensive for them now … I never knew after 4 years I would get this 
reward from my company … It is not easy for me to get a good job in this 
short time because of the present market situation.  
 
(participant 26) 
 
For another respondent: 
 
There is a policy that for a department manager, they need a Masters 
degree, with almost 7 to 10 years of experience and the degree should 
be Electrical engineering or a Telecoms degree or preferably either of 
these two degrees with the addition of an MBA. I have done a BBA. I 
have a good knowledge of the products and customer services but I 
cannot be promoted higher than shift supervisor in this company due to 
my education … The market is already very saturated. If I go for a job in 
some other company, the chances of getting a better job with more pay 
are really low.  
 
(participant 11) 
 
As is evident in the above responses, the perceptions of power asymmetry, 
stemming from the presumptions of low job mobility, largely prevented 
employees from actively negotiating organizational rewards according to their 
demands. This perceived inability to actively negotiate organizational rewards 
ultimately strengthened the perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity 
among these employees.  
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4.3.16 Summary of reciprocity findings 
This section presented the research findings concerning the assumption of 
reciprocity in the psychological contract literature. The results highlighted the 
prevailing tendency among the research participants to develop the perceptions of 
unbalanced employer reciprocity. In comparison with managerial employees, this 
tendency was relatively high in the non-managerial employees due to their 
perceptions of the fewer rewards they received despite the critical value of the 
services, they assumed, they were providing to the organization. The research 
findings further revealed the inclination among employees to perceive that their 
psychological contracts were largely established on a non-reciprocal basis. They 
attributed these perceptions to their presumptions of power asymmetry or 
disproportionate interdependence in the employment relationship preventing them 
from responding to the employer’s inducements on a reciprocal basis.  
 
In order to cope with the issue of their perceived inability to respond to the 
employer’s inducements on a reciprocal basis, however, the respondents opted for 
other possible alternatives (e.g. development of negative attitudinal reciprocity, 
withdrawal of positive discretionary behaviours etc.) The research findings further 
illustrated that, even though employees tended to attribute the employer 
reciprocity principally to their managers or supervisors, they generally avoided 
balancing any discrepancy with them. For the research participants, this could 
possibly result in further undesirable consequences as a result of a highly probable 
backlash from the managers. In such situations, employees demonstrated the 
tendency to displace their negative reciprocity to the more susceptible members of 
the organization or, in some cases, to the customers of the organization. Finally, 
the impressions of low job mobility were also observed to be significantly 
associated with employees’ perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity.  
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4.4 Agency 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
This section illustrates the results of the current study concerning the notion of 
agency in the psychological contract literature. Based on the research findings, 
different classifications of organizational agents are discussed (e.g. primary 
agents, secondary agents, multiple agents, incumbent agents etc) The notion of the 
trustworthiness of organizational agents also emerges as a prominent theme. The 
results indicate that this trustworthiness is largely based on the agents’ ability to 
explicitly communicate the organization’s expectations and the 
rewards/punishments associated with the fulfillment/non-fulfillment of these 
expectations.  
 
The results of the study point towards another electronic agents’ typology on the 
basis of the non-human nature of the organizational agents. According to the 
respondents, these agents have a largely coercive influence on their psychological 
contracts. The results indicate that these perceptions of coercion mainly stem from 
employees’ presumptions of diminished trust in the employment relationship. The 
study findings also emphasize the significant role of line managers as the primary 
agents of the organization. Finally, the results focus on employees’ attempts of 
making upward influence in order to achieve their objectives associated with the 
employment relationship.  
 
4.4.2 Primary and secondary agents 
The research findings highlighted a significant relationship between the notions of 
power and agency. The current research conceptualizes power to be embedded in 
the interdependent relationships between employees and organizational agents. 
Based on this conceptualization of power and the findings of the study, the 
researcher classifies the notion of agency into two major categories i.e. primary 
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and secondary agents. This classification is largely based on the practices of the 
different representatives of the organization (i.e. organizational agents) that 
influenced their interdependent relationships with employees on either a 
transactional (i.e. primary agents) and/or a relational (i.e. secondary agents) basis. 
In other words, the primary agents focused on monetary rewards (e.g. salary, 
bonus etc.), while the secondary agents emphasized non-monetary rewards (e.g. 
mentoring, employee recognition etc.) in order to influence employees. From the 
perspective of psychological contracts, the primary agents tended to promote the 
development of transactional contracts among employees. In contrast, the 
secondary agents influenced employees’ psychological contracts on a relational 
basis.  
 
The results of the study illustrated the principal influence of the primary agents in 
employees’ psychological contracts. This influence largely stemmed from 
employees’ major concern about the material rewards associated with their 
employment relationship. The response of an interviewee clearly represents this 
notion: 
 
He [manager] is basically the person, as a matter of fact the key person, 
for any person in an organization ... [because] he is the main person in 
charge of the most important issues, such as my pay, annual leave, 
medical, everything … If any person is not in good standing with his 
boss, if he is not able to make a good relationship with the boss or the 
boss is not happy with him, then definitely that person is in trouble. 
 
(participant 6) 
 
The results of the study further highlighted the limited influence of secondary 
agents in comparison with primary agents of the organization. Despite this 
relatively limited influence, the respondents nevertheless idiosyncratically 
acknowledged the important role of secondary agents in their psychological 
contracts. The research participants recognized the significance of secondary 
agents due to their assumptions regarding these agents as an important source 
from which to understand the expectations of the organization. According to the 
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respondents, the role of secondary agents was important because of certain 
limitations in their ability to completely understand the organizational 
expectations from the primary agents of the organization.  
 
This notion was illustratively evident in the response of a research participant: 
 
As an individual, I may be informal and share some personal things with 
them [co-workers] or seek their opinion or advice on the important 
issues related to the company … It is very difficult to go this way with 
the boss. There is always some distance, some level of formality 
between the boss and the other people. He will never behave like a 
friend or a buddy. He simply cannot, because he has to take work from 
his subordinates … in their [colleagues] case, like I have a colleague 
Rashid in my department. He is senior to me, but other than that we are 
also very good friends … he is only my senior but not my manager 
because I do not report to him but still I give considerable weight to his 
advice. First of all he is far more experienced than me and also I have 
high trust in him as a very sincere person. 
 
(participant 17) 
 
The above response is representative of the issue that employees, in order to 
understand the organization’s expectations, considered themselves dependent not 
only on the primary but also on the secondary agents of the organization. The role 
of secondary agents was significant due to different limitations in completely 
understanding the employer’s expectations from the primary agents of the 
organization.   
 
4.4.3 Multiple agents 
The analysis of the findings pointed towards another typology of multiple agents, 
in addition to the previously discussed classification of primary and secondary 
agents. This typology surfaced in relation to employees who were simultaneously 
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employed with multiple employers. The multiple agents’ typology was 
particularly evident in the case of organization C, which employed about 30 per 
cent of the customer services staff on a part-time basis. Due to the perceptions of 
being a peripheral workforce and having a relatively limited relationship with the 
employers, the psychological contracts of these employees were largely 
transactional in their orientation. For these employees, the tendency to develop 
transactional contracts with multiple employers, rather than resulting from the 
non-fulfillment of high expectations, largely stemmed from the moderate 
expectations originally limited to the transactional level. As these employees were 
simultaneously employed by more than one organization, this spread the risk for 
them as they were not completely dependent on any one employer for their 
employment.  
 
In addition, because of their transactional nature, the psychological contracts of 
these employees were mainly influenced by the distinct primary agents 
representing their employers. With a significant emphasis on the monetary 
rewards, these employees largely focused on the primary agents in order to 
achieve the transactional objectives associated with their interdependent 
employment relationships. This ultimately resulted in a very limited possibility of 
any noticeable influence on these employees from the secondary agents of the 
organization. One of the research participants expressed this scenario:  
 
Here [in call center], I have a good hello, hi with other people but I have 
not have a very strong relationship with other staff members because I 
come here only for two days [per week] … I do not have much 
interaction with other people because on weekends there are different 
people and most of them are working part-time like me. It is the same 
with my other job [WAPDA] … I spend approximately two hours each 
day if I work non-stop … some of them [other data entry operators] are 
students. Some are doing a second job like me and some are running 
their own small business. Everyone is busy and wants to finish the work 
as soon as possible because this is just a part-time job. 
 
(participant 28) 
176 
 
 
4.4.4 Incumbent agents  
In addition to the primary-secondary and multiple agents’ typologies, the 
incumbent agent’s classification emerged as another scheme in the domain of 
agency. The incumbent agent’s typology was pertinent in the case of employees 
who were transferred from one department to another within the same 
organization. The researcher refers to this classification of organizational agents in 
the context of those research participants who modified their perceptions of 
primary agents on the basis of their assumptions about their current manger. 
Although the applicability of the incumbent agents’ typology is relatively limited, 
as a very small number of employees experienced this phenomenon, a consistent 
pattern emerged during the analysis of the data from these respondents.  
 
For the research participants belonging to this category, the change in formal 
reporting authority within the same organization did not influence their 
perceptions of secondary agents. However, the change in the formal reporting 
authority of an employee from one manager to another altered the perceptions of 
the employee’s psychological contract through the replacement of the previous 
department manager as a former primary agent with the new department manager 
as a current primary agent of the organization. This notion of incumbent agent is 
evident in the response of one research participant: 
 
I still have interaction sometimes with him [previous manager] but not 
that much because I am not working in that department now. I have 
contact on a daily basis and have meetings on almost a once a week 
basis with my new boss … my personal links within this company are still 
the same. I have friends. I meet the same way with them as I used to do 
before … most of them are from my previous department. We cannot 
see each other as frequently as in the past, but our relationship is still 
the same. There is no change in it. 
 
(participant 21) 
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The above response also highlights the issue that employees consider themselves 
as more dependent on the current department manager in order to understand 
organization’s expectations, ultimately supporting them (employees) to achieve 
the objectives associated with their interdependent employment relationships. 
 
4.4.5 Implications of trustworthiness 
The trustworthiness of an individual also played an important role in developing 
the perceptions of the respondents regarding the agents of the organization. This 
trustworthiness of organizational agents was largely based on their capability to 
effectively communicate to employees the organization’s expectations and the 
resulting rewards/punishments associated with the fulfillment/non-fulfillment of 
these expectations. One of the research participants expressed this notion as:  
 
I am recently promoted as a team leader … the role of my manager is 
really helpful in this whole process … he told us very basic things, for 
example how to plan different tasks. How to give priority for them, 
especially how to decide between the urgent task and the important 
task ... most of the time we have to do many things at once and all of 
them are important but we have to decide which one to do first and 
which one to do later on. These are the things which make the bosses 
unhappy or happy, if we do them according to their preferences, 
according to the way they want, and not the way we want. This is the 
mistake which people mostly make. They work very hard but they do 
not set the priorities of the things according to the requirements of their 
manager. This is the reason that even after all their hard work, their 
managers are still not happy with them. I always listened to the 
instructions of my manager very carefully. It is always a very reliable 
guide. 
 
(participant 30) 
 
The above response highlights the significance of individual trustworthiness in the 
process of agent determination. The notion of trustworthiness is vital as it 
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strengthens employees’ perceptions regarding their dependence on particular 
organizational members in order to achieve the objectives associated with their 
interdependent employment relationship.  
 
4.4.6 The relational influence of primary agents 
The results of the study further revealed the relational influence of those primary 
agents who played the additional role of secondary agents in employees’ 
psychological contracts. In this context, employees appeared to be highly 
receptive to those primary agents who also focused on relational (in addition to 
transactional) rewards. 
 
This notion was evident in the response of a research participant: 
 
I still remember, my experience of working there [previous organization] 
was a nightmare … at that time, I had only theoretical knowledge from 
books. I needed some practical experience … my seniors never helped 
me in getting that. Whenever they were installing something or doing 
something technical, they gave me some useless task and made me sit 
in the other room. They wasted my six months this way. I learnt nothing, 
just wasted my time ... The thing which I really like in him [current 
manager] is that he never hides anything … The seniors in my last 
organization, when I was doing an internship, were afraid that if I had 
some technical knowledge, I would take their jobs and they would be 
fired by the company … In this company, there is an environment which 
is very straight-forward … the seniors are cooperative and share their 
knowledge with the juniors without any hesitation, and this they have 
learnt from the manager, who is like this ... I really appreciate all these 
things because the more someone has technical knowledge, the more 
he has market value. 
 
(participant 24) 
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Similar to the viewpoint of other research participants, this response highlights a 
considerable increase in the influence of primary agents who, in addition to the 
mere distribution of transactional rewards, also encouraged the development of 
relational dimensions in employees’ psychological contracts through their 
additional role as secondary agents. This increased influence had implications 
from the perspective of interdependence of employee–employer’s objectives 
associated with the employment relationship. On one hand, it resulted in a healthy 
influence on employees’ psychological contracts due to the perceptions of 
adequate acknowledgement and commensuration of their contributions and, on the 
other hand, it had a positive effect on the organization’s operations due to 
increased employee motivation.  
 
4.4.7 Criteria for perceived primary agents  
The results of the study further highlighted the general criterion used by the 
respondents in order to recognize a particular organizational member as a primary 
agent of the organization. This criterion was largely based on two key 
assumptions. First, the organizational member had the capability to distribute or 
withhold organizational rewards. Second, that particular organizational member 
had an active tendency to use that capability. In most of the cases, employees 
assumed their senior managers, immediate managers or supervisors as the primary 
agents because they perceived them not only as capable of distributing or 
withholding organizational rewards but also observed an active tendency to use 
this capability among them.  
 
Based on this rationale, for some research participants, the immediate supervisors 
rather than the senior department managers, served as the primary agents in their 
psychological contracts. This scenario was evident in one of the responses: 
 
We do not report to the manager directly … The manager, instead of 
talking to each of the front desk staff on a one to one basis, talks to the 
shift supervisors … The shift supervisor has no formal powers, but for 
most of us he is a very important person because the manager, he 
knows only what the shift supervisors tell him about us during the 
180 
 
meeting … his feedback is totally based on the reports which are given 
to him by the shift supervisors. That is the reason they are really 
important to me, although they have less power than the manager. On 
paper, they have no power but in reality they have the actual power 
because everything depends on what they report to the manager. 
 
(participant 32) 
 
This interview excerpt provides a pertinent representation of the theme that, for 
the primary agents, employees not only consider the capability of distributing or 
withholding organizational rewards but also the active tendency to use that 
capability.  
 
4.4.8 Electronic agents and their coercive influence 
The psychological contract literature is largely based on the conceptualization of 
organizational agents in the human context. Extending this notion of agency, the 
findings of the current research highlight the significant but ignored implications 
of non-human agents in employees’ psychological contracts. Referred to as the 
‘dead labour’ by Beirne et al. (2004, p. 99) and electronic agents of the 
organization by the researcher, the research participants, although to a varying 
extent, acknowledged the influences of these agents, largely from a coercion 
perspective.  
 
For one research participant: 
 
These cameras are everywhere. Now we are sitting here [canteen] but 
there is no reason for the cameras in this place. It is very irritating. It 
looks like somebody is secretly looking … where all the customer service 
staff sits, there may be some reason for the cameras in the main hall. 
That is understandable because the managers need to make sure the 
staff are working properly or not. They can monitor our computer 
systems from their own computers through the software … They can 
check on us in so many ways: what time we swipe our card to check our 
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arrival time in the office, the time we leave the office, then there are 
telephone logs, there is recording of telephone calls, there are so many 
other things. The company has to check us, but in places like this there is 
no need of cameras. We come here in our free time and we want to be 
relaxed during this time but as you can see this one and this one right 
over our heads, it makes no sense … The precision of these cameras is 
so high that they can see what someone is typing on his mobile phone. 
 
(participant 33) 
 
Similarly, for the other research participants, even though electronic surveillance 
was imperative to some degree for the efficient execution of organizational 
operations, the excessive and unnecessary use of these monitoring devices led to 
an unwelcome intervention in their privacy. This ultimately resulted in the 
development of employees’ perceptions of contract breach due to their 
assumptions of organizational spying. According to the respondents, the 
organization needs to carefully prescribe boundaries for the use of electronic 
surveillance equipment as otherwise it might imply the organization’s lack of trust 
in its employees.  
 
The perception of coercion fuelled by the electronic agents of the organization 
was evident in the response of another interviewee: 
 
There should be some consideration of employees’ privacy but our 
company really doesn’t take care of it … They should not intervene in 
my privacy. It is not understandable why the company does that, 
because the CCTVs show very clearly [what we do] so why is the 
company so sceptical about us or what doubts do they have in their 
mind about us?  
 
(participant 13) 
 
For the other research participants as well, the affects of these electronic agents 
were generally coercive, resulting in perceptions of contract breach. However, 
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unlike the general tendency among employees to attribute coercion primarily to 
their managers, the respondents explained it as ‘... a company policy or an 
industry practice ...’ (participant 33) which was beyond the control of their 
managers.  
 
Generally employees have a tendency to attribute perceptions of contract breach 
to different human agents (e.g. managers, supervisors, senior managers etc.) In the 
case of electronic agents, however, employees tended to attribute the surveillance-
led breach to the overall organization rather than to these non-human agents. This 
ultimately had a negative influence on their psychological contracts established 
with the organization without a noticeable effect on their perceptions of exchange 
with other human agents of the organization. The psychological contract literature 
generally assumes that the perceptions of employees’ psychological contracts 
established with their organization are principally dependent on the organizational 
agents as the contract-makers. However, the case of electronic agents presents an 
atypical scenario in which employees develop a pessimistic perception of their 
psychological contract with the overall organization without attributing it to any 
particular human agent. Figure 4.1 presents a hierarchical arrangement of the 
different typologies discussed in relation to the notion of agency. 
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4.4.9 Perceptions of limited coercion from human agents 
In comparison with the perceptions of coercion by the electronic agents of the 
organization, there was relatively limited evidence of the assumptions of explicit 
coercion by the human agents (i.e. any formal act of reprimand or reprisal by the 
organization) among the research participants. This is because employees 
themselves appeared to strive for better performance, not in order to avoid 
organizational coercion or punishment but to reap additional rewards from their 
employment relationship. Alternatively for them, coercion primarily implied not 
collecting proportionate rewards, rather than receiving any explicit punishment 
from their managers.  
 
 
This viewpoint was evident in the response of a research participant: 
 
Most of us put our efforts into making a good impression on the 
managers as a reliable person … I cannot see anybody in this 
organization who is careless or non-serious doing his job irresponsibly … 
There was a guy working over here. His behaviour was clearly not 
responsible … He was given several warnings in the beginning but 
nobody knows what was in his mind. He did not take those warnings 
seriously. After three months, when his probation period was over, the 
company said sorry to him and did not offer him a permanent job … I 
was very surprised by his attitude because I was struggling for a better 
salary and everything and that’s why I tried to do my best but he was 
doing exactly the opposite. Even after several warnings, he did not 
change his behaviour. 
 
(participant 29) 
 
From the perspective of power, this interview response also depicts the 
employers’ tendency to influence their interdependent relationships with 
employees on the basis of distributing or withholding organizational rewards 
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through the primary agents of the organization. This observation further endorses 
the significant role of the primary agents, as employees generally consider 
themselves more dependent on these agents in order to achieve their transactional 
objectives associated with the employment relationship.  
 
4.4.10 Line managers as primary agents  
Relevant to the primary–secondary agents’ typology, another research finding 
which supported the significant role of line managers as the primary agents of the 
organization was their active and predominant participation not only in their own 
domains but also in the human resource functions of the organization. As a result 
of the influence of the line managers even in human resource decisions, the role of 
human resource managers, according to employees, was symbolic and relatively 
insignificant. Consequently employees considered their line managers as 
considerably more powerful than the human resource managers in influencing 
their interdependent employment relationships.  
 
According to a research participant: 
 
My major, I would say basic, connection with the company is through 
my boss … I never saw any human resource staff attending these 
[departmental] meetings. This shows their working which is really very 
limited. If they do not work, it doesn’t make any big difference … I do 
not get what they actually do because for each and every thing I have to 
talk to my manager. If it is overtime or any other thing, I have to talk to 
him … the manager approves my holidays or the overtime and then I 
pass on this approval to the human resources department. They take a 
print of it and save the hardcopy in the files. This is what their job is … If 
they issue any other formal letter to an employee again this is as per the 
instructions of the manager. Whatever the manager requires, they 
cannot change one comma in it.  
 
(participant 29) 
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The notion of the significance of the line managers as the primary agents, partially 
strengthened by the limited role of the human resource managers, was evident in 
another response: 
 
I had only one proper interaction with human resources when they 
called me for the written test for this job. The testing of the candidates 
was carried out by them. After that they gave the CVs of the shortlisted 
candidates who passed the test to the manager and [their role was] 
finished. That is their total role in my whole job … I cannot see any of 
their role in my job or in the job of anyone else other than that. 
 
(participant 14) 
 
4.4.11 Employees’ upward influence 
Regarding the notion of agency, the research findings further highlighted that not 
only the organizational agents but also the employees attempted to influence their 
interdependent employment relationships. For the organizational agents, the 
capability to distribute or withhold organizational rewards appeared to be a major 
source of influence. In contrast, employees attempted to influence the 
organizational agents largely on the basis of developing personal or informal 
relationships with them. This influence, in addition to helping employees achieve 
their largely transactional objectives, also supported them in further strengthening 
their connections with the organizational agents. Discussed in the relevant 
literature as a notion of upward influence (McAlister and Darling, 2005), the 
respondents generally demonstrated this tendency as an attempt to contribute to 
important organizational decisions and also to support their material objectives by 
harvesting additional rewards associated with the employment relationship.  
 
This notion was evident in the response of a research participant: 
 
The higher someone has got links in the company, the more his chances 
are of becoming permanent … Last month they made some permanent 
postings and I tried for these … I was not made permanent … The 
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problem is that I cannot do flattery. I focus on my work but the others 
are very good at buttering up their bosses ... some of my juniors, who 
joined the company after me, are working in the central region as 
permanent staff in senior posts to me. They are working with them 
[senior managers] at head office and they are listened to when the 
managers take any major decision. 
 
(participant 9) 
 
From the perspective of upward influence, the employees relied heavily on 
developing and promoting their knowledge and skills in order to develop their 
credibility in the organization. This credibility ultimately supported employees to 
achieve their transactional objectives associated with the employment 
relationship. The accomplishment of these transactional objectives was supported 
not only through increasing the dependence of the current employer due to their 
higher perceived credibility, but also through enhancing future employability 
prospects with the current and the other potential employers.  
 
According to one research participant: 
 
Everyone in the retail section wants to come into this [corporate] 
section because here we have to deal with a very limited number of 
customers as compared to the retail and also the customers are far 
better because they are from business … Working in the corporate 
section provides good exposure in the market. It has good job prospects 
as compared to retail and it is very helpful in making good links with 
other companies … I was promoted in this department, as my last 
working was satisfactory. I had a very good reputation with the 
manager, who is basically in charge of both the retail and the corporate 
sections. The manager knew that I could handle corporate clients and 
the pressure of this department … I had good relations with him and I 
also showed him that I was interested to work in this department.  
 
(participant 15) 
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This observation also echoes the previous research finding in the context of 
employability. As noted, the increased credibility acquired on the basis of expert 
knowledge and skills supported employees in their interdependent employment 
relationships in a twofold manner. On one hand, it reduced their dependence on 
the current employer through enhancing their employability prospects. While on 
the other hand, it increased the employer’s dependence on them. Alternatively, 
from the perspective of power in terms of relational interdependence, the 
increased credibility had dual implications as in addition to reducing employees’ 
dependence on the employer, it also increased the employer’s dependence on 
them.  
 
4.4.12 Summary of agency findings  
This section presented the study findings concerning the notion of agency in the 
psychological contract literature. The results highlighted the different 
classifications of the notion of agency (e.g. primary agents, secondary agents, 
multiple agents, incumbent agents etc.) The notion of agents’ trustworthiness in 
the context of explicit communication also emerged as an important theme. As 
already discussed, this trustworthiness was largely based on the agents’ ability to 
explicitly communicate the expectations of the organization and the 
rewards/punishments associated with the fulfillment/non-fulfillment of these 
expectations.  
 
Augmenting the understanding of agency which is largely conceptualized from 
the human perspective, the research findings pointed towards the noticeable 
implications of the electronic agents of the organization. For the research 
participants, these agents principally had a coercive influence on their 
psychological contracts. The research findings highlighted that these perceptions 
of coercion were mainly associated with employees’ presumptions of diminished 
trust in the employment relationship. The results of the study also elaborated on 
the significant role of line managers, in comparison with human resource 
managers, in being considered to be the primary agents of the organization. 
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Finally, the results highlighted employees’ attempts of making upward influences 
in order to achieve their objectives associated with the employment relationship. 
In this respect, employees focused on developing their credibility through expert 
knowledge and skills. This credibility generally enhanced employees’ bargaining 
power in a twofold manner as, in addition to reducing their dependence on the 
employer, it also increased the employer’s dependence on them.  
 
4.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter elaborated on the findings of the current study concerning the 
assumptions of mutuality, reciprocity and agency in the psychological contract 
literature. Undermining the conceptualization of establishing mutuality on an 
implicit basis, the results highlighted the notion of indeterminacy between 
employees and the employer. The results also illustrated the employers’ tendency 
to influence employees’ perceptions of mutuality in favour of the organization. 
The research findings pointed towards different issues (e.g. employees’ concern 
regarding training, and job flexibility) that promote employees’ perceptions of 
biased mutuality in their employment relationships. Under the influence of 
perceptions of biased mutuality, employees therefore made efforts to enhance 
their employability prospects. In order to enhance their employability, employees 
generally focused on developing and promoting their knowledge and skills. From 
the perspective of power, this enhanced employability supported employees in a 
dual manner as, in addition to reducing their dependence on the employer, it also 
increased the employer’s dependence on them. The final section elaborated on the 
issue of divergence in the perceptions of mutuality between employees and 
managers.  
 
In relation to reciprocity, the research findings highlighted the greater tendency 
among employees to develop perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity. In 
addition, and consistent with the previous research finding regarding the 
development of relatively low perceptions of mutuality in non-managerial 
employees, those research participants who had comparatively weak perceptions 
of reciprocity were largely non-managerial. Irrespective of the differences in the 
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assumptions of reciprocity among the managerial and the non-managerial 
employees, the respondents generally did not perceive their employment 
relationship as being established on a reciprocal basis. The results further 
highlighted that these perceptions were principally associated with employees’ 
presumptions of disproportionate interdependence or power asymmetry in the 
employment relationship, preventing them from responding to employer’s 
inducements on a reciprocal basis. Employees did not tend to reciprocate not only 
because of their perceptions of disproportionate interdependence, but also to 
achieve their personal objectives associated with the employment relationship.  
 
Because of their perceived inability to respond to the employers’ inducements on 
a reciprocal basis, employees pursued other alternatives (e.g. developing negative 
attitudinal reciprocity, withdrawing positive discretionary behaviours etc.) 
Another major finding pointed towards the considerable tendency among 
employees to associate employers’ reciprocal practices mainly with their 
immediate managers or supervisors. The respondents, however, tended to avoid 
balancing any discrepancy with their managers or supervisors. According to the 
respondents, this could result in further undesirable consequences for them 
because of the prevailing power asymmetry between themselves and their 
managers. The respondents in such situations, however, opted to displace their 
negative reciprocity to the more vulnerable members of the organization and in 
some cases to the customers of the organization. Finally, the impressions of less 
job mobility were also observed to be significantly associated with employees’ 
perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity.  
 
Concerning the notion of agency, the results of the study highlighted different 
classifications of organizational agents (e.g. primary agents, secondary agents, 
multiple agents, incumbent agents etc.) The issue of agents’ trustworthiness in the 
context of explicit communication also emerged as an important theme. The 
results illustrated that this trustworthiness was largely based on the agents’ ability 
to communicate explicitly the expectations of the organization and the 
rewards/punishments associated with the fulfillment/non-fulfillment of these 
expectations. Augmenting the understanding of the notion of agency which had 
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been conceptualized mainly from the perspective of human agents, the results 
pointed towards noteworthy implications in relation to the electronic agents of the 
organization. For the respondents, these agents had a largely coercive influence on 
their psychological contracts. The findings of the study illustrated that these 
perceptions of coercion principally stemmed from employees’ presumptions of 
diminished trust in the employment relationship.  
 
The research findings further illustrated the significant role of line managers, who 
were considered as being the primary agents of the organization. Finally, the 
research findings elaborated on employees’ attempts of making upward influences 
in order to achieve their objectives associated with the employment relationship. 
From the perspective of making upward influence, employees mainly focused on 
developing their credibility through expert knowledge and skills. This credibility 
in turn enhanced employees’ bargaining power in a dual manner as, in addition to 
reducing their dependence on the employer, it further increased the employer’s 
dependence on them.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Discussion    
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the findings of the study in the context of the relevant 
literature. The first section of the chapter focuses on the assumption of mutuality 
in the psychological contract literature. The discussion begins by highlighting the 
issue of indeterminacy between employees and the employer as key to 
undermining the presumption of an implicit mutuality. In addition to the 
assumption of mutuality established on an implicit basis, the issue of biased 
mutuality in favour of the employer is highlighted. In this context, the discussion 
focuses on different issues (e.g. employability, job flexibility, training and career 
development) that promote employees’ perceptions of biased mutuality in their 
psychological contracts. Consequently, employees in order to manage their 
bargaining power in the employment relationship make efforts to decrease their 
dependence on the employer and increase the employer’s dependence on them. 
The limitations in Rousseau’s (2001) conceptualization for promoting employees’ 
perceptions of mutuality are then highlighted. The last part of the discussion 
focuses on the issue of divergence between the employees’ and the managers’ 
perceptions of mutuality. 
 
 
5.2 Mutuality 
5.2.1 Indeterminacy in employment relations 
The psychological contract literature places significant emphasis on an 
assumption of mutuality which is largely implicit in nature (Dabos and Rousseau, 
2004; Rousseau, 2011). In contrast, other researchers argue that in reality the 
assumption of mutuality does not play out to the extent that is theoretically 
assumed (e.g. Dulac et al., 2008; Guest et al., 2010; Jun Je et. al., 2012). Even 
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though these studies do not specifically gauge the notion of an implicit mutuality, 
their findings clearly indicate the absence of such mutuality, as otherwise the 
majority of their results (endorsing the existence of an implicit mutuality) would 
logically have pointed towards psychological contract fulfillment. Consistent with 
the argument of Rodrigues and Guest (2010, p. 1158), the researcher emphasizes 
‘an evidence-based approach, reflecting the need for a stronger empirical basis on 
which to evaluate the claims’ (e.g. implicit mutuality in this case) underpinning 
the psychological contract theory.  
 
Taking into account, the diverse social as well as economic dimensions, the 
indeterminate nature of complex employment relationships is generally 
recognized in the relevant literature (e.g. Atkinson et al., 2014; Hamilton, 2001; 
Kessler et al., 2013). Researchers argue that this indeterminacy begins at the start 
of the employment relationship in the form of the employment contract (e.g. 
Deakin and Njoya, 2008; Edwards, 1995; Hyman, 1975; Suazo et al., 2011). The 
argument of these researchers echoes the viewpoint of Baldamus (1961) that ‘the 
formal wage contract is never precise in stipulating how much effort is expected 
for a given wage (and vice versa).’ (p. 35). In relation to the psychological 
contract, Cullinane and Dundon (2006) also acknowledge the existence of the 
notion of indeterminacy by attributing it to the ‘indeterminate interactions 
between two parties: employer and employee’ (p. 115). Atkinson et al. (2014, p. 
13) state that the disagreements resulting from this indeterminacy in employment 
relationships generally result in perceptions of the ‘breach of the psychological 
contract’.  
 
The implications of the notion of indeterminacy, undermining the assumption of 
an implicit mutuality can be further seen in the concept of collective bargaining. 
Researchers argue that collective bargaining arrangements provide support to 
overcome indeterminacy, a phenomenon ultimately leading to disagreements in 
employment relationships (e.g. Kessler et al., 2013; Towers, 1997). Flanders 
(1970) emphasizes the significance of collective bargaining arrangements as an 
effective solution to promote mutuality and to reduce disagreements, by arguing 
that these arrangements ‘are needed in the first place to reduce uncertainty and 
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ambiguity in the relations between the parties’ (p. 205). According to Towers 
(1997), collective bargaining arrangements minimize uncertainty by ‘establishing 
both rights and obligations in a web of rules’ (p. 302).  
 
However, despite all these suggested efficiencies, Hamilton (2001) argues that 
‘the process of collective bargaining is indeterminate’ (p. 439). This is because, in 
spite of their explicit nature, ‘the outcomes of management–union negotiations are 
not predictable’ (Martin, 1992, p. 105). Similarly, Arrowsmith and Marginson 
(2011), from the perspective of different pay schemes for employees, state that 
collective bargaining arrangements have not been able to successfully promote 
mutuality in employment relationships. It appears therefore as very challenging to 
conceptualize mutuality, according to Rousseau’s (2011) view, not only on an 
implicit basis but also at the level of ‘objective accuracy’ (p. 197).  
 
This argument is further supported by the inherent complexities in the 
conceptualization of the psychological contract. The collective bargaining 
arrangements are explicitly negotiated, established between two clear parties (i.e. 
employees and the organization), and are relatively objective and stable in nature 
(Fox, 1985; Hayter, 2011). Despite all these features, such arrangements are not 
completely capable of inducing mutuality and predicting the outcomes of the 
employment exchange (Hamilton, 2001; Martin, 1992). In contrast, psychological 
contracts are implicit, established between one clear (i.e. the employee) and 
another vague party (i.e. the employer comprising different agents), on a one-to-
many basis (i.e. one employee and many vague agents of the organization), are 
also highly subjective and dynamic in nature as they are shaped by the daily 
interactions between employees and the different representatives of the 
organization (Conway and Briner, 2009; Guest et al., 2010; Herriot and 
Pemberton, 1997).  
 
In spite of all these limitations, or at least complications, the psychological 
contract literature has generally acknowledged the notion of an implicit mutuality 
without any empirical scrutiny and based its empirical investigations on such an 
unrealistic assumption (see Conway and Briner, 2009; Guest, 1998; Guest et al., 
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2010; Shore et al., 2012 for a few theoretical exceptions). The tendency to follow 
this assumption without having a considerable level of empirical support is 
reflected in the way that, since the pioneering work on the notion of the 
psychological contract by Argyris (1960), no specific study has attempted to 
investigate practically the notion of an implicit mutuality (Conway and Briner, 
2009).  
 
5.2.2 Implications of rhetoric 
As is clear in the findings of the current study and as argued in the above 
discussion, the notion of an implicit mutuality does not appear to be highly 
relevant to practical employment conditions. Because of its radical disagreement 
with the prevalent psychological contract literature, the researcher’s argument 
logically raises the question of why the relevant research predominantly and 
consistently followed this tradition. A meta-analytic review of the relevant 
literature provides support to answer this question by attributing this tendency to 
rhetoric rather than a reality-based academic discussion. Schoeck (1986) argues 
that rhetoric has consequences in ‘most, if not all, of the spheres of human public 
activity’ (p. 25). Foss et al. (1991) posit that, with the background of mutuality, 
employment arrangements are a good example to use for the study of rhetoric.  
 
Similar with other disciplines, rhetoric in organizational behaviour refers to the 
‘under examination, either denoting emptiness or as a contrast with reality’ 
(Hamilton, 2001, p. 433). According to Friedman (1977), rhetoric is an ubiquitous 
feature as its influences can also be observed in the domains of performance 
management (Bowles and Coates, 1993; Pollitt, 2006), managerial attitudes 
(Mamman and Rees, 2004; Poole and Mansfield, 1992; Vallas, 2003), industrial 
relations (Clarke, 1996; Clarke and Patrickson, 2008), personnel management 
(Sisson, 1994), social partnerships (Ackers and Payne, 1998; Googins and 
Rochlin, 2000; Selsky and Parker, 2005) and employee mobility (Hallier, 2009). 
The domain of the psychological contract is not an exception (Cullinane and 
Dundon, 2006; Guest et. al., 2010). Hallier (2009) from the perspective of power 
asymmetry, particularly in case of the larger category of lower level employees, 
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argues that rhetoric in the domain of the psychological contract has limited 
‘relevance to the practices of most organizations and the work reality encountered 
by the majority of workers’ (p. 847). 
 
Furthermore, the relevant literature is overwhelmed with assumptions of increased 
individualism and the escalated sensitivity of contemporary employees to 
employability rather than job security (e.g. Arthur and Rousseau 1996; Briscoe et 
al., 2012; Grimshaw and Rubery, 2010; Rubery et al., 2010; Singh, 1998; Sullivan 
and Arthur, 2006). This research does not challenge the validity of these claims, 
but there are concerns about the pace at which such changes and their effects on 
contemporary employment arrangements are projected. Cullinane and Dundon 
(2006, p. 123), consistent with the later emphasis of Rodrigues and Guest (2010), 
argue that the psychological contract literature appears to acknowledge these 
claims ‘with very little scrutiny’ (p. 123). According to Thompson and McHugh 
(2002) these claims are a consequence of exaggeration and over-generalizability, 
stemming from the prevailing tendency among researchers to emphasize the 
changes in employment relations over the past few decades.  
 
Hallier (2009) considers these claims as an effort to:  
 
legitimize [the] so-called “new” psychological contract [which] differs 
from the established concept propounded by Argyris (1960) and 
MacNeil (1985), in that it refers to a managerialist version of the 
employment relationship which is not only normative but also which 
eschews many of the essential features of contracting, such as 
mutuality, reciprocity, voluntariness. 
 
(p. 852, quotation marks in original) 
 
Watson (2004) maintains that the use of language, whether rhetorical or realistic, 
enables us to create realities. Extending the argument of Watson (2004), Cullinane 
and Dundon (2006) raise the issue that unfortunately the use of rhetorical 
language in the psychological contract literature has created ‘an orthodoxy’ that, 
rather than illuminating, further obscures the reality of the employment 
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relationship (p. 124). Supporting this viewpoint, Inkson and King (2011) argue 
that (with the exception of the smaller category of managerial, professional and 
knowledge workers who have significant powers in the employment relationship) 
the rhetoric of ‘new careers’ in the psychological contract literature has limited 
relevance to the larger category of ‘lower-level workers’ (p. 42).  
 
The above discussion helped in answering the question of why the relevant 
research followed the ideology of an implicit mutuality, by attributing it to the 
notion of rhetoric. However, this in turn raises another question: what motivated 
the majority of the research to opt for this rhetorical tradition. Hamilton (2001, p. 
435), consistent with the later endorsement of other researchers (e.g. Clarke and 
Patrickson, 2008; Colye-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; 
Hallier, 2009; Inkson and King, 2011; Shore et al., 2012), explains this issue as, 
‘since management is the dominant party within employment relationships, it is 
therefore perhaps unsurprising that it is management’s rhetoric that is typically 
referred to’. According to Kirkbride (1992), rhetoric is a device used by 
management to influence union relations and achieve other objectives, such as 
‘legitimizing principles, signalling a group’s possession of and potential use of 
resources, masking a group’s relative power, and as a source of power in itself, in 
terms of a skilled orator being able to advance a case’ (p. 77). This argument is 
further extended by Thompson and McHugh (2002) to consultancy firms and 
researchers who, in collaboration with the dominant managerialist research 
agenda, have attempted to market their own ideological products.  
 
Similarly from the perspective of rhetoric, Rodrigues and Guest (2010, p. 1157) 
raise concerns about the claims of other researchers (e.g. Arthur, 2008; Briscoe 
and Hall, 2006; Rousseau, 1995; Sullivan and Arthur, 2006) regarding the 
‘collapse’ of the traditional employment relationship. The critique of Rodrigues 
and Guest (2010) echoes the concern of Sisson (1994) who, while discussing the 
issue of rhetoric and reality, responds to these claims as a soft-centered 
doublespeak by management in order to mask the hardships experienced by 
employees beginning from the same era of 1980s. He clearly equates terms like 
‘flexibility’, ‘employability’, ‘customer first’ and ‘lean production’, promulgated 
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under the influence of the management-oriented research agenda, with ‘no 
employment security’, ‘management can do what it wants’, ‘market forces 
supreme’ and ‘mean production’ (Sisson, 1994, p. 15).  
 
Similarly, Keenoy and Anthony (1992) maintain that the psychological contract 
literature tends ‘to transform, to inspire, to motivate, and above all, to create a 
new (unitarist) “reality” which is freely available to those who choose or are 
persuaded to believe’ (p. 235). Cullinane and Dundon (2006) agree with the 
concern of Keenoy and Anthony (1992), suggesting that ‘the so-called benefits 
and claims [regarding the new employment contract] are presented in such a 
reified state that they appear as natural laws [rather than as] the engendered 
products of powerful societal agents’ (p. 124). Consistent with the critique of 
other researchers (e.g. Arnold and Cohen, 2008; Feldman and Ng, 2007; Guest et. 
al., 2010; Hallier, 2009), Rodrigues and Guest (2010, p. 1158) therefore 
emphasize ‘a stronger empirical basis on which to evaluate the claims [regarding 
the emergence of the] new deal’.  
 
5.2.3 Employer oriented rhetoric 
The above discussion highlighted the issue of employer-oriented rhetoric in the 
domain of the psychological contract. The following section elaborates on the 
different dimensions of this rhetoric (e.g. employability, flexibility, training and 
career development opportunities) with implications from the perspective of 
power dynamics in the employment relationship.  
 
5.2.3.1  The employability issue 
From the perspective of employability, there is a general assumption that 
contemporary employers, in order to encourage employees’ perceptions of 
mutuality, support them in enhancing their employability prospects (Ellig, 1998; 
Sullivan and Arthur, 2006). According to Ghoshal et al. (1999), as a reward for 
loyalty, employers tend to invest in their employees with the objective of 
promoting their marketable talents. Dries et al. (2014, p. 566) argue that, as most 
employers can no longer guarantee employment security, they tend to ‘offer 
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employability security instead, in the form of continuous transferable skills 
development’. Waterman et al. (1994, pp. 88–89) refer to the responses from 
managers regarding employability: ‘we became convinced that we had a 
responsibility to put employees back in control of their lives … by empowering 
people so that they have job choices when circumstances change…’. In their 
study, Waterman et al. (1994) further note the managers suggesting that the 
companies tend to ‘give employees the power to assess, hone, redirect, and 
expand their skills so that they can stay competitive in the job market’ (p. 88).  
 
The proponents of employability, in addition to considering it as a prominent 
source of success for businesses, further discuss it as a win–win situation for both 
employee and employer (e.g. Dries et al., 2014; Schmid, 2006; Thijssen et al., 
2008; Waterman et al., 1994). Other researchers, however, consider these claims 
overly optimistic and influenced by ‘implicit undertones of managerialism’ (e.g. 
Clarke and Patrickson, 2008; Crouch, 2006; Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; Hallier, 
2009; Inkson and King, 2011, p. 43). The researcher, consistent with the concern 
of Prujit and Derogee (2010), therefore argues that further empirical support for 
these claims is still required.  
 
 
 
According to Clarke and Patrickson (2008): 
 
the dynamics of employability appear to be based on a number of 
assumptions that have emerged as recurrent themes within the 
managerialist literature. These assumptions, which include both explicit 
and implicit statements about the responsibilities and benefits of 
employability, remain relatively unexplored and unchallenged. 
 
(p. 124) 
 
Similarly, Crouch’s (2006) argument has significant intuitive resonance that, in 
comparison with poaching an already trained workforce from their competitors, 
investing in employees’ marketable skills, to make them more attractive for 
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competitors is a relatively less attractive option for employers. Sieben (2007) 
further endorses this view by arguing that, because of their concerns of high 
turnover, employers are generally reluctant to enhance the employability 
prospects of their employees, particularly the highly skilled ones.  
 
The observation of these researchers is echoed in the findings of the current study. 
As noted in the results, employers (rather than making an investment in 
employees’ marketable skills to enhance their employability) are more concerned 
with developing employees’ skills to meet their own requirements. These 
practices, rather than promoting employees’ marketability or employability, 
largely result in the development of employees’ skills pertinent to their current 
employer (Clarke and Patrickson, 2008). This tendency may increase employees’ 
dependence on their employer, ultimately strengthening their perceptions of 
power asymmetry due to the assumptions of disproportionate interdependence in 
the employment relationship (Tjosvold and Wisse, 2009; Uhl-Bien and Carsten, 
2007). However, this is not the case for a small category of employees with 
critical skills (e.g. managerial, professional and knowledge workers). These 
employees have significant bargaining power as the organizations are highly 
dependent on their skills (Inkson and King, 2011). Rather than promoting their 
employability prospects, employers constantly make efforts to retain these 
employees (Cappelli, 2004). This is largely due to the scarce skills and 
competencies of these employees, which are critically important for the key 
operations of the organization.  
 
Inkson and King (2011) consider the assumption of employers enhancing 
employees’ prospects of employability as an employer oriented rhetoric suited to 
the demands of a managerialist agenda. Prujit and Derogee (2010, pp. 440–441) 
maintain that claims such as, ‘full employability’ and ‘lifetime employability’ are 
a management discourse ‘to mask a shift in power to the advantage of the 
employers’. While criticizing the unrealistic assumption that contemporary 
employers foster employees’ marketable skills as a reward for their loyalty, they 
further posit that ‘the theory of the new psychological contract also hints at a 
private good that the employer can gain when investing in employees’ 
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employability; a non-sticky kind of employee commitment’. (Prujit and Derogee, 
2010, p. 442). 
 
From the perspective of employability, there is another assumption that 
contemporary employees are themselves more concerned with the issue of their 
marketability or employability than their job security (Arthur and Rousseau, 1996; 
Briscoe and Hall, 2006; Briscoe et al., 2012; Rousseau, 2011; Singh, 1998; 
Sullivan and Arthur, 2006). Contrary to this viewpoint and consistent with the 
critique of Rodrigues and Guest (2010), the results of the current study highlight 
that, although contemporary employees, particularly in call centres (Holman et al., 
2008), are more concerned with the issue of their employability than before, the 
underlying reason is the diminished job security, they have with their employers. 
 
According to Uhl-Bien and Carsten (2007), the trend of looking for increased 
employability among contemporary employees: 
 
is one of the outcomes of the downsizing craze in the 1990s - many 
employees became aware that they were at the mercy of one 
organization for employment. Since then, many workers have adopted a 
new approach to career management that involves making themselves 
more broadly marketable and more willing to change organizations if 
better options come along. 
 
(p. 194) 
 
Many employees, therefore, generally tend to reduce their dependence on the 
employer in order to manage their bargaining power in the employment 
relationship (Tjosvold and Wisse, 2009).  
 
As is evident in the research findings, this reduced dependence is largely 
associated with employees’ enhanced employability prospects resulting from a 
more proactive approach towards their career management. From the perspective 
of power as a relational interdependence, this enhanced employability generally 
supports employees in a dual manner as, in addition to reducing their dependence 
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on the current employer, it also increases the employer’s dependence on them 
(Tjosvold and Wisse, 2009; Uhl-Bien and Carsten, 2007). Millward and 
Brewerton (2000) maintain that employees have not opted for these tendencies of 
their own freewill; rather these contracting terms are imposed on them and this 
has a significant influence on their psychological contracts. Rodrigues and Guest 
(2010) further support this view by arguing that the majority of contemporary 
workers still value long-term traditional careers characterized by job security in 
the employment relationship.  
 
From the employers’ perspective, Saunders and Thornhill (2005) argue that 
‘organizations have not set out deliberately to create an employment periphery’ 
(p. 450). A similar observation was made in the current study. According to the 
research participants, the employer did not tend to encourage their long-term 
employment with the organization. For the respondents, the employers generally 
develop this tendency due to their motive of cost efficiency (i.e. for the same job 
paying a lower salary to a junior employee rather than a high salary to a senior 
employee). Hallier (2009) and Hallier and James (1997) also attribute this 
employers’ tendency to their objectives of cost efficiency and meeting the short-
term goals of the organization. This ultimately prevents employers from 
encouraging employees’ perceptions of long-term job security in their 
employment relationship (George, 2009; Golzen and Garner, 1992; Guest et al., 
2010; Hirsch, 1989). Wellin (2012) argues that, rather than reassuring job 
security, in some cases employers may advise employees to renounce their 
expectations of job security and assume more responsibility for their own career 
development.  
 
5.2.3.2  The issue of flexible employment contracts 
Similar to the issue of employability, there is a general assumption that the 
employers offer flexible employment contracts (i.e. flexible working days, hours, 
working locations etc.) particularly to ‘trusted senior workers’ in order to 
encourage employees’ perceptions of mutuality (Rousseau, 1997, p. 521). 
Rousseau’s (1997) argument helps us understand the healthy influence of flexible 
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employment contracts on employees’ psychological contracts. Clarke and 
Patrickson (2008), however, posit that, even though the feature of flexibility 
appears as more beneficial from the employees’ perspective, contemporary 
organizations generally opt for flexible employment contracts in order to serve 
their own objectives of increasing efficiency and reducing operational costs.  
 
Boxall and Purcell, (2011) concur by stating that the majority of contemporary 
organizations have opted for flexible employment contracts opportunistically. 
According to Guest et al. (2010, p. 6), even though flexible employment contracts 
have become more prevalent, flexibility in employment arrangements generally 
‘reduces the bargaining power of workers and their unions’. This viewpoint is 
consistent with the observation of De Witte (2005) that flexible employment 
contracts tend to enhance job insecurity for employees. Guest et al. (2010, p. 55) 
suggest that it is imperative to ‘find a balance between employment flexibility and 
job security for the employees’ in order to maintain the bargaining power of 
workers.  
 
From the perspective of call centres, Belt (2002a) argues that, although the notion 
of flexibility is generally projected as an attractive feature where employees have 
the liberty to choose from a specified range of alternatives, it is important to 
acknowledge that this range of alternatives is ultimately determined by the 
employers and may not necessarily be consistent with employees’ preferences. 
This issue gains more currency in the case of call centres as, according to 
Lindgren and Sederblad (2006) and Russell (2008), the nature of the call centre 
industry is more amenable to flexibility in its operations in comparison with other 
industries.  
 
The prevailing zero-hour contracts, which have the apparently appealing feature 
of flexibility, in reality offer zero hours of guaranteed work to employees, also 
point towards the actual level of job security and career advancement 
responsibility assumed by the employers. This argument is further supported by 
the empirical evidence for incongruence rather than mutuality between employees 
and the employers on the issue of job security (Clarke and Patrickson, 2008; Jun 
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Je et al., 2012; Tekleab and Taylor, 2003). These more demanding and less 
rewarding employment conditions push contemporary employees to constantly 
make efforts to upgrade their professional skills. As noted by Guest et al. (2010), 
these efforts largely assist employees in managing their bargaining power through 
promoting their employability and consequently reducing their dependence on the 
current employer.  
 
5.2.3.3  Training and career development 
In relation to mutuality, there is another assumption that employers assume the 
responsibility of employees’ training and career development in order to 
compensate lack of job security and promote employees’ perceptions of mutuality 
(Bal et al., 2010; Hornung et al., 2008). Contrasting evidence exists regarding the 
validity of this assumption (Clarke and Patrickson, 2008; Guest et al., 2010). Jun 
Je et al. (2012) and Sturges et al. (2005) argue that a shift of assumptions 
regarding career development responsibility from organizations to employees has 
developed recently. The results of the current study support this view in the way 
that the responsibility for employees’ training from the perspective of their career 
development is not assumed by the employers. Therefore contemporary 
employees are more concerned with the issue of their employability, not only 
because of their limited job security but also due to the modest training and career 
development opportunities they are provided with by their employers (Clarke and 
Patrickson, 2008; Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; Guest et al., 2010).  
 
Jun Je et al. (2012) refer to this issue: 
 
the key features of the current employment relationship include, on the 
one hand, a lack of job security resulting from leaner organization 
structures and more limited opportunities for organizational 
advancement, and on the other hand, a requirement that employees 
assume greater responsibilities for their work, training and career. 
 
(p. 294) 
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As noted in the research findings, this lack of training and career development 
responsibility assumed by the employers largely results in a situation of dual 
disadvantage for employees. In addition to reducing their employability with other 
potential employers, it further increases their dependence on the current employer. 
This perception of disproportionate interdependence ultimately strengthens 
employees’ assumptions of power asymmetry in the employment relationship 
(Kotter, 2010; Tjosvold and Wisse, 2009). Uhl-Bien and Carsten (2007) therefore 
argue that, as a result of these perceptions of power asymmetry, employees 
generally focus on their skills and training for two major reasons. First, it reduces 
their dependence on the current employer because of their increased employability 
if they have skills and training that are in high demand. Second, these highly 
demanded skills and training (in addition to reducing their dependence on the 
current employer) further increase the dependence of the employer on them.    
 
Conway and Briner (2009) argue that opportunities for training and development 
are vitally important in an employee’s psychological contract and any discrepancy 
on the part of employer may result in perceptions of breach. In order to minimize 
these perceptions of breach, employers not only need to determine the nature and 
level of training and development opportunities they are prepared to provide but 
also ensure that the ‘employees know what they can expect to receive’ (Clarke 
and Patrickson 2008, p. 135). Other researchers also concur with this viewpoint in 
order to promote mutuality and to avoid the development of breach perceptions 
among employees (e.g. De Cuyper et al., 2009; Jun Je et al., 2012; McDowell and 
Fletc.her, 2004).  
 
5.2.4  Promoting employees’ perceptions of mutuality 
The relevant literature, with the exception of Rousseau (2001), is silent on the 
subject of how to promote implicit mutuality in employment relationships. 
According to Rousseau (2001; 2011, p. 197), ‘objective accuracy’ in the 
perceptions of mutuality can be achieved only if employees have the opportunity 
to accept or reject the terms of the contract negotiated with the employer on the 
basis of shared information without restriction. The current research empirically 
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evaluated these theoretical assumptions made by Rousseau. According to the 
research participants, their perceptions of mutuality would be considerably 
strengthened if their organization provided them with the opportunity to accept or 
reject the terms of the contract without restriction. However, they also generally 
assumed that their employment conditions were not based on such democratic 
arrangements.  
 
This research finding is consistent with the viewpoint of other researchers (e.g. 
Dobbins and Gunnigle, 2009; Guest and Peccei, 2001; Guest et al., 2008; Danford 
et al., 2008) that, even in the case of employee partnerships – a scenario generally 
acknowledged as the highest effort from management to promote mutuality 
(Haynes and Allen, 2001; Suff and Williams, 2003; Wilkinson et al., 2014) – 
employees generally have limited bargaining power to actively negotiate their 
terms of contract with the management. Consequently employees generally have a 
low ‘level of direct participation in work decisions and representative 
participation in wider organizational policy decisions’, because of the power 
asymmetry in the employment relationship (Guest and Peccei, 2001, p. 231). 
 
Researchers argue that the issue of mutuality is generally considered relevant by 
employers if it is beneficial to the organizational objectives (Bacon and Storey, 
2000; Boxall and Purcell, 2011; Guest et al., 2008). Similarly, Dobbins and 
Gunnigle (2009, p. 546) maintain that workplace partnerships to promote 
mutuality generally deliver ‘most gains for management.’ From the perspective of 
power, Guest et al. (2010) and Undy (1999) argue that partnerships which 
apparently focus on enhancing mutuality, largely serve as a management 
instrument to improve business performance through weakening the power of 
trade unions. Highlighting the implications of power asymmetry between 
employees and management, Whyman and Petrescu (2014) also note that in most 
cases the employee partnership ‘may represent little more than an alternative 
means of restating management control over employees’ (p. 822).  
 
Supporting evidence was found in the current study for Rousseau’s (2001, 2011) 
postulation of promoting mutuality through shared information. Rousseau (2001, 
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2011) argues for the maximum sharing of information between the exchange 
partners in order to promote perceptions of mutuality. The respondents in the 
current study generally supported this view by reporting that, in order to develop 
consensus or mutuality on different issues, they rely heavily on clear and explicit 
communication with their management. Rousseau’s argument (emphasizing the 
significance of clear and explicit communication in reinforcing employees’ 
psychological contracts) appears to hold validity in this study. However, this 
raises the issue of where we can find the so-called ‘implicitness’ in these 
arrangements.  
 
Hence, there is an inherent discrepancy in the conceptualization of Rousseau 
(1989, 1995, 2001, 2011), which emphasizes the contradictory notions of 
implicitness and explicit communication in the domain of the psychological 
contract. Similar to the views of other scholars, the researcher therefore argues for 
a focus on the notion of explicit communication rather than on implicit mutuality 
in the domain of the psychological contract (e.g. Mumford et al., 2002; 
Northouse, 2012; Yukl, 2010). This viewpoint is further supported by Conway 
and Briner (2009) who argue that, if the psychological contract is based on a 
strong form of mutuality, then it seems highly unlikely that such a clear 
understanding of the terms of the contract can be achieved without some overt or 
explicit sign of agreement. Alternatively, if the psychological contract entails a 
weak form of mutuality, then can this plausibly be considered a contract, as the 
perceived terms of exchange remain largely unspecified. 
 
5.2.5 Divergent mutuality perceptions for managers and employees 
Another theme which emerged in the research findings was the difference in the 
perceptions of mutuality of managerial and non-managerial employees. The 
psychological contract literature is relatively scant on the issue of the relationship 
between implicit mutuality and employees’ hierarchical status. From the 
interviews conducted with managerial and non-managerial employees, a 
noticeable difference in the perceptions of mutuality emerged between these two 
categories of employees. The respondents working at lower level positions had a 
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weak perception of mutuality as compared with those working at relatively senior 
positions.  
 
Given the issues of power asymmetry and access to different information sources 
for managerial and non-managerial employees, this finding is not surprising that 
‘mutuality matters differently for managerial and non-managerial employees’ (Jun 
Je et al., 2012, p. 299). In terms of access to information sources, managerial 
employees enjoy greater access to various sources of information because of their 
hierarchical position (Carroll and Teo, 1996; Dries and Gieter, 2014) and 
influential social networks within the organization (Anderson, 2008). 
Consequently, the differential in access to various sources of information 
generally ‘creates a heightened risk of psychological contract breach’ particularly 
among the non-managerial employees (Dries and Gieter, 2014, p. 138).  
 
Managerial employees, due to their superior bargaining power, are also in a better 
position to know who, how and when to coordinate with in order to acquire the 
necessary information (Burt, 2000). In contrast, non-managerial employees have 
restricted access to the different information sources leaving them to ‘fill in the 
blanks’ on the basis of vague information (Dries and Gieter, 2014, p. 141). In such 
situations, employees with vague information generally tend to ‘engage in a 
construal process relying on contextual cues or prior information’ frequently 
resulting in incongruence in their and the employers’ perceptions of the 
psychological contract (Coyle-Shapiro, 2001, p. 7). Huang et al. (2010, p. 22) 
argue that this ‘perceived powerlessness’ in terms of access to different sources of 
information has a significant influence on employees’ psychological contracts.  
 
Based on the findings of the current study and the observation of these 
researchers, it can be argued that employees at the lower hierarchical levels tend 
to develop low perceptions of mutuality in their psychological contracts as 
compared with employees at the higher levels of the hierarchy. Clarke and 
Patrickson (2008) argue that the employers can reinforce the psychological 
contracts of employees in order to restrain the development of low perceptions of 
mutuality by ‘clarifying and making explicit what they see as employer versus 
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employee obligation’ (p. 135). This viewpoint is consistent with the emphasis of 
Conway and Briner (2009, p. 117) to focus on the issue of ‘explicit contracting’ in 
the domain of the psychological contract.  
 
5.2.6 Summary of mutuality discussion 
This section discussed the research findings regarding the assumption of mutuality 
in the context of the relevant literature. The discussion commenced by illustrating 
the issue of indeterminacy between employees and the employer as a prominent 
source to undermine the assumption of an implicit mutuality. The issue of biased 
mutuality in favour of the employers was elaborated on. In the context of biased 
mutuality, the discussion highlighted different issues (e.g. employability, job 
flexibility, training and career development) which develop perceptions of biased 
mutuality in employees’ psychological contracts. Influenced by the perceptions of 
biased mutuality, employees tend to make efforts to enhance their employability 
in order to manage their bargaining power in the employment relationship. From 
the perspective of relational interdependence, this enhanced employability not 
only reduces employees’ dependence on the employer but also increases the 
employer’s dependence on them. The latter part of the discussion highlighted the 
limitations in Rousseau’s (2001) theorization on the promotion of employees’ 
perceptions of mutuality. Finally the issue of the divergence in employees’ and 
managers’ perceptions of mutuality was considered.  
 
In terms of contribution to knowledge, this study demonstrates the significance of 
interdependence in the domain of the psychological contract. The notion of 
interdependence fully acknowledges the implications of power dynamics in the 
employment relationship. These implications are evident in the context of 
different issues (e.g. employability, flexibility, training and career development 
etc.), ultimately restricting the perceptions of mutuality, or promoting the 
perceptions of biased mutuality among employees. The psychological contract 
literature has largely ignored these implications because of its emphasis on the 
assumption of mutuality. The concept of interdependence also gains currency as it 
sets the relevant research free from the unachievable task of promoting mutuality 
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to a level of ‘objective agreement’ (Dabos and Rousseau, 2004, p. 52; Rousseau, 
2011) between two parties who establish an exchange relationship in pursuit of 
different and in many cases competing interests (Detert et al., 2007; Detert and 
Linda, 2010). This is similar to Kotter (1973), who argues to explore the 
psychological contract on the basis of incongruent and competing rather than 
mutual expectations. 
 
 
5.3 Reciprocity 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the findings of the current study regarding the assumption 
of reciprocity in the context of the relevant literature. The discussion begins by 
highlighting the prevalence of perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity 
among employees. The issue of the critical but largely ignored implications of 
negotiated contracts in the psychological contract literature is considered. In the 
later section, the discussion proceeds to the different alternatives of reciprocity 
(e.g. developing negative attitudinal reciprocity, withdrawing positive 
discretionary behaviours, ignoring the discrepancy, making additional efforts 
towards reconciliation, forgiveness, exercising deviant behaviour etc.) selected by 
employees because of their perceptions of power asymmetry which inhibit them 
from responding to the employer’s inducements on a reciprocal basis. The final 
part of the discussion highlights the conceptual incompatibility of Gouldner’s 
(1960) theorization with the employment relationships and the associated issue of 
the implications of rhetoric in the relevant literature.  
 
5.3.2 Prevalence of perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity 
The analysis of findings regarding the second area of investigation, i.e. 
reciprocity, pointed towards several important issues. Based on the responses of 
the research participants, there was evidence ranging from perceptions of high 
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reciprocity to almost negligible reciprocity. For employees with perceptions of 
unbalanced employer reciprocity, the employment relationship represented the 
phenomenon discussed in the literature as the prisoner’s dilemma in which one 
exchange partner receives disproportionately smaller benefits compared with the 
other (Cotterell et al., 1992; Ott-Ursula, 2013; Pruitt and Kimmel, 1977). There 
were two research participants who perceived their employment relationship as 
having no employer reciprocity. There is virtually no discussion of relationships 
lacking any reciprocity in the psychological contract literature. Gouldner (1960), 
however, acknowledges the presence of such relationships: ‘although reciprocal 
relations stabilize patterns [however] it cannot be merely hypostatized that 
reciprocity will operate in every case [as] it need not follow that a lack of 
reciprocity is socially impossible’ (p. 164).  
 
Gouldner (1960) coins the term ‘survivals’ to represent ‘the extreme case of a 
complete lack of reciprocity’ (p. 165). However, he argues that such cases of a 
complete lack of reciprocity (i.e. survivals) are ‘rare in social relations and the 
intermediary case, in which one party gives something more or less than that 
received, is probably more common’ (p. 164). For him, the survivals cases are 
rare as it is difficult for the disadvantaged party to continue the relationship if the 
other party ‘may give nothing in return for the benefits it has received’ (p. 164).  
 
Shore et al. (2012, p. 146) posit that relationships based on unbalanced reciprocity 
may occur when the power dynamics support one party to receive 
disproportionately greater benefits as compared with the other party with ‘lesser 
power’. This perception of unbalanced employer reciprocity was particularly 
evident among the research participants working at the non-managerial level. 
These employees, due to their prevailing assumptions of disproportionate 
interdependence or power asymmetry in the employment relationship, generally 
believed they had to accept the terms of employment as formulated by their 
employer.  
 
These perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity (particularly among the 
non-managerial employees) largely result in the development of the presumptions 
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of a psychological contract established on a non-reciprocal basis (Coyle-Shapiro 
and Shore, 2007; Morrison and Robinson, 1997; Shore et al., 2012). Burgess and 
Nielson (1974) posit that these situations may particularly exist if A is noticeably 
more powerful than B, since A may force B to provide benefits with little or no 
reciprocity. The later research, however, acknowledged that employment 
relationships are not as straightforward as to be analyzed merely in the form of the 
power of A over B or vice versa. This is because the phenomenon of power is 
highly complex, dynamic and relational (Fleming and Spicer, 2014), and is largely 
shaped by the ‘mutual interdependencies’ of the exchange actors (Beirne, 2006, p. 
12).  
 
Cook and Emerson (1978) and Cook et al. (2013) concur with this viewpoint. For 
them, unequal interdependencies of exchange actors generally result in 
exploitation because of the unequal value of the exchange. According to Gouldner 
(1960), in organizational settings this may sometimes even take the form of 
‘institutionalized exploitation’ (p. 165). The later research has endorsed the notion 
of institutionalized exploitation in the form of a variety of negative consequences, 
such as diminished psychological well-being (Yagil, 2006), subordinates’ 
unfavourable attitudes toward the job and the organization (Schat et al., 2006), 
deviant work behavior (Dupre et al., 2006; Mitchell and Ambrose, 2007), 
employee resistance (Bamberger and Bacharach, 2006), low performance 
contributions (Aryee et al., 2007), and reduced family well-being (Hoobler and 
Brass, 2006).  
 
5.3.3 Reciprocal or negotiated exchange 
The psychological contract literature is largely based on an assumption of 
exchange which is primarily reciprocal in nature (Rousseau, 2011; Seeck and 
Parzefall, 2010; Wellin, 2012). However, other researchers conceptualize the 
notion of exchange on reciprocal as well as negotiation basis (e.g. Blau, 1964; 
Cook et al., 2013; Emerson, 1981; Levi-Strauss, 1969; Molm, 2010). The findings 
of the current study urge the psychological contract research to explore the 
dynamics of exchange from the perspective of negotiation as well. This argument 
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largely stems from the incompatibility of Gouldner’s (1960) conceptualization of 
reciprocity with the underlying dynamics of the employment relationship. 
According to Gouldner (1960), the parties in a reciprocal relationship can pay 
back (any previous act of kindness or harm) according to their freewill due to the 
existence of power symmetry between them.  
 
In contrast, the research participants generally viewed their employment 
relationship with the organization as an exchange which was characterized by 
power asymmetry and established on negotiation rather than on a kindness 
(reciprocation) basis. For them, this negotiation was mainly led by the 
organization (particularly in the case of non-managerial employees) because of 
the issue of disproportionate interdependence in the favour of the organization. As 
noted by other researchers, these perceptions of disproportionate interdependence 
between employees and the organization ultimately strengthened the employees’ 
assumptions of power asymmetry in the employment relationship (e.g. Kotter, 
2010; Tjosvold and Wisse, 2009; Uhl-Bien and Carsten, 2007). Acknowledging 
these implications of power dynamics, Molm et al. (2000) argue that such 
conditions render employment relationships to be more pertinent to the negotiated 
rather than the reciprocal exchange.  
 
The researcher’s argument to focus on negotiated exchanges is further 
strengthened by the frequent use of the term ‘gifts’ by Gouldner (1960) in 
association with reciprocity in the context of general society (pp. 170, 174, 175). 
In contrast, for specific employment relationships, Gouldner (1960) refers to the 
term ‘wages’ in association with ‘complementarity’ rather than reciprocity (pp. 
175–176). Similarly, Conway and Briner (2009) maintain that ‘psychological 
contracts in employment do not involve the exchange of gifts’ (p. 113). 
Furthermore, Gouldner (1960) argues that the nature of returns (i.e. gifts) in the 
case of reciprocity cannot be specified as they are decided independently by the 
other party.  
 
Conway and Briner (2009), while referring to this dimension of reciprocal 
exchanges, posit that ‘this lack of specificity regarding the nature of the exchange 
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in regard of the psychological contract is potentially problematic for the 
advancement of psychological contract theory’ (p. 113). Another conclusion 
which can be drawn from this issue is that there exists a minimal level of 
interdependence between the parties in reciprocal exchange relationships, 
allowing them to decide the returns (i.e. gifts) independently of each other 
(Conway and Briner, 2009; Gouldner, 1960). This feature is, however, not 
compatible with employment relationships as both the employees and the 
employer (in order to achieve their objectives associated with the employment 
relationship) are relationally interdependent on each other.  
 
Gouldner (1960), while discussing his notion of reciprocity in the context of 
general society, presents the case of a cultural ritual known as vartan bhanji, 
which is a practice of a ‘ritual gift exchange in Pakistan and other parts of India’ 
(p. 175). From this case study, it becomes further evident that, for the early 
theorists, reciprocity is more pertinent to general society as they conceptualize it 
as a voluntary (Eglar, 1958) and discretionary (Malinowski, 1922) act. Based on 
the conceptualization of these early researchers (e.g. Burgess and Nielsen, 1974; 
Eglar, 1958; Malinowski, 1922; Mauss, 1925; Michaels and Wiggins, 1976), the 
notion of reciprocity does not appear to be pertinent to employment relationships 
as, repaying the other party in such situations is a binding, not a voluntary act of 
kindness. In addition, the discussion of these researchers is largely based on a 
general societal context, as they conceptualize reciprocity as a moral norm in 
society. However, in an organizational scenario, because of the formally 
negotiated employment contracts, repayment (rather than being considered only as 
a moral norm) has strong legal implications (Suazo et al., 2011).  
 
We therefore need to acknowledge the relevance of negotiated exchanges. This 
view is supported by the established relevant research, highlighting the 
implications of negotiation influenced by power dynamics in exchange 
relationships (e.g. Blau, 1964; Carroll and Flood, 2000; Cook et al., 2013; 
Epstein, 2013; Flood et al., 2001; Shore et al., 2012). The researcher’s emphasis 
also gains currency because, as compared to reciprocation, ‘negotiation is more 
typical of exchange in some settings (e.g. work)’ (Molm et al., 2000, p. 1400). 
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While highlighting the pertinence of negotiated exchanges to employment 
settings, Molm (2003) argues that: 
 
in negotiated exchange, actors engage in a joint decision process, such 
as explicit bargaining, in which they seek agreement on the terms of the 
exchange. Both sides of the exchange are agreed upon at the same time, 
in a discrete, bilateral transaction that gives each partner benefits of 
equal or unequal value. 
 
(p. 2) 
 
The same point is made by Coleman (1994) as he maintains that in social life, the 
relationships tend to be reciprocal in nature. However, in the domain of 
employment, the relationships are principally based on negotiation (Shore et al., 
2012; Uhl-Bien and Maslyn, 2003; Wellin, 2012). Coyle-Shapiro and Conway 
(2004) argue that ‘almost all social exchange research refers to Gouldner’s work 
[as] evidence of the existence of the “norm of reciprocity”, although the 
assumption is largely unelaborated and untested’ (p. 8, quotation marks in 
original). Other researchers have also raised similar concerns about the relevance 
of Gouldner’s (1960) notion of reciprocity in the domain of the psychological 
contract (e.g. Conway and Briner, 2009; Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; Guest et 
al., 2010; J. B. Wu et al., 2006; Shore et al., 2012).  
 
The emphasis in this thesis on negotiated exchange requires more validation, as an 
overwhelming majority of the psychological contract literature, following the 
conceptualization of Rousseau (1995, 2011), is principally based on an 
assumption of exchange which is fundamentally reciprocal rather than negotiated 
in its orientation. From the perspective of risk and uncertainty, all types of 
exchange, although with varying intensities, incorporate both features to a certain 
extent (Cook et al., 2013; Knight, 2012; Kollock, 1994). However, the degree of 
risk and uncertainty in reciprocal exchanges is very high as the ‘actors initiate 
exchange without knowing what they are getting in return, and with no guarantee 
of the other’s reciprocity’ (Molm et al., 2000, p. 1400).  
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In the domain of employment relationships, with more inclination towards 
negotiated exchanges, this is, however, not the case as generally at the 
commencement of an employment relationship both parties have an idea (at least 
to a transactional extent) of the benefits they will be drawing from the 
relationship. These benefits are guaranteed to the respective parties in the form of 
a formal employment contract (Suazo et al., 2011). Although, there may be a 
certain degree of ambiguity (Deakin and Njoya, 2008; Suazo et al., 2009) as all 
the aspects of employment cannot be ascertained in the beginning, the risk that a 
party will receive no reward at all for its contributions is very low.  
 
Furthermore, reciprocity takes place on an implicit basis, as generally there is no 
explicit bargaining between the exchange partners (Rousseau, 1995, 2011). In 
addition to implicit bargaining, the decisions of whether to reciprocate and also 
how to reciprocate are independently taken by the exchange partners with limited 
mutual consultation (Cook et al., 2013; Gouldner, 1960; Lawler, 1992). These 
underlying mechanisms render the reciprocal exchange process as ‘nonnegotiated’ 
(Molm et al., 2000, p. 1309). This non-negotiated exchange, because of its 
implicit nature, further increases the risk of a possible ‘unilateral flow of benefits’ 
from one party of the exchange to the other party without a balanced reciprocation 
(Molm, 2010, p. 124).  
 
On the other hand, in negotiated exchanges, the returns are determined on the 
basis of an explicit discussion between the exchange partners, which helps them 
to achieve a consensus on the terms of the exchange (Molm, 2010). However, 
there is a possibility that ‘the terms may be unequal and unsatisfactory to one or 
both parties, but unless both benefit more from the exchange than they would 
without it, it should not take place’ (Molm et al., 2000, p. 1401). This explicit 
negotiation undertaken at least once at a certain point in time serves as an 
instrument to ensure the bilateral flow of benefits (Molm, 2010). The flow of 
benefits in a negotiated exchange, despite its bilateral nature, is not necessarily 
equal for both parties (Kuwabara, 2011; Lawler and Yoon, 1996) because of the 
possible power asymmetries or unequal interdependencies of the exchange actors 
(Blau, 1964; Tjosvold and Wisse, 2009). This feature of power asymmetry, 
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resulting in an uneven flow of benefits in negotiated exchanges, makes them more 
applicable to employment arrangements, as reciprocal exchanges in comparison 
are based on the assumption of power symmetry between the exchange actors 
(Cook et al., 2013; Molm, 2010).  
 
5.3.4 Gouldner’s notion of reciprocity and psychological contract 
Relevant to the assumption of reciprocity, there is another critical issue which the 
psychological contract literature still needs to address. Gouldner (1960), like 
Malinowski (1932), conceptualizes reciprocity as a repayment to another’s 
preceding act of harm or kindness. In such arrangements, the repayment (i.e. 
reciprocity) leads to a variety of relationships in society. However, in the 
psychological contract literature the application of Gouldner’s (1960) 
conceptualization appears in exactly the reverse manner, as in the relevant 
literature it is the relationship which leads to the repayment (i.e. reciprocity). To 
explain this further, Gouldner (1960) discusses the notion of reciprocity as 
repaying another’s previous act of kindness or harm. For him the relationship is 
established after a reciprocating act, in response to a prior action (whether kind or 
harmful) taken by someone else.  
 
In this way, an act of reciprocity (pairing an act with a previously performed 
action) results in different relationships in society. In the psychological contract 
literature, the sequence is in reverse as, according to Gouldner (1960), the 
reciprocity leads to the relationship while, in actual employment conditions, the 
relationship leads to the reciprocity. Alternatively, in the employment 
arrangements, it is the employment relationship (established in the form of an 
employment contract) that leads to the repayment process (i.e. reciprocity). 
However, for Gouldner (1960), it is the repayment process (i.e. reciprocity) that 
leads to the relationship.  
 
We should note the conceptual problem stemming from the application of 
Gouldner’s (1960) perspective of reciprocity in the domain of the psychological 
contract. Due to several characteristics inherent in this conceptualization (i.e. the 
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discretion over whether or not to reciprocate, power symmetry among the 
exchange actors, focus on society, and establishing reciprocity before relationship 
development), the notion of reciprocity may not be logically helpful in the domain 
of the psychological contract. This is because in the employment arrangements, 
repayment (i.e. reciprocity) is not discretionary, rather it is a binding act (Molm et 
al., 2000; Shore et al., 2012; Wang, 2011). Moreover, there is another important 
issue of disproportionate interdependence associated with the power asymmetry 
of the two exchange actors (i.e. employee and the employer) in employment 
arrangements. Also the focus in the psychological contract literature is 
organizational settings and not general society. Finally, in the organizational 
scenario the employment relationship, originating from the employment contract, 
leads to different episodes of repayment or reciprocity, which is directly opposite 
to the conceptualization of Gouldner (1960) in which the different incidents of 
reciprocity lead to the relationship.  
 
5.3.5 Reciprocity and complementarity 
The above discussion helps to crystallize the problem that, despite all its 
conceptual richness, Gouldner’s (1960) theorization of reciprocity is not 
compatible with the notion of the psychological contract. This is in itself an acute 
argument as the development of the psychological contract literature, in direct 
contrast to the researcher’s view, has primarily been based on an assumption of 
reciprocity. However, fortunately support for this argument is traceable in the 
writings of Gouldner (1960) himself. As mentioned earlier, it is not only 
reciprocity, rather there is another distinct concept i.e. complementarity, discussed 
by Gouldner (1960) in the context of employment exchange relationships.  
 
For Gouldner (1960), ‘complementarity connotes that one’s rights are another’s 
obligations, and vice versa’ (p. 169). He clearly distinguishes complementarity 
from reciprocity as, in addition to their distinct definitions, he tends to associate 
complementarity with employment relationships (pp. 175–176). However, 
reciprocity for him is a ‘general norm’ of society (p. 170). According to Gouldner 
(1960), complementarity comprises ‘rights and obligations’, in which the rights of 
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one party are the responsibilities of the other party (p. 168), while for reciprocity, 
the rights of one party are not necessarily the obligations of the other party.  
 
This is a relatively complex phenomenon. Gouldner (1960), however, further 
explains it in this way:  
 
for example, where a group shares a belief that some status occupant 
has a certain right, say the right of a wife to receive support from her 
husband, does the group in fact also share a belief that the husband has 
an obligation to support the wife? Furthermore, even though rights may 
logically or empirically imply duties, it need not follow that the reverse is 
true. In other words, it does not follow that rights and duties are always 
transitive … For example, what may be regarded as a duty of charity or 
forbearance, say a duty to "turn the other cheek", need not be socially 
defined as the right of the recipient. While a man may be regarded as 
having an unconditional obligation to tell the truth to everyone, even to 
a confirmed liar, people in his group might not claim that the liar has a 
right to have the truth told him. 
 
(p. 168, quotation marks in original) 
 
Gouldner’s (1960) argument, consistent with that of other researchers, has 
significant implications which are not fully acknowledged in the psychological 
contract literature (e.g. Michaels and Wiggins, 1976; Molm, 2010). This is 
because, in the employment scenario, the rights of one party are generally the 
obligations of the other party. For example, a wage is the right of the employee 
and the obligation of the employer. Similarly, performing organizational tasks is 
the right of the employer and the obligation of the employee. In this way, the 
rights of one party become the obligations of the other party. Gouldner (1960) 
refers to this notion as complementarity.  
 
It is therefore the concept of complementarity on which the psychological contract 
literature primarily needs to focus, rather than the general norm of reciprocity that 
is voluntarily practised in society. According to Gouldner (1960):  
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the general norm of reciprocity, however, is a second-order defense of 
stability; it provides a further source of motivation and an additional 
moral sanction for conforming with specific status obligations. For 
example, the employer may pay his workers not merely because he has 
contracted to do so; he may also feel that the workman has earned his 
wages. 
 
(pp. 175-176) 
 
This clearly highlights that complementarity is the primary criterion for 
determining the dynamics of rights and obligations in employment arrangements, 
while reciprocity may serve as the secondary plan. Unfortunately, the 
psychological contract literature has not only ignored the primary concept 
suggested by Gouldner (1960) for equilibrating the rights and obligations (i.e. 
complementarity), but has also adapted the auxiliary concept (i.e. the general 
norm of reciprocity) as the primary one.  
 
Despite a clear caution from Gouldner (1960), the later research has consistently 
followed this pattern and thus further added to the confusion as is evident in the 
current psychological contract literature (Conway and Briner, 2009; Shore et al., 
2012). Gouldner (1960), while criticizing the practice of assuming 
complementarity and reciprocity as identical concepts, argues that: 
 
Malinowski frequently seems to confuse this general norm with the 
existence of complementary and concrete status rights and duties. It is 
theoretically necessary, however, to distinguish specific status duties 
from the general norm. Specific and complementary duties are owed by 
role partners to one another by virtue of the socially standardized roles 
they play ... In contrast, the generalized norm of reciprocity evokes 
obligations towards others on the basis of their past behaviour. 
 
(p. 170) 
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Gouldner’s (1960) argument provides significant help in improving our 
understanding that in comparison with reciprocity (a general societal norm, acting 
as a second-order defense) the notion of complementarity (because of its focus on 
specific status rights and responsibilities) is relatively more pertinent to the 
domain of employment relationships.  
 
5.3.6 Reciprocity from a practical perspective 
The above discussion focused on the theoretical inconsistencies between 
Gouldner’s (1960) conceptualization and the underlying dynamics of employment 
relationships. The following discussion highlights the implications of these 
inconsistencies from the perspective of practical employment conditions. Based 
on the notion of reciprocity, the psychological contract literature generally 
assumes that employees reciprocate the employer’s treatment by adjusting their 
obligations accordingly (e.g. Bordia et al., 2008; Rousseau, 1995, 2011). For 
researchers (e.g. Kelloway et al., 2010; Robinson, 2008; Turnley and Feldman, 
1999), employees tend to pay back in the form of poor performance when they 
perceive that their employer is not reciprocating according to their contributions. 
Bordia et al. (2008, p. 1105) argue that ‘when the organization is perceived to 
break a promise, employees reciprocate by hurting organizational interests (e.g. 
withholding effort, engaging in anti-citizenship behaviors and exiting the 
organization)’. This notion, discussed in the relevant literature as negative 
reciprocity or organizational misbehaviour, is defined by Mitchell and Ambrose 
(2007) as, a ‘tendency for an individual to return negative treatment for negative 
treatment’ (p. 1159).  
 
The findings of the current study, however, reveal that the assumption of 
commensuration of negative employer treatment with negative employee 
reciprocity is fairly naive. This is because, given the issue of power asymmetry in 
practical employment conditions, the dynamics of the employee–employer 
relationship do not necessarily operate on a reciprocal basis (Coyle-Shapiro and 
Shore, 2007; Guest, 1998; Shore et al., 2012; Tepper et al., 2009). As noted in the 
research findings, even if employees perceive a discrepancy in the employer 
222 
 
reciprocity, they have to maintain their original level of contributions. The notion 
of reciprocity, therefore, may not be valid as it is based on the assumption of 
power symmetry between the exchange actors (Gouldner, 1960; Molm, 2010; 
Molm et al., 2000). In the domain of employment, however, this is generally not 
the case (Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; Shore et al., 2012) as employees, 
because of their perceptions of power asymmetry or disproportionate 
interdependence in the employment relationship, are obliged to respond according 
to the performance requirements established by the employer.  
 
Following the conceptualization of early researchers (e.g. Clark and Mills, 1979; 
Graen and Scandura, 1987; Gouldner, 1960; Murstein et al., 1977), reciprocity 
implies that, if the employer does not reward employees according to their 
contributions, employees will in turn attempt to balance the relationship (as is 
generally assumed in the psychological contract literature) by reducing their 
contributions towards the organization. The research findings, however, point 
towards the opposite and are consistent with the conclusions of Uhl-Bien and 
Carsten (2007) and Uhl-Bien and Maslyn (2003, p. 516) that, in the domain of 
employment, the assumption of reciprocity may not hold true ‘due to the nature of 
power/status differences inherent in these relationships’. Given these power/status 
differences, Shore et al. (2012, p. 8) argue that, in the context of psychological 
contract breach, the assumption of employees’ reciprocity as conceptualized by 
Gouldner (1960) ‘is rarely tested explicitly’.  
 
This view is further supported by the organizational behaviour literature regarding 
exploitative employment practices (e.g. Barclay et al., 2014; Butler, 2005; 
Pearson and Porath, 2005; Tripp et al., 2007). The literature highlights that 
employees with a perception of unbalanced employer reciprocity are under stress 
as they may not be able to respond proportionately because of the fear of further 
exploitative employer behaviour. Aquino et al. (2001) argue that employees with 
lower power/status positions may not reciprocate because:  
 
a high-status offender can more negatively impact the victim’s welfare 
than can a low-status or equal-status offender due to the fact that the 
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former may influence desired outcomes (e.g. pay, promotion 
opportunities, access to social networks), the victim may refrain from 
pursuing revenge because he or she fears the loss of these outcomes. 
 
(p. 54)  
 
5.3.7 Internal motives of employees 
As observed in the research findings, in addition to the perceptions of power 
asymmetry or disproportionate interdependence in the employment relationship 
(inhibiting employees from responding according to the employer’s inducements), 
employees do not tend to reciprocate negatively because of their internal motives 
associated with the employment relationship. According to Organ (1990), despite 
unfavourable circumstances, individuals will not engage in behaviours projecting 
their organizational performance negatively. Liden et al. (1997) and Miller (1999) 
maintain that it is not mutual interest or employer interest but self-interest that 
inhibits employees from engaging in such actions as this will negatively affect 
their employability with the current and other potential employers. Individuals 
will maintain their prior work performance, without engaging in deviant behaviors 
but with increased consideration of their self-interest rather than mutual or 
employer interest. Shore et al. (2012) maintain that in these situations, employees 
(because of their perceptions of the under-fulfillment of the employer’s 
obligations) tend to establish their employment relationships which, rather than 
being mutual or employer oriented, are largely aligned with their own self-interest 
associated with the employment relationship.  
 
5.3.8 Different alternatives of reciprocity 
As noted, employees (because of their perceptions of power asymmetry or 
disproportionate interdependence and internal motives associated with the 
employment relationship) often do not tend to respond to the employer’s 
inducements on a reciprocal basis. However, in these situations of perceived 
unbalanced employer reciprocity, employees choose among several other 
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alternatives. The next section is based on a detailed discussion of these 
alternatives.  
 
5.3.8.1  Development of negative attitudinal reciprocity  
The development of negative attitudinal reciprocity is generally the first 
alternative selected by employees in the situation of perceived unbalanced 
employer reciprocity. As noted in the research findings, employees with a 
perception of unbalanced employer reciprocity generally develop a negative 
attitudinal reciprocity, even though the behavioural dimension of their reciprocity 
towards the employer is still positive. This viewpoint is supported by the 
empirical observation of Aquino et al. (2006) and Lian et al. (2012), who 
acknowledge that the power dynamics in the employment relationship generally 
restrict or moderate the intensity of employees’ behavioural responses to their 
perceptions of unbalanced employer’s inducements. Similarly, Porath and Pearson 
(2012) argue that power dynamics affect the ‘behavioural options’ of employees 
in the employment relationship (p. 327). According to J. B. Wu et al. (2006), in 
the case of unbalanced employer reciprocity, employees generally tend to repay 
largely on an attitudinal basis. For them, this is mainly because employees ‘may 
fear further exploitation’ from their organizations because of their perceptions of 
power asymmetry in the employment relationship (J. B. Wu et al., 2006, pp. 389–
390).  
 
5.3.8.2  Higher tendency to develop negative attitudinal  
reciprocity among lower level employees 
 
The results further highlighted that, in comparison with managerial employees, 
the psychological contracts of non-managerial employees appeared to be more 
negatively skewed on the scale of attitudinal reciprocity towards the organization. 
The employees at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy showed a relatively 
higher negative attitudinal tendency to reciprocate to their employer because of 
their dominant perceptions of unbalanced employer reciprocity. This observation 
is consistent with the findings of Aquino et al. (2006) and Tepper et al. (2009, p. 
157) that employees, particularly those ‘who hold lower power positions’, 
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generally have more negative reciprocity beliefs towards their employer as 
compared with employees with high power positions in the organization.  
 
The reason for this tendency is that attaining a high power/status position is one of 
the objectives most desired by individuals (Kotter, 2010; Tjosvold and Wisse, 
2009). For Gilligan (1996), those who successfully achieve this objective receive 
a disproportionately large percentage of material and symbolic benefits (e.g. high 
salary, recognition, prestige etc.), while those who are not able to achieve it 
receive a relatively smaller proportion of these benefits. This differential in 
material and symbolic benefits generally leads to frustration that ultimately results 
in a higher tendency to reciprocate negatively among employees in low 
power/status positions as compared with employees in high power/status positions 
(Aquino et al., 2006; Tepper et al., 2009).  
 
According to Aquino and Douglas (2003) ‘a high status position and the symbolic 
and material affirmations that accompany it provide the role occupant with a 
psychological buffer’ which significantly prevents the development of any 
‘losers’ self-perception (p. 199). Similarly, the respondents in the current study 
appeared to have relatively weaker psychological buffers because of their lower 
status positions. This had a negative influence on their attitude towards the 
organization, ultimately resulting in more alertness to protect their self-identities, 
which according to them were already compromised.  
 
Other researchers reached similar conclusions while investigating the notion of 
abusive supervision (e.g. Grandey and Kern, 2004; Tepper et al., 2009). 
According to them, the effects of abusive supervision are buffered for high 
power/status employees because of the superior financial resources which they 
possess as compared with employees in low power/status positions. From the 
perspective of mutuality, this viewpoint is consistent with the previous research 
finding regarding the relatively high perceptions of mutuality in managerial 
employees in comparison with the low perceptions of mutuality among non-
managerial employees.  
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5.3.8.3  Influences of job mobility 
The perceptions of low job mobility appeared as another stimulus for increased 
employee negative attitudinal reciprocity. There was an evident feeling of stress 
and frustration among those employees who could not foresee sufficient 
employment opportunities with other employers and consequently perceived 
themselves as highly dependent on the current employer. These perceptions of 
disproportionate interdependence further strengthened employees’ assumptions of 
power asymmetry in the employment relationship. This finding is consistent with 
the observation of other researchers that the assumptions of less job mobility, 
other than increasing the level of frustration and promoting the perceptions of 
power asymmetry, also have negative influences on employees’ attitudes towards 
work (e.g. Harvey et al., 2007; Tepper, 2007; Uhl-Bien and Carsten, 2007; Wei 
and Steven, 2013). For these researchers, employees who have limited attractive 
employment alternatives and who are also abused by their organizations generally 
consider themselves as ‘powerlessly trapped’ and incapable of getting away from 
this stressful situation (Biron, 2010, p. 879).  
 
In contrast to developing negative attitudinal reciprocity, the scarcity of 
alternative employment opportunities has a positive influence on employee 
withdrawal behaviour. According to Wei and Steven (2013), employees might not 
withhold their efforts in the face of uncooperative employer behaviour, because 
there are limited attractive employment opportunities available. For Deery et al. 
(2006), ‘where individuals have few available job opportunities, for example, they 
may be unwilling to reduce their contribution to the organization and take time off 
work for fear of being dismissed from their job’ (p. 168). In contrast, when 
employees have abundant and lucrative employment prospects in the external 
market, they are more inclined towards reciprocating on an equal basis by making 
a noticeable reduction in their work efforts (Deery et al., 2006; Wei and Steven, 
2013). From the perspective of relational interdependence, these employees are 
relatively less dependent on their current employer in terms of employment. 
Consequently, they are in a position to reciprocate the employers’ inducements on 
an equal basis.  
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Gouldner (1960) discusses this issue from the perspective of exploitation. He 
explains his viewpoint on the basis of a scenario in which: 
 
B may have many alternative sources for supplying the services that it 
normally receives from A. A, however, may be dependent upon B’s 
services and have no, or comparatively few, alternatives. Consequently, 
the continued provision of benefits by one pattern, A, for another, B, 
depends not only upon (1) the benefits which A in turn receives from B, 
but also on (2) the power which B possesses relative to A, and (3) the 
alternative sources of services accessible to each beyond those provided 
by the other. 
 
(p. 164) 
 
5.3.8.4  Withdrawal of positive discretionary behaviours  
In the context of unbalanced employer reciprocity, the second alternative 
generally selected by employees is withdrawing positive discretionary behaviours. 
The relevant literature discussing employee withdrawal behaviour in relation to 
reciprocity generally ignores the distinction between compulsory and 
discretionary activities (e.g. Bordia et al., 2008; Kelloway, 2010; Robinson, 2008; 
Turnley and Feldman, 1999). The research findings, however, reveal that 
employees (particularly non-managerial employees) may withhold only positive 
discretionary behaviours. The withdrawal of compulsory employment activities is 
usually not possible as they comprise the employee’s primary job description and 
are directly translated into their performance evaluation.  
 
This observation is consistent with the findings of other researchers that 
employees, with a perception of unbalanced employer reciprocity, tend to 
withdraw only positive discretionary behaviours (e.g. organizational citizenship 
behaviours, altruism etc.), which are not compulsory but are beneficial for the 
organization (e.g. Biron, 2010; Davis and Rothstein, 2006; Organ, 1990; Setton et 
al., 1996). According to Rafferty and Restubog (2011), generally employees can 
only withdraw positive discretionary behaviours because they as a ‘less powerful’ 
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actor are ‘constrained in terms of what they can do in response to unfavourable 
treatment’ (p. 272). Similarly, Biron (2010) notes that employees generally opt for 
withdrawing only positive discretionary behaviours as that may not result in 
‘negative consequences’ for them (p. 892).  
 
5.3.8.5  Ignoring discrepancy, reconciliation and forgiveness 
As noted in the research findings, other than developing negative attitudinal 
reciprocity and withdrawing positive discretionary behaviours, there are some 
other choices practised by employees to cope with the issue of unbalanced 
employer reciprocity. First, they tend to ignore the discrepancy by doing nothing 
and merely waiting for the situation to improve. Second, they attempt more 
reconciliation through friendly efforts, with the objective of making their 
employer realize that the contributions of employees are not being adequately 
acknowledged and rewarded. A third strategy – forgiveness – is also followed by 
some employees.  
 
The first, do nothing, option practised by employees in the current study is 
consistent with the findings of other researchers (e.g. Aquino et al., 2006; Tepper 
et al., 2009; Tripp et al., 2007). For them, employees in these situations often 
perceive that doing nothing (rather than being aggressive for the purpose of taking 
revenge) is the best strategy to restore their employment relationship because of 
their perceptions of power asymmetry. Similarly, Bies and Tripp (1996) and Kim 
et al. (1998) note that employees generally prefer to ignore the discrepancy by 
doing nothing when they perceive their bargaining power as insufficient to 
influence the employer. Uhl-Bien and Carsten (2007) state that these ‘feelings of 
powerlessness are expected to lead to passive, rather than active, responses. When 
employees feel a sense of powerlessness they perceive a lack of options [which] 
creates a sense of hopelessness’ among them (p. 193).   
 
Employees mainly follow the second option of reconciliation based on a more 
friendly strategy to support their self-interests associated with the employment 
relationship. Tepper et al. (2009) maintain that employees opt for reconciliation as 
it might resolve disagreements or at least limit additional negative consequences 
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due to the escalation of conflict. Similarly, other researchers note that employees 
tend to promote harmony through reconciliation as it might resolve disagreements 
and restore the quality of their relationship with the employer (e.g. Aquino et al., 
2006; Shriver, 1995; Tripp et al., 2007). Regarding the third choice followed by 
the research participants (i.e. forgiveness), other researchers argue that employees 
generally pursue this option when they perceive themselves to be in low 
power/status positions in comparison with the harm-doer (e.g. Aquino et al., 2006; 
McCullough et al., 1998; Tepper et al., 2009).  
 
Based on the conceptualization of Enright et al. (1991) and McCullough et al. 
(1997), Aquino et al. (2006) define the notion of forgiveness as ‘the internal act of 
relinquishing anger, resentment and the desire to seek revenge against the 
offender’ (p. 654). Although, the relevant empirical evidence supporting the 
notion of forgiveness in employment relations is relatively scant (Aquino et al., 
2006), employees generally opt for this strategy in order to repress their desire for 
retaliation which may possibly result in further undesirable consequences for them 
(Enright et al., 1991; Tripp et al., 2007). When harmed by a powerful individual, 
the receiver of the harm is more inclined towards ignoring or forgiving the harm 
than seeking any revenge, because of the fear of further undesirable consequences 
from the source of the harm (Kim et al., 1998; Tepper et al., 2009).   
 
In addition to preventing any further development of undesirable consequences, 
forgiveness may also serve as a precursor to reconciliation between the involved 
parties (Aquino et al., 2006; McCullough et al., 1997). In the current study, the 
lower level employees with an apparent forgiveness approach did not, however, 
appear very satisfied with the effectiveness of this strategy. According to Aquino 
et al. (2001) this is because ‘mercy bestowed by a person in power has a more 
noble quality than mercy bestowed by someone who is weak, because the former 
is able to exact swift, certain, and severe retribution if he or she chooses’ (p. 54).  
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5.3.8.6  Exercising deviant behaviour 
The fourth choice selected by employees with a negative reciprocation orientation 
observed in this study was deviant behaviour. The relevant research has discussed 
two prominent domains of deviant behaviours, i.e. one targeted at the supervisors 
and the second targeted against other members of the organization (Hershcovis et 
al., 2007; Wang et al., 2012). In the current study, two prominent themes emerged 
with respect to the assumption of reciprocation in relation to deviant behaviour. 
First, the respondents with either positive or negative assumptions of employer 
reciprocity attributed it primarily to their managers. Second, employees with a 
negative reciprocation orientation tended to avoid balancing this inconsistency 
with their managers, even though they attributed it primarily to them. In the 
majority of cases, they managed to pay back for this anomaly to other more 
vulnerable members (i.e. individuals with lower status or power) of the 
organization.  
 
Although these themes have not yet been thoroughly investigated in the relevant 
literature, other empirical studies in the domain of dysfunctional employee 
behaviour have made similar observations to this study (e.g. Aquino and Thau, 
2009; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005; Hershcovis et al., 2007; Mitchell and 
Ambrose, 2007; Schyns and Schilling, 2013; Zellars et al., 2002). Regarding the 
former theme i.e. employees attributing positive or negative reciprocity primarily 
to their managers, other researchers reached the similar conclusion that employees 
generally associate any treatment from their organization, either positive or 
negative, primarily with their managers (e.g. Biron, 2010; Neuman and Keashly, 
2003; Petersitzke, 2009). Similar evidence can be drawn from the domain of the 
psychological contract. The psychological contract literature largely 
acknowledges that different organizational agents (e.g. recruiting agents, 
managers, human resource personnel) exert influence on employees’ 
psychological contracts (Conway and Briner, 2009; Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 
2007; Guest et al., 2010; Petersitzke, 2009; Shore et al., 2012). Among these 
agents, the managers may be considered as the principal or primary agents 
because of their critical role in developing employees’ perceptions of contract 
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fulfillment or contract breach (Bordia et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2008; Petersitzke, 
2009).  
 
Regarding the later theme in the context of deviant behaviour (i.e. individuals 
paying back any mistreatment to other members of the organization rather than 
their managers), when probed further the respondents generally attributed this 
tendency to their anticipation of undesirable consequences from their managers. 
Other researchers have made a similar observation that employees, rather than 
reciprocating any mistreatment to their managers/supervisors (even though they 
presume them to be responsible), tend to balance it with other members of the 
organization who might not be considered as responsible for the harm (e.g. 
Harvey et al., 2014; Mitchell and Ambrose, 2007; Schyns and Schilling, 2013; 
Wang et al., 2012). This is largely because of the fear of facing additional 
negative consequences from the managers. This study finding has been previously 
discussed in the literature under the topic of displaced deviance (e.g. Cropanzano 
and Mitchell, 2005; Porath and Pearson, 2012; Wang et al., 2012).  
 
For Mitchell and Ambrose (2007), the notion of displaced deviance ‘suggests that 
individuals who become angry and frustrated by a harm-doer may displace their 
aggression on individuals who are not the source of the harm’ (p. 1161). 
Displacing aggression on those who are not the source of the harm may appear 
surprising but, as noted by other researchers, individuals generally engage in 
displaced aggression because they fear further damage due to the perceptions of 
power asymmetry between them and the source of the harm (e.g. Petersitzke, 
2009; Tepper et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2012). This view is consistent with the 
basic emphasis in this thesis that the notion of power asymmetry in employment 
relationships has notable influence on employees’ psychological contracts. In this 
case, these influences are manifested as displaced reciprocation resulting from 
employees’ perceived inability to reciprocate negatively because of their 
assumptions of a prevailing power asymmetry in the employment relationship.  
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5.3.9 Summarizing the incompatibility of Gouldner’s (1960) theorization  
The above discussion explored the implications of the Gouldner’s (1960) notion 
of reciprocity in the psychological contract literature from the conceptual as well 
as the practical perspective. The first part, discussing the philosophical 
underpinnings, highlighted the disagreements between Gouldner’s (1960) 
conceptualization of reciprocity and the psychological contract literature. As 
noted, reciprocity is more a general societal norm which is voluntary or 
discretionary in nature and operates on the basis of power symmetry (Gouldner, 
1960). For Gouldner (1960), as reciprocating a previous act is not obligatory, the 
party to make the first move has no prior knowledge of whether and how the other 
party is going to reciprocate. Furthermore, in reciprocity there are no rights or 
responsibilities as in relation to the action of one party – the other party is not 
bound to make a pairing act i.e. reciprocate. Finally, according to Gouldner 
(1960), the relationship among the parties is a product of prior reciprocity.  
 
These are the fundamental philosophical underpinnings of reciprocity according 
to Gouldner (1960). Despite all their conceptual significance, these assumptions 
are, however, not very relevant to the psychological contract literature. This is 
because repayment in employment is obligatory and generally does not operate on 
an equality basis. Also the parties in an employment relationship have a relatively 
better knowledge of the nature of returns, as compared to the parties in a 
reciprocal relationship. In addition, unlike reciprocal relationships, in employment 
conditions the rights of one party are the responsibilities of the other party, a 
concept which Gouldner (1960) clearly describes as complementarity. Finally, in 
employment relations, reciprocity originates from the relationship established in 
the form of the employment contract, while for Gouldner (1960) it is the other 
way round i.e. the relationship originates from the previous act of reciprocity.  
 
The above section summarizes the previous detailed discussion of the conceptual 
incompatibility of Gouldner’s (1960) theorization of reciprocity with practical 
employment conditions. The following table presents the key points of this 
discussion:  
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Table 5.1  Gouldner’s (1960) concept of reciprocity and practical employment conditions 
Gouldner’s (1960) concept of reciprocity  Practical employment conditions 
Reciprocity leads to relationship Relationship leads to reciprocity 
Relationship based on power symmetry 
  
Relationship based on power asymmetry 
Relationship established between two 
individuals or groups   
Relationship established between an individual 
and the organization 
Relationship guided by general societal norms
  
Relationship guided by specific organizational 
dynamics 
Implicit negotiation in the relationships  Largely explicit negotiation in the relationships 
High degree of risk and uncertainty Low degree of risk and uncertainty 
Returns are discretionary  Returns are compulsory  
No knowledge of the nature of returns An approximate knowledge of the nature of 
returns 
More exploitative due to likely unilateral flow 
of benefits 
Less exploitative due to bilateral flow of 
benefits 
No consultation with the other party At least a formal consultation with the other 
party 
Rights of one party are not the obligations of 
the other party 
Rights of one party are the obligations of the 
other party 
Source: Developed for the Thesis   
 
At this point, there may be a counter argument against the researcher’s emphasis 
that the organizations do not exist in a vacuum. They are an integral part of a 
society and hence their operational dynamics are influenced rather based on 
broader societal norms. This counter argument apparently carries intuitive 
resonance. The researcher, however, emphasizes that, although organizations are 
influenced by societal norms, they do not largely operate in the context in which 
Gouldner (1960) conceptualizes reciprocity. This context has already been 
discussed in detail and summarized in the above table and the preceding 
paragraph, with an argument of why Gouldner’s (1960) view of reciprocity, 
despite its suitability for the societal context, is not applicable to the 
organizational scenario. Gouldner (1960), who was also aware of this issue, 
makes a clear distinction between the repaying mechanisms in society (i.e. 
reciprocity) and the repaying mechanisms in organizations (i.e. complementarity).  
 
From an exchange perspective, it is important to mention that this research does 
not argue that shifting the focus in the psychological contract literature from 
reciprocal to negotiated exchange will eliminate all the complexities associated 
with the concept. The point is that a theorization on relevant and realistic rather 
than rhetorical grounds will support the research to proceed towards a more 
234 
 
pertinent and rational conceptualization with fewer inconsistencies. The current 
notable contrasts in the different conceptualizations of the psychological contract 
also point towards this issue and urge contemporary researchers for a more 
pragmatic theorization. From a variety of perspectives discussed earlier, the 
notion of negotiated rather than reciprocal exchange appears as more applicable to 
the psychological contract literature. It supports the ideology of organizational 
bargaining and negotiation (rather than being merely kind or harmful) based on 
the dynamics of power in the employment relationship (Aylott, 2014; Conway and 
Briner, 2009; Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; Molm, 2010).  
 
In addition, negotiated exchanges have a lower degree of risk and uncertainty as 
compared with reciprocal exchanges. Negotiated contracts are explicit and agreed 
on (although the negotiation may not necessarily be based on equal grounds), but 
this is generally not the case in reciprocal exchanges (Molm, 2010). Moreover, 
conceptualizing psychological contracts on a reciprocal rather than a negotiated 
basis indirectly legitimates exploitation for three reasons. First, there is a limited 
possibility of negotiation in such exchanges as they are largely implicit in nature 
(e.g. Rousseau, 1989, 1995, 2011). Second, these exchanges are independently 
made without any consultation with the other exchange partner (Molm, 2010). 
Finally, unlike reciprocal exchanges, in negotiated exchanges there is an 
acknowledgement of the notion of power in terms of unequal gains stemming 
from the disproportionate interdependence of the exchange actors (Blau, 1964; 
Cook and Emerson, 1978; Cook et al., 2013).  
 
5.3.10 Implications of rhetoric 
The notion of reciprocal exchange, although conceptually incompatible, is 
however overwhelmingly discussed in the psychological contract literature. On 
the other hand, the phenomenon of negotiated exchange, in spite of all its 
relevance, is surprisingly ignored in the relevant theory. Even though the ideology 
of reciprocal exchange is compatible with the assumption of an implicit mutuality, 
as reciprocal exchanges are also implicit due to their non-negotiated nature 
(Molm, 2000, 2010), this synchronization is not very helpful in the psychological 
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contract literature. It is argued that the assumption of implicitness (in the form of 
both mutuality and reciprocity) guides the psychological contract literature into a 
domain in which virtually everything may be considered implicit, providing a 
very limited chance to gauge the dynamics of the phenomenon. In this context, 
recent research has raised similar concerns by pointing towards the validity of the 
assumption of reciprocity in the psychological contract literature (e.g. Conway 
and Briner, 2009; Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; Shore et al., 2012).  
 
At this point, it is valid to raise the question of why the relevant research (despite 
high applicability of negotiated exchanges and considerably less suitability of 
reciprocal exchanges) consistently and almost exclusively followed the concept of 
reciprocal exchange in the psychological contract literature. In response to this 
question, it is argued that, similar with the case of an implicit mutuality, the 
assumption of reciprocity, largely under the influence of rhetoric is emphasized in 
order to promote the interests of the dominant party i.e. the employer (Hallier, 
2009; Inkson and King, 2011) by creating a reality from a unitarist perspective 
(Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; Dick and Nadin, 2011; Keenoy and Anthony, 
1992). The assumption of reciprocity is conceptualized in a way that projects 
employees into a position with comparable bargaining power to their employers 
(e.g. Bordia et al., 2008; Kelloway, 2010; Robinson, 2008; Turnley and Feldman, 
1999). As noted, however, this is not the case for the larger category of lower 
level employees (Guest et al., 2010; Hallier, 2009; Inkson and King, 2011).  
 
This argument is further strengthened by the evidently prevalent but unrealistic 
assumption that, if employees perceive their employer as not reciprocating 
according to their contributions, they tend to balance the relationship by damaging 
the interests of the organization. According to Bordia et al. (2008, p. 1105), when 
employees perceive a contract breach, they ‘reciprocate by hurting organizational 
interests’ in different ways e.g. retaliation, engaging in anti-citizenship behaviour, 
withholding effort. In practical employment conditions, however, such 
assumptions may not be considered valid (Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; Shore 
et al., 2012). The underlying conceptualization for such an idealistic assumption is 
associated with Gouldner’s (1960) view of reciprocity, which is based on the 
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principle of power symmetry between the exchange actors. As argued earlier, this 
principle is generally not valid in practical employment conditions because of the 
disproportionate interdependencies or power asymmetries between employees and 
employers.  
 
5.3.11 Summary of reciprocity discussion 
This section analyzed the assumption of reciprocity in the psychological contract 
literature from the conceptual as well as the practical perspective. The discussion 
highlighted the misinterpretation of Gouldner’s (1960) theorization in the relevant 
literature. The later part of the discussion illustrated the incongruity of Gouldner’s 
(1960) conceptualization from the practical viewpoint. The discussion further 
emphasized that employees rather than responding to the employers’ inducements 
on a reciprocal basis, opt for other alternatives (e.g. developing a negative attitude 
towards the organization, withdrawing positive discretionary behaviours etc.) This 
is because of their perceptions of power asymmetry and their internal motives 
associated with the employment relationship. The final part of the discussion 
focused on the conceptual incompatibility of Gouldner’s (1960) theorization and 
the relevant issue of the implications of rhetoric in the psychological contract 
literature.  
 
In terms of contribution to knowledge, this research demonstrates the significance 
of negotiation rather than reciprocation in the domain of the psychological 
contract. Exploring psychological contracts on the basis of reciprocity has issues, 
both from the conceptual as well as the practical perspective. This is because the 
notion of reciprocity is based mainly on the assumption of power symmetry 
between the exchange actors (Gouldner, 1960). In contrast, employment 
relationships for most employees are generally characterized by power asymmetry 
in favour of employers (Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; Inkson and King, 2011). 
Negotiated contracts, therefore, gain currency in the conceptualization of the 
psychological contract as they acknowledge and highlight the issue of power 
asymmetry in exchange relationships (Cook et al., 2013; Molm, 2010).  
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5.4 Agency 
 
5.4.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the findings of the current study regarding the notion of 
agency in the context of the relevant literature. The discussion highlights the 
different classifications of organizational agents (e.g. primary agents, secondary 
agents, multiple agents, incumbent agents etc.) proposed on the basis of the 
research findings. The implications of the trustworthiness of individuals 
(developed on the basis of their ability to communicate organization’s 
expectations and the rewards/punishments associated with the fulfillment/non-
fulfillment of these expectations) in relation to their consideration as agents of the 
organization are described. Beyond the domain of human agents, the notion of 
electronic agents is also developed.  
 
The discussion further illustrates the largely coercive influences of these 
electronic agents on the psychological contracts of employees. The issue of 
explicit communication – in contrast to the assumption of implicitness – in the 
conceptualization of organizational agents is considered. The discussion then 
focuses on the relatively limited influence of human resource managers, in 
comparison with line managers, as the perceived primary agents of the 
organization. The prevailing tendency among employees to make upward 
influence in order to achieve their objectives associated with the employment 
relationship is discussed. Finally, in the context of agency and interdependence, 
the important work of Hindess is considered.  
 
5.4.2 Psychological contract with the organization  
Since the inception of the phenomenon of the psychological contract, the 
discussion of agency has generally been vague (Conway and Briner, 2009; Coyle-
Shapiro and Shore, 2007; Shore et al., 2012). As argued in the literature review, 
the relevant research needs to develop more precision in defining the criteria for 
organizational agents. Advancing the understanding of this vague notion, the 
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results of the current study suggest extended specificity in the theorization of 
organizational agents. Based on the implications of the phenomenon of power, the 
notion of organizational agents is recommended to be conceptualized as primary 
and secondary agents. Before the detailed discussion of this classification of 
organizational agents, the issue of the establishment of the employees’ 
psychological contract either with the overall organization as an abstract entity or 
with different agents of the organization needs to be revisited in relation to the 
research findings.   
 
From the analogy of formal employment contracts established with the employer 
(Suazo et al., 2011), it may be argued that a psychological contract (rather than 
different organizational agents) is generally established with the overall 
organization. This viewpoint is consistent with the emphasis of Coyle-Shapiro and 
Shore (2007) who argue that: 
 
employees view all possible agents and contract makers (even 
administrative contract makers, such as human resource policies and 
mission statements) bundled into one “humanlike” contract maker in 
such a way that the employee has a relationship with a single entity (i.e. 
the organization). 
 
(p. 167) 
 
The Coyle-Shapiro and Shore’s (2007) argument (i.e. considering the 
psychological contract as established with the organization, rather than different 
agents of the organization) is further supported by the findings of the current 
study, as employees cannot establish their psychological contracts with the 
electronic agents of the organization. Moreover, in the case of presumed coercion 
from electronic agents, employees attribute their perceptions of contract breach to 
their organization and not to the electronic agents themselves.  
 
It is, however, important to mention that in this scenario (i.e. the employee’s 
psychological contract established with the organization) the role of the 
organization is symbolic as an abstract entity. As argued by Coyle-Shapiro and 
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Shore (2007) and Shore et al. (2012), the organization cannot negotiate the 
contract on its own. The focus, therefore, needs to be on the different 
organizational agents as contract makers, as they principally shape the employees’ 
global psychological contract established with the organization. In other words, 
even though the psychological contract is mainly established with the 
organization, it is largely shaped by the different exchanges (of transactional 
and/or relational nature) between employees and the agents of the organization. 
The researcher’s argument is further supported by Conway and Briner (2009) who 
maintain that employees generally aggregate the messages communicated by the 
different agents of the organization in order to develop a view of the organization: 
 
as if it were a coherent single entity. [However] organizations cannot 
have psychological contracts [rather] the organization, as the other 
party in the relationship, provides the context for the creation of a 
psychological contract, but cannot in turn have a psychological contract 
with its members. 
 
(p. 84) 
 
The emphasis of Conway and Briner (2009) is consistent with the view of early 
researchers that the psychological contracts are held between employees and their 
organization rather than any specific agent of the organization (e.g. Levinson et 
al., 1962; Schein, 1965; Sims, 1994). Similarly, Morrison and Robinson (1997) 
posit that, although ‘organizational agents (e.g. supervisors) may have their own 
understanding of the psychological contract between employee and organization; 
they are not actually parties to that contract’ (p. 229). The notion of considering 
the establishment of employees’ psychological contracts as being with the 
organization has intuitive resonance. However, this postulation presents a 
significant challenge in terms of the issue of the representation of the 
organization. According to Coyle-Shapiro and Shore (2007) and Shore et al. 
(2012), considering the variety of the organizational agents, it could be argued 
that each employee is working for a different organization.  
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5.4.3 The issue of organization representation 
The validity of the concern of Coyle-Shapiro and Shore (2007) and Shore et al. 
(2012) is manifest in the form of a disagreement among the researchers on the 
issue of organization representation. As discussed in the literature review, for 
some researchers (e.g. Lee and Taylor, 2014) the immediate managers, while for 
others (e.g. Tomprou and Nikolaou, 2011), the senior managers largely qualify as 
the agents of the organization. In contrast, other researchers (e.g. Chen et al., 
2008; Petersitzke, 2009; Zagenczyk et al., 2011) consider the supervisors as the 
agents representing the organization. In spite of the divergence in the assumption 
of the organizational agents, a common feature in the conceptualization of these 
researchers can be identified. A meta-analytic review of these investigations 
highlights that, for these researchers, the phenomenon of the individual’s 
capability of distributing or withholding organizational rewards appears to be a 
primary criterion in the process of agent determination. 
 
However, it is not only the perceived capability of the individuals to distribute or 
withhold organizational rewards but also their perceived tendency to actively use 
that capability which serves as an additional criterion for employees in 
considering these individuals as agents of the organization. These two criteria 
were evident in the research findings, as employees (despite their perceptions of 
the manifestly superior capability of the managers to distribute or withhold 
organizational rewards) considered their supervisors as additional primary agents 
of the organization. These assumptions of employees were largely based on their 
perceptions regarding the indirect but active role of the supervisors in the 
distribution of organizational rewards on behalf of department managers.  
 
5.4.4 The role of organizational managers/supervisors 
As mentioned above, the managers/supervisors’ perceived capability of 
distributing or withholding organizational rewards and their perceived tendency to 
actively use that capability had a significant influence on employees’ 
psychological contracts. Based on this finding, the researcher emphasizes the 
critical role of managers/supervisors as the primary agents of the organization. As 
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noted in the research findings, these primary agents largely focus on 
organizational rewards in order to influence their interdependent relationships 
with employees. This observation is consistent with the viewpoint of other 
researchers emphasizing the notable influence of organizational rewards and 
punishments on employees’ perceptions of their employment relationships (e.g. 
Podsakoff et al., 2006; Rubin et al., 2010; Tremblay et al., 2013). The 
conceptualization of Rubin et al. (2010) implies that the managers/supervisors’ 
perceived capability of distributing or withholding organizational rewards is a key 
criterion in defining organizational agents, as the rewards and punishments assist 
employees in understanding organizational expectations in terms of the ‘actions 
which are desired or not by the organization’ (p. 400).  
 
The tendency to rely largely on rewards and punishments is generally considered 
to be weakly associated with the relational dimension of the employment 
relationship (Aguinis et al., 2008). However, employees in the current study 
appeared to be largely influenced by this issue in their employment relationship. 
The employees’ primary reliance on organizational rewards and punishments, in 
addition to achieving their own objectives (e.g. salary increment, promotion etc.), 
also served as a mechanism to develop a better understanding of the expectations 
of the organization. As the managers in organizations generally have the 
capability to reward or punish (Reuver, 2006; Petersitzke, 2009; Tremblay et al., 
2013; Yukl, 2010), it can be argued that this capability significantly promotes 
their qualification as the primary agents of the organization.  
 
The argument for considering managers as the primary agents of the organization 
also gains momentum as employees are most responsive to the organizational 
members whom they perceive as capable of rewarding or punishing them 
(Trevino and Nelson, 2010). Similarly, other researchers argue that there is an 
increasing tendency among employees to interact with their organization largely 
through their line managers (e.g. Guest and King, 2004; Guest and Woodrow, 
2012; Reuver, 2006). From the perspective of relational interdependence (Cook et 
al., 2013; Hindess, 1982), this highlights that employees are largely dependent on 
their managers for several reasons (e.g. understanding the organization’s 
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expectations, career development, mentoring, recognition etc.) This further 
strengthens the argument of the qualification of managers as the primary agents of 
the organization.  
 
5.4.5 The typology of multiple agents 
There is an elaborate discussion in the psychological contract literature regarding 
the complexities surrounding the notion of agency (Conway and Briner, 2009; 
Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; Guest et al., 2010; Shore et al., 2012). The 
researcher in the current study similarly experienced a number of complex issues 
associated with the identification of organizational agents. The issue of agency is 
inherently complex not only because of the intricate nature of psychological 
contracts but also due to the variety of evolutionary arrangements in the 
contemporary employment structures (e.g. temporary workers, part-time workers, 
flexible workers, remote workers etc.) On the basis of these underlying intricacies, 
the researcher argues for an exploration of the notion of agency on the basis of 
different typologies.  
 
From the perspective of different employment structures mentioned above, it is 
suggested to explore the notion of agency on the basis of multiple and incumbent 
agents’ typologies. The recommendation of a multiple agents’ typology is based 
on the research findings in relation to employees working simultaneously for 
multiple employers. According to these research participants, they have distinct 
organizational agents in each of their employing organizations, who support them 
in comprehending the expectations of their employers. Alternatively, in terms of 
relational interdependence, these employees considered themselves as largely 
dependent on these distinct agents not only to understand the expectations of their 
employing organizations but also to achieve their objectives associated with the 
employment relationships. Therefore these multiple agents representing different 
employers were largely perceived as primary agents by these employees.  
 
Perceiving these agents as primary was generally based on the research 
participants’ tendency to develop predominantly transactional psychological 
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contracts with their different employers. This finding is consistent with the 
observation of other researchers regarding the issue of the influence of the nature 
of employment on employees’ psychological contracts (e.g. Clarke and 
Patrickson, 2008; De Cuyper et al., 2009; Guest, 2004b; Shore et al., 2012). In 
such atypical employment arrangements, Guest (2004b) posits that the 
psychological contracts of workers are more restricted and transactional as 
compared to full-time and permanent employees. Parallel to the observation of 
Guest (2004b), Winkler (2011) argues that these employees generally develop 
their relationships with the employers on a transactional basis. This tendency 
among employees is largely the result of their perceptions as a ‘peripheral 
workforce [leading to an] assumption that the relationship may be terminated soon 
as the organization reinterprets its need for numerical flexibility, in other words to 
reduce the amount of its workforce’ (Winkler, 2011, p. 503).  
 
5.4.6 The classification of incumbent agents 
In addition to the multiple agents’ typology, the researcher posits another 
incumbent agents’ typology. In comparison with the multiple agents’ typology, 
associated with inter-organizational employment, the incumbent agent’s typology 
is linked to intra-organizational employment arrangements. As observed in the 
study, employees who are moved from one department to another redefine their 
organizational agents (particularly primary agents) on the basis of their 
perceptions of the current reporting authority. This observation is consistent with 
the empirical findings of other researchers that the psychological contracts of 
employees are significantly influenced by those organizational representatives 
whom they perceive to possess the capability of rewarding or punishing them (e.g. 
Cooke et al., 2004; Petersitzke, 2009).  
 
The notion of an incumbent agent’s typology is also compatible with the basic 
assumption regarding the underlying nature of psychological contracts as highly 
dynamic, which is influenced by the employees’ daily experiences regarding their 
employment relationships (Conway and Briner, 2009; Guest et al., 2010). 
Consistent with this assumption, the results of the study further highlight that 
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employees who are moved to other departments in the same organization replaced 
their former manager with the current manager as primary agent, even though they 
sustained their relationship with their former manager. This was based on their 
consideration of the current manager as the most relevant person not only to 
understand the organizational expectations but also as a key representative of the 
organization (i.e. primary agent) to reward or punish them. From the perspective 
of relational interdependence, this notion highlights the change in employees’ 
perceptions regarding their dependence on the new manager as the most relevant 
person to achieve their objectives associated with the employment relationship.  
 
5.4.7 Contingent reward-based trustworthiness 
In addition to the above mentioned issues, the notion of trustworthiness played a 
significant role in the process of agent determination. This trustworthiness was 
largely based on the agent’s capability to clearly explain organizational 
expectations and the rewards/punishments associated with the fulfillment/non-
fulfillment of these expectations. This observation is coherent with the leadership 
theory and is discussed in the relevant literature as contingent reward transactional 
leadership (Bass et al., 2003; Podsakoff et al., 2006; Pieterse et al., 2010; 
Walumbwa et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2011). Parallel to the rationale of 
psychological contracts as a mechanism for employees to build their expectations, 
the notion of contingent reward transactional leadership provides individuals with 
a basis on which to develop expectations and anticipate outcomes associated with 
their employment relationship (Jackson et al., 2012; Podsakoff et al., 2010).  
 
Rubin et al. (2010) argue that leaders’ contingent reward behaviours increase and 
non-contingent reward behaviours decrease their trustworthiness. According to 
Tremblay et al. (2013), leaders who reward or punish on a non-contingent basis 
are generally perceived as incompetent, resulting in a reduction in their perceived 
trustworthiness. Employees generally believe that organizational rewards should 
be commensurate with their efforts (Colquitt, 2001). Organizational leaders who 
administer rewards on such equity basis, rather than on an arbitrary basis or on the 
basis of some other rules (e.g. seniority, equality, need, etc.) are considered as 
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relatively more trustworthy (Podsakoff et al., 2006). Similarly, Rubin et al. (2010) 
emphasize that ‘non-contingent punishment diminishes employees’ perceptions of 
leader trustworthiness’ (p. 402).  
 
5.4.8 The issue of implicitness 
As evident in the research findings, the notion of trustworthiness had a significant 
influence on the process of agent determination. This observation, however, 
contradicts the assumption of implicitness in the psychological contract literature. 
As noted, contingent reward practices played a significant role in establishing an 
individual’s trustworthiness. This trustworthiness, in turn, influenced employees’ 
perceptions of relational interdependence from the perspective of their 
dependence on particular individuals as the agents of the organization (i.e. the 
individuals they can trust to help them in understanding the organization’s 
expectations and also in achieving their objectives associated with the 
employment relationship). In this context, clear and explicit communication 
appeared to play a significant role. According to Walumbwa et al. (2008), 
‘contingent reward transactional (CRT) leader behaviour refers to leader 
behaviours emphasizing clarifying role and task requirements, and providing 
followers with material or psychological rewards contingent on the fulfillment of 
contractual obligations’ (p. 252, emphasis added in Italics). In addition to 
contingent reward leadership theory, the significance of clear and explicit 
communication (strengthening an individual’s trustworthiness) is also emphasized 
in other leadership models.  
 
Subasica et al. (2011) argue, there is supporting empirical evidence that in-group 
leaders, as compared with out-group leaders who explicitly communicate the 
details of the employment context to their followers, are considered to be more 
trustworthy. The argument of Subasica et al. (2011) helps us to recognize that the 
emphasis on the assumption of implicitness in the psychological contract literature 
is inherently an invitation to the notion of breach, as it provides no opportunity for 
organizational agents to discuss the employment context explicitly. The literature 
places emphasis on the notion of agency, albeit in a vague manner. The 
assumption of implicitness appears to be an unavoidable barrier to proceed in this 
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context as according to Walumbwa et al. (2008) ‘a leader discusses with followers 
what is required and clarifies how these outcomes are to be achieved and the 
reward they will receive in exchange for their satisfactory effort and performance’ 
(p. 252, emphasis added in Italics).  
 
5.4.9 The underlying patterns of primary-secondary agents’ typology 
Some consistent patterns on the primary–secondary classification of 
organizational agents emerged during the study. First, the influence of primary 
agents as compared to secondary agents on employees’ psychological contracts 
was noted as fundamental. However, in terms of time duration, the influence of 
the secondary agents appeared to be more prominent. In other words, even though 
the influence of primary agents on employees’ psychological contracts was clearly 
greater than the secondary agents, the duration of this influence, unlike the 
secondary agents, was limited to the extent to which these agents were perceived 
by employees as capable of distributing or withholding organizational rewards.  
 
Second, there was a considerable expansion not only in the time duration but also 
in the intensity of the influence of the primary agents if these agents also played 
the role of secondary agents. Third, for those employees working with multiple 
employers, a relatively limited function of the secondary agents was observed, as 
the psychological contracts of these employees were largely transaction based and 
were primarily influenced by the perceptions of the reward and punishment 
capabilities of the primary agents of different organizations. Finally, although 
employees may recognize multiple secondary agents in an organization at the 
same time, this possibility was relatively limited in the case of primary agents. In 
other words, employees generally acknowledged a very limited number of 
individuals as primary agents in one organization at a single point in time. This 
was because of the employees’ tendency to perceive particular organizational 
members as responsible for communicating to them the organization’s 
expectations and consequently rewarding or punishing them on the basis of 
fulfillment or non-fulfillment of these expectations.  
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Although there is relatively limited prior discussion of the classification of 
organizational agents in the established psychological contract literature, a proxy 
but clear support for these patterns can be found in the relevant organizational 
theory. Regarding the first pattern discussed above, researchers argue that the 
influence of transactional leaders, although substantial, is limited to the time 
period in which the leader can disperse rewards and punishments (e.g. Bass and 
Riggio, 2005; Burns, 1978; Judge et al., 2004; Northouse, 2012). On the other 
hand, the influence of transformational leaders transcends any time limit of their 
capability of rewarding or punishing followers.  
 
Regarding the second pattern, researchers argue that the influence of a leader 
considerably increases by moving from a transactional to a transformational 
domain, if the leader fulfils not only the extrinsic but also the intrinsic needs of 
the followers (e.g. Bass and Riggio, 2005; Conger and Kanungo, 1998; 
Northouse, 2012). In accordance with the third pattern, employees in atypical 
employment arrangements generally focus on extrinsic rewards and therefore 
develop their psychological contracts largely on a transactional basis (Coyle-
Shapiro and Kessler, 2002; De Cuyper et al., 2008b; Guest, 2004b) with a 
relatively limited interest ‘in developing strong emotional bonds with their 
organization’ (Winkler, 2011, p. 503). The final pattern echoes the tendency of 
employees to look towards particular organizational members (i.e. primary 
agents) in order to receive transactional rewards after fulfilling the organizational 
expectations communicated by these members (De Cuyper et al., 2008b; Rubin et 
al., 2010). In terms of relational interdependence, employees are thus dependent 
on primary agents in two ways. First, employees tend to depend on these agents in 
order to understand organization’s expectations. Second, they depend on primary 
agents for receiving organizational rewards after the fulfillment of these 
expectations.  
 
5.4.10 A perspective on transactional/relational contracts 
The findings of the current study highlighted the prevalence of transactional 
contracts among the research participants. With a major focus on the extrinsic 
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rewards associated with the employment relationship, the psychological contracts 
of the respondents were generally centred on the primary agents of the 
organization. Although for a small segment of respondents, the presence of 
relational contracts could also be observed, the development of these relational 
contracts was also based on the perceived prior fulfillment of the transactional 
obligations of the organization. Consistent with the observation of Zagenczyk et 
al. (2011) in the call centre environment, the research participants in the current 
study explained this tendency as it is unlikely for them to establish a long-term 
relationship with the organization if their prior short-term transactional needs 
remain unfulfilled or ignored by the employer.  
 
Deery et al. (2006) attribute this high tendency among call centre employees to 
the ‘change in the nature of the employment relationship, occasioned by a loss of 
job security, the erosion of promotional opportunities, and the increased 
uncertainty of regular and orderly pay increases’ (p. 166). According to Dundon 
and Van den Broek (2012), it is relatively difficult for contemporary employees to 
establish relational contracts with their employers because of changes in employer 
preferences. Similarly, other researchers argue that modern employers tend to 
promote transactional contracts themselves, not only because of the pressures 
from the external labour market but also due to their objectives of maintaining 
cost efficiency and meeting the short-term needs of the organization (e.g. Clarke 
and Patrickson, 2008; Guest et al., 2010; Hallier, 2009; Rodrigues and Guest, 
2010; Shore et al., 2012). This view is consistent with Hallier and James (1997), 
who posit that, in order to meet short-term needs, contemporary organizations 
tend not to encourage long-term relationships but offer ‘more monetizable and 
specific transactional agreements that emphasize explicit links between extrinsic 
rewards and employee performance’ (pp. 705–706).  
 
5.4.11 The non-human agents and their coercive influence 
The psychological contract literature has conceived the notion of agency largely 
on the basis of the human agents of the organization. The findings of this study, 
however suggest that, in addition to these human agents, the psychological 
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contracts of employees are also influenced by the electronic agents of the 
organization. Largely ignored in the psychological contract literature, Beirne et al. 
(2004) imply the significance of these electronic agents by arguing that, ‘although 
purposeful human agency is now acknowledged, its relative impact is often 
unclear given the weight attached to techno-bureaucratic controls’ (p. 98). These 
agents function in the form of a variety of technological installations deployed by 
employers. As the current study was based in call centres, very cutting-edge 
technology-based equipment was used by the employers to constantly monitor 
their employees.  
 
These monitoring mechanisms comprised CCTVs, computer screen monitoring, 
records of employee attendance through machine-readable swipe cards, number of 
calls taken by employees, average time spent on each call, the level of customer 
satisfaction served by a particular employee. Although these strict monitoring 
mechanisms may be considered as a requirement to meet the standards of an 
industry operating in a hypercompetitive environment (Ball and Margulis, 2011; 
Deery et al., 2010) their impact was perceived by employees as largely coercive. 
This assumption of coercion developed a perception of breach by reducing the 
level of trust in their psychological contracts with the employer. Although 
employees acknowledged that some level of monitoring is an industry 
requirement, they also mentioned that it was being used to an unnecessary extent. 
As a result, this induced dissonance among employees as, according to the 
research participants, it represented the low level of trust their employers had in 
them.  
 
According to Tyler and Blader (2013), it is normal to expect employees to conceal 
certain behaviours from management in order to avoid reprisals. They further 
posit that instruments of surveillance are effective in identifying and sanctioning 
such detrimental employee behaviours. According to a survey from the American 
Management Association (AMA, 2007), around 45% companies monitor 
employee telephone usage, 66% constantly check internet use and 48% keep an 
eye on employees through CCTV. Researchers, however, raise the concern that 
surveillance in some cases may be a source of unnecessary intervention because 
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of the monitoring of those organizational behaviours that fall into the category of 
employee privacy or are not necessarily relevant to their performance (e.g. Alge 
and Hansen, 2013; Ball and Margulis, 2011; Spitzmuller and Stanton, 2006).  
 
Similar with the observations of the current study, in which employees felt 
coercion from the employer due to excessive surveillance, Subasica et al. (2011) 
mention that surveillance is generally assumed by employees ‘as relatively 
intrusive and punitive’ with a negative effect on their performance and wellbeing. 
(p. 171). According to Turner (2005), surveillance leads to perceived coercion as 
it: 
 
is a divisive, destabilizing and counter-productive means of control. The 
more coercion is used the more it must be used, since it undermines 
influence and authority and leads to attitude change away from the 
source at the same time as it provokes resistance and reactance to the 
loss of freedom. 
 
(p. 13) 
 
Supporting this viewpoint, there is empirical evidence indicating the detrimental 
effects of surveillance on employees’ wellbeing and productivity (Subasica et al., 
2011), job performance and satisfaction (Thompson et al., 2009), perceptions of 
privacy (Alge, 2001; Posey et al., 2011), organizational commitment (Brown and 
Korczynski, 2010; Spitzmuller and Stanton, 2006), and perceptions of trust 
(Coultrop and Foutain, 2012).  
 
5.4.12 Electronic agents and contract breach 
With significant implications for the psychological contract literature, researchers 
argue that employees generally consider the installation of surveillance equipment 
in the workplace as a major source of breach of trust in their employment 
relationship (e.g. Alge and Hansen, 2013; Ball and Margulis, 2011; Stanton and 
Stam, 2006; Westin, 1992). Parzefall and Salin (2010) and DeConinck (2010), 
while referring to social exchange theory, emphasize the significance of trust as an 
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essential feature for the development of employment relationships. In the context 
of psychological contract breach, Suazo (2009) posits that trust is imperative in 
employee–employer relationship in terms of developing and reinforcing 
employees’ perceptions of ‘being valued and respected by the employing 
organization’ (p. 140). Similarly, Shore et al. (2012) maintain that the absence of 
trust may ultimately strengthen employees’ perceptions of breach of their 
psychological contract.  
 
According to Ball and Margulis (2011) and Lyon (2013), surveillance has 
significant coercive effects as it is least likely to encourage employees to 
internalize the viewpoint of their employer. This is due to the perceived loss of 
trust resulting from employers’ constant surveillance (Alge and Hansen, 2013; 
Kramer, 1999). A similar conclusion is reached by the researcher as, according to 
the research participants, intrusive organizational surveillance largely served as an 
instrument of coercion and an invasion of their privacy. Although coercion is 
generally considered to be negatively related to leader effectiveness (Aguinis et 
al., 2008), the participants in this research did not attribute the surveillance-led 
coercion to their supervisors or managers, as they recognized it as a company 
policy, and therefore beyond the control of their managers. Employees 
nevertheless considered it as a breach of trust by the organization because of their 
assumptions of coercion, echoing the viewpoint of Turner (2005) that ‘at the 
extreme, coercion threatens the power of the source itself, since it brings into 
being an enemy dedicated to its downfall’ (p. 13).  
 
5.4.13 Limited coercion from human agents 
In comparison with electronic agents which are prominent sources for developing 
perceptions of coercion among the research participants, there was limited 
evidence of coercive practices from the human agents of the organization. This 
was largely because employees (in addition to evading any reprisals from the 
organization) appeared to strive for more organizational rewards as for them 
coercion, rather than being any formal reprimand, mainly comprised the 
withholding of the rewards they were expecting from their organization. 
According to Deutsch (2011), coercion is rarely applied by exchange actors even 
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when they are capable of using it. This is because coercion is mostly ineffective 
and results in resistance rather than compliance (Blau, 1964; Deutsch, 2011). 
Molm (1997) maintains that ‘real subjects do not apply coercion consistently in 
exchange relations. Subjects in both strong and weak power positions typically 
punish their partners on fewer than 5 per cent of all opportunities’ (p. 117). A 
similar observation was made in the current study, when the organizational agents 
predominantly appeared to influence their interdependent relationships with 
employees by distributing or withholding rewards rather than by explicitly 
punishing them.  
 
5.4.14 The limited influence of HR managers 
The respondents in the current study generally perceived their managers to be 
even more powerful than the human resource managers who were formally 
responsible for making critical decisions such as hiring and promotion. The 
employees participating in the study explained it as the human resource managers, 
in order to perform the majority of their daily operations (ranging from 
recruitment to employee layoff), were themselves dependent on the information 
provided by their line managers. Consistent with the observation of Beirne et al. 
(2004, p. 107) in a call centre context, this finding highlights the dynamic nature 
of power relations characterized by ‘complex patterns of interdependence’ and 
struggles on different levels (e.g. HR managers and line managers in this case).  
 
For the research participants, the influence of human resource managers on their 
employment was very limited and rather symbolic, as they had almost negligible 
powers to influence the functioning of other departments. This observation is 
consistent with Legge (2005) who emphasizes that human resource managers 
need to increase their influence in mainstream organizational operations. Guest 
and King (2004), however, argue that ‘in a capitalist society, dominated by the 
profit motive, the ambiguities in the personnel role made it unlikely that personnel 
managers would become powerful unless they learnt to play by the rules of the 
game’ (p. 402). Similarly, Bach and Edwards (2012) and Lupton (1966) maintain 
that human resource managers need to extend their contributions to the operations 
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of other departments in order to enhance their powers. However, they further posit 
that in order to achieve this, human resource managers are required to advance 
their social science knowledge and professional skills.  
 
It was evident from the interviewees’ responses that the line managers were 
unexpectedly contributing to those tasks which are generally considered to be 
human resource managers’ responsibilities (e.g. recruitment, performance 
appraisal). Reuver (2006) explains this as, in many contemporary organizations, 
the management of a variety of human resource functions (e.g. selection, 
performance appraisal, compensation and employee training) is considered as the 
responsibility of line managers. Consequently, line managers have a significant 
influence not only in their own departments but also in the human resource 
departments. This influence adds to the existing ambiguity regarding the role of 
human resource managers and further increases ‘the lack of power of HR 
managers’ (Guest and Woodrow, 2012, p. 110).  
 
According to these researchers, the combined effect of role ambiguity, lack of 
centrality and relevant powers to influence decisions ultimately results in the non-
involvement of human resource managers in organizational operations (e.g. 
Caldwell, 2003; Guest and Woodrow, 2012; Legge, 2005). The findings of the 
current study endorse this viewpoint, as the research participants were generally 
of the view that their human resource managers had a passive role in the issues 
related to employee management. The employees therefore considered themselves 
as primarily dependent on their line managers rather than the human resource 
managers to ascertain the expectations of the organization. Irrespective of the 
debate over the allocation of organizational authority between line and human 
resource managers, this finding further supports the assumption that the line 
managers are the primary agents of the organization.  
 
5.4.15 Employees’ upward influence  
The results highlighted that not only managers but also employees attempted to 
influence their interdependent employment relationships on the basis of 
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developing informal relations with the perceived organizational agents. In this 
context, the research participants relied heavily on developing their credibility and 
reputation on the basis of their expert knowledge and skills. According to Uhl-
Bien and Carsten (2007), ‘if the employee has a solid reputation and is perceived 
as highly credible, however, others will be less likely to automatically disregard 
the individual and instead give the employee’s concern legitimate consideration’ 
(p. 196). For other researchers, credibility and reputation are not only critical for 
organizational leaders to influence their followers, but also for the followers in 
order to progress to higher positions (e.g. Basadur et al., 2000; Kouzes and 
Posner, 2011; Mouly and Sankaran, 1999). Similarly, the research participants 
also perceived that credibility and reputation were important tools to progress to 
high power/status positions.  
 
The results of the study highlighted that this credibility and reputation supported 
employees in achieving two major objectives. First, it assisted them in advancing 
their career with the current employer and increasing their future employability 
prospects with other potential employers. Second, it supported employees in 
increasing their employer’s dependence on them. In other words, from the 
perspective of power as relational interdependence, acquiring superior expert 
knowledge and skills supported employees in a twofold manner. First, it reduced 
their dependence on the current employer. Second, it increased their employer’s 
dependence on them. Uhl-Bien and Carsten (2007) concur with this viewpoint, 
arguing that superior expert knowledge and skills promotes the employability 
prospects of employees as ‘the choice to remove the manager’s power over them 
is made easier if the employee has managed her employability (e.g. marketability) 
to keep her options open’ (p. 195). In relation to the agency-structure perspective, 
this finding also highlights the tendency among employees to exercise their 
agency in the employment relationship. In addition to rejecting the notion of call 
centre workers as passive subjects who are reduced to the employment structures 
characterized by techno-bureaucratic controls, this finding illustrates employees’ 
efforts to increase their bargaining power (e.g. through developing their credibility 
and reputation in this case) in the employment relationship.  
 
255 
 
Furthermore, credibility and reputation, acquired on the basis of expert knowledge 
and skills, also assisted the research participants in making stronger associations 
with the dominant members of the organization. The majority of these members 
were employees’ immediate managers. However, in some cases, these were also 
the managers of other departments and even the bosses of the employees’ 
immediate managers. Consistent with the emphasis of Hindess (1982, p. 503), this 
finding highlights the different ‘axes of struggle’ in power relations beyond the 
capitalist–worker domain. Similarly, in the context of call centres, Beirne et al. 
(2004) point towards the workplace struggles for power that are characterized by 
complex interdependencies in the workplace. 
 
According to Neill (2014), employees generally seek to develop these 
relationships with the dominant members of the organization in order to ‘increase 
their power and influence’ within the organization (p. 602). Researchers generally 
refer to this tendency among employees as their attempts for the inclusion in the 
dominant coalition (e.g. Bowen, 2009; Dozier et al., 2013; Neill, 2014; O’Neil, 
2003). This dominant coalition is generally defined by these researchers as the 
inner circle comprising those employees who mainly control the structure and the 
resources of the organization. According to Dozier et al. (2013), this inner circle 
generally comprises employees at the top level of the organizational hierarchy but 
in some cases may also include employees at the middle and lower levels.  
 
The relevant literature has discussed this tendency among employees to develop 
associations with the dominant members of the organization as upward influence 
(Morris and Feldman, 1996; Neill, 2014; O’Neill, 2003; Olufowote et al., 2005). 
According to McAlister and Darling (2005), the concept of upward influence 
represents ‘the informal nature of power and relationships in the modern 
workplace’ (p. 559). For Shim and Lee (2001), these relationships are ‘webs of 
influence’ that exist upward, downward and across the organization (p. 396). The 
findings of the research established that employees attempted to exert upward 
influence not to counter their managers, but mainly with the objective of gaining 
additional powers on the basis of their enhanced credibility, reputation and 
agreeableness. This echoes the previously recognized view of the research that 
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employees tend to develop informal relations with their managers not only to 
avoid disagreements but also to enhance their powers in employment relationships 
(Aquino et al., 2006; Tjosvold and Wissee, 2009).  
 
5.4.16 Agency and interdependence 
The previous section discussed the issue of agency in the call centre environment. 
Researchers argue that studies based on call centres have generally focused on the 
bureaucratic and technological systems for labour control, while relatively 
ignoring the issue of employee resistance and struggles in the workplace (Berni et 
al., 2012; Fleming and Sturdy, 2011; Hastings, 2011; Russell, 2008). According to 
Beirne et al. (2004), because of the prevailing tendency to largely focus on the 
techno-bureaucratic controls, the issue of ‘relational interdependencies and 
workplace struggles’ in call centre studies remains relatively under-researched (p. 
107).  
 
This tendency has largely resulted in the depiction of call centre workers as 
passive subjects in the workplace (Taylor and Bain, 2000; Fleming and Sturdy, 
2011; Hastings, 2011). According to this viewpoint, the capacity for independent 
sense-making of these passive subjects ‘disappears as they police themselves into 
complete subordination’ (Beirne et al., 2004, p. 101). However, there is empirical 
evidence highlighting that employees resist and respond to these employer’s 
efforts to ensure workers’ complete subordination (Hastings, 2011). As noted in 
the research findings, employees make purposeful efforts (e.g. spending more 
time on lunch-breaks, not helping the customers appropriately, withdrawing 
positive discretionary behaviours etc.) to negatively influence the call centre 
operations with the objective of resisting employer’s efforts towards the complete 
subordination of the workers.  
 
Hastings (2011) argues that the tendency to portray call centre workers as passive 
subjects largely stems from the excessive emphasis on Foucault’s (1977) view of 
power. Based on the notion of self-discipline and the all-encompassing nature of 
power through panopticon gaze, Foucault’s (1977) work downplays the issue of 
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freedom and human agency. Consequently, the relevant research with its approach 
of workers’ complete subordination, generally underplays the vital issue of the 
relational interdependencies and the associated workplace struggles (Beirne et al., 
2004). Similarly, Hindess (1996) maintains that, due to his oversight of the notion 
of interdependence in human exchanges, Foucault’s (1977) work largely 
downplays the issue of subjectivity (i.e. individuals acting against disciplinary 
practices and dominant discourses) in power relations. 
 
Acknowledging this issue, the relational interdependence approach to exploring 
the implications of power dynamics in the workplace is therefore helpful from 
several perspectives. First, the relational interdependence approach is dissociated 
from the mechanical and all-encompassing view of power (Foucault, 1977) that 
leads to predictable outcomes through serving the interests of the powerful 
without any resistance. Following this view of power, human agency is largely 
reduced to organizational structures characterized by techno-bureaucratic controls. 
Similarly, other researchers argue that because of its principal focus on structural 
factors, Foucault’s (1977) view of power largely downplays the issue of active 
human agency in call centres and requires employees ‘to reproduce the status quo, 
as mechanical accounts of the panopticon and self-discipline imply’ (e.g. Beirne 
et al., 2004, p. 108; Hastings, 2011).  
 
Second, consistent with the emphasis of Hindess (1982), this approach highlights 
the interdependencies and the struggles for power in exchange relationships. This 
notion is evident in the research findings in which not only organizational agents 
but also employees appeared to be actively engaged in workplace struggles to 
influence their interdependent employment relationships through making different 
efforts (e.g. increasing their employer’s dependence through establishing their 
own credibility and reputation, developing informal relations with perceived 
organizational agents, making upward influence etc.)  
 
The struggles for power in these interdependent relationships were not only 
characterized by their complexity (e.g. employees attempting to make stronger 
connections with their managers, the bosses of their managers, the managers of 
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other departments and even the managers in other prospective organizations to 
increase their employability) but also by their proceedings at multiple levels (e.g. 
struggles at the group level between HR departments and operations departments, 
struggles at the individual level between employees and their managers, struggles 
at the individual–organization level, i.e. employees attempting to reduce 
organizational influence through reduction in the use of different surveillance 
mechanisms, or employees attempting to increase the employer’s dependence on 
them through developing their own credibility and reputation).  
 
Finally, the interdependence approach provides support in investigating exchange 
relationships beyond the narrow class terms of workers and capitalists. This 
notion is previously explained by Hindess (1982). According to him: 
 
the analysis of enterprises in class terms, that is, in terms of relations 
between capitalists and workers, brings out only one aspect of the 
differential conditions of action of agents in enterprises. But an 
enterprise may also involve other axes of struggle which cut across each 
other. Analysis in class terms specifies one set of features of the 
conditions of action of agents involved in production but it doesn’t 
determine what the other conditions will be and neither does it ensure 
that the agents concerned will regard it as the most important issue to 
fight about. 
 
(Hindess, 1982, pp. 503–504) 
 
From the perspective of call centres, the emphasis of Hindess (1982) is endorsed 
by Beirne et al. (2004). According to them, the interdependence approach brings 
into focus the complex relational interdependencies in the domain of employment 
by highlighting workplace struggles beyond the narrow dyadic view of employee–
employer relationships.   
 
 
 
259 
 
5.4.17 Summary of agency discussion 
This section elaborated on the research findings regarding the notion of agency in 
the context of the relevant literature. The discussion highlighted the different 
classifications of the notion of agency (e.g. primary agents, secondary agents, 
multiple agents, incumbent agents etc.) proposed by the researcher. The 
implications of the individuals’ trustworthiness (largely dependent on their ability 
to communicate organization’s expectations and the rewards/punishments 
associated with the fulfillment/non-fulfillment of these expectations) in the 
context of their consideration as organizational agents were also discussed. 
Beyond the notion of human agents, the concept of the electronic agents of the 
organization was also highlighted.  
 
The discussion further illustrated the negative influences of these electronic agents 
on employees’ psychological contracts. Moreover, contrary to the assumption of 
implicitness, the significance of explicit communication in the conceptualization 
of organizational agents was highlighted. The discussion also illustrated the 
principal influence of line managers (in comparison with human resource 
managers), supporting the notion of their consideration as the primary agents of 
the organization. The efforts made by employees to develop their credibility and 
reputation were discussed in the next section. From the perspective of power, this 
credibility and reputation, in addition to making an upward influence, also 
supported them in terms of reducing their dependence on the employer while 
simultaneously increasing the employer’s dependence on them. Finally, in relation 
to agency and interdependence, the important work of Hindess was considered.  
 
In terms of contribution to knowledge, this research proposes different 
classifications of organizational agents. With an invitation to be further explored, 
the study recommends the classifications of primary agents, secondary agents, 
multiple agents and incumbent agents. This research makes another contribution 
by extending the notion of agency beyond the boundary of human agents into the 
domain of technology-based electronic agents of the organization. The research 
also contributes to the psychological contract literature by highlighting that it is 
not only the perceived capability to reward or punish but also the perceived 
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tendency to actively use that capability which significantly influences employees’ 
assumptions to consider a particular organizational member as the agent of the 
organization. Another key contribution that this thesis makes is providing a 
conceptual framework (discussed in detail in the next chapter) based on the 
concepts of interdependence, negotiation and different classifications of 
organizational agents. 
 
5.5 Researcher’s conceptualization of psychological contract 
The above section discussed the research findings regarding mutuality, reciprocity 
and agency in the context of the relevant literature. In contrast to these notions, 
the researcher based on the above discussion argues that contract negotiation 
(rather than reciprocation) lies at the centre of the notion of the psychological 
contract (refer to the framework, page 269). The employees, based on their 
perceptions of interdependence (rather than mutuality) in the employment 
relationship, negotiate their contracts both implicitly and explicitly with the 
different agents of the organization. These perceptions of interdependence in the 
employment relationship, serving as a foundation for contract negotiation are 
shaped by a number of factors (e.g. job security/mobility, employee’s mental 
schema, hierarchical position etc.)  
 
The contract negotiation stage is generally characterized by its largely operational 
nature and is principally based on the prior stage of interdependence, which is 
mainly perceptual in nature. Consistent with the conceptualization of 
psychological contracts as highly complex, dynamic and idiosyncratic (Conway 
and Briner, 2009; Shore et al., 2012), employees may begin and continue the 
negotiation of a variety of subcontracts (collectively forming the employees’ 
global psychological contract with the overall organization i.e. the central 
negotiated contract) based on various transactional and relational exchanges with 
the different perceived agents of the organization. In addition to their dynamic 
nature, these subcontracts may not only be multidimensional (i.e. transactional 
exchanges with primary agents and relational exchanges with secondary agents) 
but also possibly overlapping (i.e. establishing both transactional and relational 
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exchanges with an individual, e.g. a primary agent of the organization additionally 
contributing as a secondary agent to employees’ psychological contracts).  
 
Another layer of complexity can surface in the case of employees working for 
more than one employer (e.g. agency employees or subcontracted employees 
temporarily working for another organization etc.) These employees may develop 
multiple psychological contracts with their different employing organizations. 
Each of these psychological contracts, independently established with a particular 
employer, may comprise all of these complex, dynamic and idiosyncratic 
transactional/relational exchanges (i.e. subcontracts) with different agents of every 
organization. Finally, these are not only human agents (as generally assumed in 
the psychological contract literature) but also electronic agents, which can exert a 
significant influence (largely coercive in nature) on the psychological contracts of 
employees.  
 
5.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter discussed the findings of the current study in the context of the 
relevant literature. On the issue of mutuality, the earlier part of the discussion 
highlighted the existence of indeterminacy as a prominent source to undermine 
the assumption of an implicit mutuality between employees and employer. Given 
the issue of power asymmetry in employment relationships, the notion of biased 
mutuality in favour of the employer was highlighted. The discussion focused on 
the different issues (e.g. employability, job flexibility, training and career 
development) that promote the perceptions of biased mutuality among employees. 
Stemming from these perceptions of biased mutuality, employees generally tend 
to make efforts to strengthen their powers through decreasing their dependence on 
the employer and increasing the employer’s dependence on them. The next 
section highlighted the limitations in the theorization of Rousseau (2001) in order 
to promote employees’ perceptions of mutuality. The last part of the discussion 
elaborated on the issue of divergence in employees’ and managers’ perceptions of 
mutuality.  
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The discussion on reciprocity focused on the issues from the conceptual as well as 
the operational perspective. Regarding the issues related to its conceptualization, 
the discussion emphasized the misinterpretation of Gouldner’s (1960) notion of 
reciprocity in the relevant literature. The next section of the discussion focused on 
the operational issues, highlighting the incompatibility of Gouldner’s (1960) 
theorization in actual employment conditions. The discussion also illustrated that 
employees (because of their perceptions of power asymmetry or disproportionate 
interdependence and internal motives associated with the employment 
relationship) rather than responding to the employers’ inducements on a reciprocal 
basis, opt for other alternatives (e.g. developing negative attitude towards the 
organization, withdrawing positive discretionary behaviours etc.) The final section 
elaborated on the conceptual incongruity of Gouldner’s (1960) theorization and 
the associated issue of the implications of rhetoric in the psychological contract 
literature.  
 
The discussion on agency focused on the different classifications of organizational 
agents (e.g. primary agents, secondary agents, multiple agents, incumbent agents 
etc.) proposed on the basis of the research findings. The implications of the 
trustworthiness of individuals (based on their ability to communicate the 
organization’s expectations and the rewards/punishments associated with the 
fulfillment/non-fulfillment of these expectations) in relation to their consideration 
as agents of the organization were also discussed. Furthermore, beyond the 
conceptualization of human agency, the notion of the electronic agents of the 
organization was highlighted.  
 
The discussion on electronic agents also emphasized the negative influence of 
these agents on employees’ psychological contracts. In contrast to the assumption 
of implicitness, the importance of explicit communication in relation to 
organizational agents was also illustrated. From the perspective of power, the next 
section highlighted the principal influence of line managers, in comparison with 
human resource managers, as the perceived primary agents of the organization. 
The following discussion was based on the efforts made by employees to develop 
their credibility and reputation. This credibility and reputation, in addition to 
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making an upward influence, also promoted employees’ bargaining power 
through reducing their dependence on the organization and increasing the 
organization’s dependence on them. Finally, the important work of Hindess was 
considered in the context of agency and interdependence.  
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Chapter 6 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
The notion of the psychological contract serves as an important organizational 
behaviour construct in order to explore the dynamics of the employment 
relationship (Suazo et al., 2011; Wellin, 2012). Over the last two decades, there 
has been an exponential growth in the number of journal articles published on the 
subject due to its capability to explore the employment relationship as an ongoing 
exchange unfolding dynamically on a day-to-day basis (Guest et al., 2010). 
Researchers, however, highlight the issue of divergence in the different definitions 
of the psychological contract and argue the need to proceed towards more general 
agreement in the conceptualization of the construct (Conway and Briner, 2009; 
Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; Shore et al., 2012).  
 
The majority of the psychological contract literature, because of its underlying 
assumptions of mutuality and reciprocity, largely downplays the implications of 
power dynamics in the employment relationship (e.g. G. E. Dabos, M. B. Arthur, 
P. M. Bal, R. Schalk, S. A. Tijoriwala). This has largely resulted in an oversight 
of the issues related to the complex relational interdependencies between 
employees and organizational representatives. These issues are imperative as they 
deflect attention from the limited view of power based on the narrow class terms 
of workers and capitalists (Hindess, 1996) to the in-depth view of power 
highlighting the ongoing workplace struggles between employees and the 
different agents of the organization. This research is, therefore, conducted with the 
key objective of investigating the under-researched implications of power in 
relation to the psychological contract. More specifically, the presumptions of 
mutuality, reciprocity and agency, which underpin the concept of the 
psychological contract, are investigated from the perspective of power.  
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Regarding the first issue, it is argued to focus on interdependence rather than 
mutuality in the conceptualization of the psychological contract. This is not in 
itself a new line of argument as not only the early but also the contemporary 
psychological contract researchers acknowledge the implications of 
interdependence in relation to the psychological contract (e.g. Conway and Briner, 
2009, p. 118; Levinson et al., 1962, p. 104; Meckler et al., 2003, p. 225; Schein, 
1980, p. 65). The researcher emphasizes interdependence rather than mutuality, as 
it will support to incorporate the critically important but largely underplayed 
implications of power in the conceptualization of the psychological contract. 
According to Schein (1965, p. 65), power from the perspective of interdependence 
has significance in understanding the implications of ‘mutual influence and 
mutual bargaining to establish a workable psychological contract’.  
 
This argument is consistent with the viewpoint of other researchers (e.g. Blau, 
1964; Cook et al., 2013; Molm, 2010) who emphasize that power relations are 
generally characterized by complex interdependencies in which exchange actors 
are dependent on each other for valued outcomes. The researcher’s emphasis is 
further supported by the viewpoint of Tjosvold and Wisse (2009) to consider the 
issue of complex interdependencies influencing power relations in the 
employment exchange networks. Similarly, other researchers (e.g. Conway and 
Coyle-Shapiro, 2012; Coyle-Shapiro and Conway, 2004; Ingram, 2007) argue that 
the lack of attention to these interdependent linkages has been a major limitation 
in the psychological contract research.  
 
Regarding the second issue, the research findings highlighted to focus on 
negotiation rather than reciprocation in relation to the psychological contract. As 
noted, reciprocation largely underplays the issue of relational interdependence 
since it is based on the assumption that parties in the reciprocal exchange 
relationships are minimally dependent on each other (Molm, 2010). Therefore, the 
parties can decide the returns (i.e. gifts) independently (Conway and Briner, 
2009). This assumption is, however, not compatible with the dynamics of the 
employment relationship as both the employees and the employer are relationally 
interdependent on each other for valued outcomes (Tjosvold and Wisse, 2009).  
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Based on this line of argument, the concept of negotiation gains currency as it 
recognizes the implications of power dynamics from the perspective of relational 
interdependence between employees and organizational representatives. 
Acknowledging these implications, Molm et al. (2000) emphasize to explore the 
employment relationship on the basis of negotiation rather than reciprocation. 
This view is further supported by the established relevant research, highlighting 
the significance of negotiation which is largely influenced by power dynamics in 
the exchange relationships (e.g. Blau, 1964; Cook et al., 2013; Shore et al., 2012). 
The same point is made by Uhl-Bien and Carsten (2007) that in social life, the 
relationships tend to be reciprocal, however, in the domain of employment, the 
relationships are principally based on negotiation. 
 
From a conceptual perspective, despite the clear cautionary statements, the 
implications of the discussion by Gouldner (1960) are largely ignored in the 
psychological contract literature. Human interactions comprise ‘countless ad hoc 
transactions’ on a daily basis (Gouldner, 1960, p. 175). Repayment in all of these 
transactions on a numerically equivalent basis is virtually impossible. As an 
attempt to bring more equality into the repayment of these transactions, exchange 
actors tend to rely on the social norm of reciprocity as a second order defence 
(Gouldner, 1960). An example is presented in order to further elaborate on this 
critically important but largely ignored viewpoint of Gouldner (1960).  
 
There is a very common practice of expressing gratitude among exchange actors 
after the completion of a transaction. A typical example may be the passengers 
expressing their gratitude to the driver while alighting from a bus. On the basis of 
Gouldner’s (1960) conceptualization, in this case, the expression of gratitude from 
the passengers is an absolutely discretionary act and they exercise this behaviour 
as a social norm, even though they are not obliged to as they have paid for using 
this service. The payment is, however, an obligation on the receiver of the service, 
which Gouldner (1960) connotes as complementarity. The expression of gratitude, 
on the other hand, is a societal norm of reciprocity and serves as a second order 
defence, as an attempt by the service receiver to better payoff the service provider.  
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This simple daily life example helps in understanding the underlying conceptual 
differences between the two notions of complementarity and reciprocity. 
Gouldner (1960) emphasizes in an unambiguous manner to acknowledge the 
conceptual differences between these two notions. Specifically he argues that the 
implications of the notion of reciprocity ‘are neglected’, while referring to the 
influential work of Malinowski (Gouldner, 1960, p. 168). Unfortunately, the 
concerns of Gouldner (1960), despite his clear recommendations, are seriously 
overlooked as the later research has largely ignored the primary mechanism of 
exchange, i.e. complementarity, by focusing only on the secondary mechanism, 
i.e. reciprocity. Based on this viewpoint, the researcher argues the need to explore 
the notion of the psychological contract on a more relevant (i.e. negotiated rather 
than reciprocal) basis of exchange. Unlike reciprocal exchange, the notion of 
negotiated exchange is not only compatible with the fundamental feature of 
complementarity in the employment exchange relationship, but is also cognizant 
of the consequential implications of the notion of power in terms of the relational 
interdependencies of the exchange actors (Tjosvold and Wisse, 2009), a critical 
but largely ignored issue in the psychological contract literature (Guest et al., 
2010; Shore et al., 2012). 
 
The above discussion highlighted the significance of complementarity as a first 
order defence in different human transactions. Extending the viewpoint of 
Gouldner (1960), it is, however, pertinent to mention that, despite its significance 
as a primary or first order defence mechanism, complementarity does not 
necessarily operate in all human interactions. Echoing the conceptualization of 
Gouldner (1960), such transactions, without any influence of complementarity, 
are entirely based on the second order defence mechanism of the social norm of 
reciprocity. In order to further elaborate on this viewpoint, another example from 
daily life is presented.  
 
There is a common scenario in which a seller for some reason is unable to provide 
a product or service requested by the buyer. In this scenario, the seller generally 
makes an expression of apology as a courtesy for being unable to provide the 
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requested product or service to the buyer. Even though not obligated, the seller 
nevertheless, in accordance with Gouldner’s (1960) view of reciprocity, makes 
such an expression on an absolutely discretionary basis as a second order 
stabilizing mechanism to make a better repayment to the buyer, despite the lack of 
complementarity in this encounter. This daily life scenario provides help in 
understanding the subtle issue that although complementarity may serve as a 
primary or first order stabilizing or equilibrating mechanism in a number of 
human transactions, nonetheless it does not necessarily function in all incidences. 
In comparison, reciprocity, although it serves as a secondary defence or 
stabilizing mechanism, generally operates in almost all transactions.   
 
The important concept of agency has been frequently debated in the psychological 
contract literature. The majority of the arguments, rather than empirically 
advancing our understanding, however, are confined to a discussion of 
complexities associated with its conceptualization (e.g. Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 
2007; Cullinane and Dundon, 2006). In order to further develop the 
conceptualization of this complex notion, the current study suggested extended 
specificity in the theorization of the organizational agents. Based on the responses 
of the research participants, the study findings highlighted different classifications 
of organizational agents (i.e. primary agents, secondary agents, multiple agents, 
incumbent agents).  
 
The trustworthiness of the individuals appeared to play a vital role in the process 
of agent determination. This trustworthiness largely influenced employees’ 
perceptions of relational interdependence from the perspective of their 
dependence on particular individuals as organizational agents (i.e. the individuals 
they can trust to help them understand the organization’s expectations and also to 
achieve their objectives associated with the employment relationship). In addition, 
the research extended the conceptualization of agency beyond the domain of 
human agents. Largely ignored in the psychological contract literature, Beirne et 
al. (2004, p. 99), acknowledge the significance of these agents by highlighting the 
‘domination of dead labour (technology) over living workers’ in the call centre 
industry. Primarily perceived as coercive (Tyler and Blader, 2013), the influence 
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of these agents appeared to play a significant role in inducing perceptions of 
breach in employees’ psychological contracts.  
 
In the context of agency, the current research, did not only focus on employee 
surveillance in call centres but also highlighted the issue of relational 
interdependencies influencing power relations between employees and 
organizational agents. This view of power, in addition to representing the 
complexity of the workplace struggles, also depicted the issue of their proceedings 
at multiple levels (Hindess, 1982). Conceptualizing power in terms of relational 
interdependencies further highlighted that it is only the organizational agents but 
also the employees who actively engage in the workplace struggles to influence 
their interdependent employment relationships through making different efforts 
(e.g. increasing the employer’s dependence on them through developing their 
credibility and reputation). 
 
Finally, the psychological contract literature generally alludes to the leadership 
theory while discussing the notion of agency. This may create confusion between 
the two notions of organizational leaders and agents. It is therefore pertinent to 
highlight the distinctions between the two apparently similar but conceptually 
distinct notions. In the context of leadership, conscious efforts based on extrinsic 
or intrinsic appeal are made by certain organizational members to be 
acknowledged as organizational leaders (Northouse, 2012). In comparison, no 
planned efforts are made by organizational agents to be recognized. It is rather the 
employees’ subjective interpretations of their employment relationships which 
idiosyncratically define the agents in their psychological contracts (Shore et al., 
2012).  
 
Based on this viewpoint, the researcher argues that the agents may be 
conceptualized as the ‘passive leaders’ of the organization. Similar to the 
organizational leaders, these passive leaders have a significant influence on the 
employees’ perceptions of their employment relationship. This influence, 
however, rather than being based on any conscious efforts by particular 
organizational members (i.e. organizational leaders), largely originates from the 
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subjective perceptions of the employees. In other words, a push strategy directed 
at followers generally operates in a leader–follower relationship, in which the 
leader attempts to influence the followers to achieve a certain set of objectives. In 
comparison, a pull strategy, directed at the agents, operates in an agent–employee 
relationship, in which employees, based on the subjective perceptions of their 
psychological contracts, attempt to influence the agents to achieve their 
objectives.  
 
The second major difference between organizational leaders and agents is based 
on the autonomous or independent role of secondary agents, i.e. to act as a 
secondary agent without any prior contribution as a primary agent of the 
organization. On the basis of the research findings, it may be argued that certain 
organizational members may influence employees’ psychological contracts on a 
relational basis without any prior influence as primary agents. As noted in the 
study, employees acknowledge the influence of secondary agents because of the 
perceived role of these agents in understanding the expectations of the 
organization. In contrast, leaders generally have to make prior extrinsic 
contributions in order to manipulate their followers on an intrinsic basis. As a 
result, in order to have a relational influence as a transformational leader, the 
organizational leaders, unlike organizational agents, generally need to rely on 
transactional leadership skills as well (Yukl, 2010).  
 
According to Rubin et al. (2010) ‘it has been noted that leader rewards and 
punishments are critical in forming the foundation upon which more active and 
effective forms of leader behavior, such as transformational leadership, build’ (p. 
400). The observation of Atwater et al. (1997) provides further support to the 
researcher’s argument that generally transformational leaders are also seen by 
their followers as using transactional rewards more frequently. A similar 
argument is made by Bass (2009) that transformational leadership cannot be a 
substitute for transactional leadership, as the former is largely influenced by the 
latter style of leadership. Spencer et al. (2012) and Waldman et al. (1990) also 
argue that transformational leadership, rather than being an alternative, is an 
extension of transactional leadership.  
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6.2 Critical realist position in the thesis 
The above discussion comprised the conclusions drawn from the current study 
which is based on the critical realist research philosophy. The critical realist meta-
theoretical position is utilized throughout the thesis. As previously discussed in 
detail, rather than developing generalizable laws (positivism) or determining the 
lived experience of the social actors regarding a particular phenomenon 
(interpretivism), the current study with a critical realist research philosophy 
mainly focused on the deeper levels of understanding and explanation of the 
research problem (i.e., investigating the under-researched implications of power 
dynamics from the perspective of relational interdependence in relation to the 
psychological contract).  
 
Following the critical realist position, the abductive mode of inference was 
employed as this research neither focused on proving/disproving something 
(deduction) nor did it set aside the already existing theory (induction). Rather, the 
current study, with an acknowledgement of the relevant theory, re-contextualized 
the concept of the psychological contract in relation to power. The abductive 
mode of inference was therefore very helpful in highlighting the relational 
interdependencies and the workplace struggles in this re-contextualization of the 
psychological contract. Consistent with the critical realist position, the intensive 
research design was followed in the study. Critical realism is more aligned with 
the intensive rather than the extensive research design (Sayer, 2000). According to 
Clark (2000), while extensive research designs focus on highlighting empirical 
regularities, the intensive research designs are more concerned with what makes 
some things rather than others happen in a certain context. This feature of 
intensive research design in critical realism is imperative as the current study, 
rather than looking for regularities in the phenomena of mutuality, reciprocity or 
agency, was more concerned with what makes these phenomena exist in certain 
contexts.  
 
The case study research strategy was utilized in the thesis. As previously 
discussed in detail, this strategy was selected due to its underpinning features that 
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are highly compatible with the critical realist research philosophy (e.g., 
emphasizing an in-depth analysis of the research problem, focusing on intensive 
rather than extensive research design, investigating research problem with 
counterfactual thinking to seek more innovative, frame breaking and challenging, 
rather than reconciling descriptions of the research problem). For the purpose of 
data collection semi-structured interviews were employed. Semi-structured 
interviews provided significant support in managing any unanticipated dimensions 
of the research problem that emerged from the interviewees’ responses. This key 
feature of semi-structured interviews is consistent with the critical realist research 
philosophy as, rather than prohibiting any unanticipated dimensions (e.g. as in 
positivistic research), it allowed the unpredicted outcomes to emerge from the 
research process. Finally, the technique of template analysis was used for the 
purpose of data analysis. This technique has been utilized in a number of 
qualitative studies based on the critical realist research philosophy and the case 
study approach (e.g. Au, 2007; Biedenbach and Müller, 2012; Carter, 2012).  
 
6.3 Contributions to knowledge 
This study contributed to the relevant research from the empirical as well as 
theoretical perspectives. The empirical data of the study, in addition to 
highlighting the complex relational interdependencies and the associated 
workplace struggles in the employment relationship, also offered new knowledge 
about work and management in Pakistan. This context of the employment 
relationship, which is based on the underlying power dynamics that are embedded 
into the complex and interdependent relationships between employees and 
organizational representatives, is globally significant in terms of workplace 
research, yet generally neglected in the relevant studies. The current study 
particularly focused on this issue. The results highlighted that, rather than as 
passive subjects, employees make purposeful efforts to support their interests and 
resist the employer’s attempts to reshape the interdependent employment 
relationships in their own favour. For this purpose, employees actively engage in 
workplace struggles to enhance their bargaining power through decreasing their 
dependence on the employer and increasing the employer’s dependence on them 
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(e.g., establishing their own credibility and reputation, increasing their 
employability with other potential employers etc.)  
 
In addition to the empirical contribution, the research made a theoretical 
contribution to the psychological contract literature from the perspectives of 
mutuality, reciprocity and agency. Concerning mutuality, this study highlighted 
the significance of interdependence in contrast to the assumption of mutuality. 
The concept of interdependence fully acknowledges the implications of power 
dynamics in the employment relationship. These implications, in spite of their 
critical nature, are largely underplayed in the psychological contract literature due 
to the emphasis on the assumption of mutuality. The interdependence approach is 
consistent with Blau’s (1964) conceptualization of social exchange. In relation to 
power, Blau (1964, p. 2) argues that the influence of exchange actors is largely 
based on their ‘complex interdependence’ in that relationship. Similarly, Beirne 
(2006) maintains that ‘the influence of one party can only be understood in terms 
of their relational interdependency with others’ (p. 13). 
 
This study further contributed to knowledge by highlighting the significance of 
negotiation in contrast to reciprocity. The research findings demonstrated that it is 
the negotiated rather than the reciprocal contracts that principally need to be 
focused on in the theorization of the psychological contract. The concept of 
negotiated contracts is based on the ideology of bargaining and negotiation rather 
than on merely being kind or harmful (Cook et al., 2013; Molm, 2010). The 
negotiated contracts also acknowledge the implications of power dynamics in 
terms of unequal gains stemming from the disproportionate interdependence of 
the exchange actors (Blau, 1964; Cook et al., 2013).  
 
In relation to agency, this research contributed to the psychological contract 
literature by proposing different classifications of organizational agents. With an 
invitation to further exploration, the study put forward classifications of primary 
agents, secondary agents, multiple agents and incumbent agents. The research also 
extended the notion of agency beyond the boundary of human agents into the 
domain of technology-based electronic agents of the organization. Furthermore, 
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the study highlighted that it is not only the perceived capability to reward or 
punish but also the perceived tendency to actively use that capability which 
significantly influences employees’ assumptions to consider a particular 
organizational member as the agent of the organization.  
 
Based on the above mentioned empirical and theoretical developments, this thesis 
makes another contribution by providing a framework (Figure 6.1) of the 
psychological contract which principally emphasizes interdependence and 
negotiation between employees and organizational representatives. According to 
this framework, the perceptions of interdependence (rather than mutuality) in the 
employment relationship serve as the foundation of the psychological contract 
established between employees and the organization. A number of underlying 
factors (e.g. the employee’s mental schema, hierarchical position in the 
organization, communication, job security/mobility and future employability 
prospects in the broader labour market) generally influence the employee’s 
perceptions of interdependence in the employment relationship.  
 
Based on these perceptions of interdependence, negotiated rather than reciprocal 
contracts influence the employee’s psychological contract with the organization. 
Characterized by the assumptions of complementarity (Gouldner, 1960), these 
negotiated contracts are largely influenced by employees’ internal motives and 
perceptions of interdependence in the employment relationship. As the 
organization generally comprises a number of contract makers, i.e. agents 
(Conway and Briner, 2009; Guest et al., 2010; Shore et al., 2012), the broader 
overarching psychological contract which the employee establishes with the 
overall organization, is generally based on a number of exchanges, both implicitly 
and explicitly negotiated with these different agents of the organization.  
 
Furthermore, the employees’ perceptual development regarding organizational 
agents is guided by their presumptions of the trustworthiness and the 
reward/punishment capability of these organizational representatives, along with 
the perceived tendency of these representatives to actively use that capability. 
Based on the findings of the current study, it is posited that these exchanges – 
276 
 
negotiated with the different agents of the organization – may have a variety of 
outcomes. These outcomes may range from ignoring the discrepancy (generally 
associated with employees’ perceptions of minor contract breach) to exercising 
deviant behavior (largely associated with employees’ perceptions of serious 
contract violations).  
 
 
 
 
 
6.4 Research limitations 
The current research, although providing useful insights into the notion of the 
psychological contract is not without its limitations. The first limitation of the 
study originates from the self-reporting nature of the data. The studies based on 
self-reported data may be contaminated by skewed findings, as a result of the 
possibility of underreporting of actual behaviour or a social desirability bias 
among the research participants (Huddy et al., 1997). Even though there is 
evidence of candid and truthful responses from research participants in studies 
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Figure 6.1: Conceptual framework              Source: Developed for the thesis 
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exploring deviant, immoral or even illegal human behavior (e.g. Bennett and 
Robinson, 2000; Gilligan, 1996), there nevertheless exists the possibility of 
inflated results due to the self-report nature of the data (Saunders et al., 2009).   
 
The argument of Saunders et al. (2009) has intuitive resonance. However, based 
on the recommendations of Easterby-Smith et al. (2008), the approach of the 
current study of relying on self-reported data is driven by its key objectives, i.e. to 
make an improved understanding of the notion of the psychological contract. 
Despite the considerable body of literature, the notion of the organizational agent, 
a key exchange actor in the agent–employee relationship, remains largely vague. 
The current study, therefore, has to rely on the only visible exchange actor in this 
relationship, i.e. the employee. Later research may efficiently manage the issues 
arising as a result of self-reported data by incorporating not only the viewpoint of 
employees but also the perspective of relatively visible organizational agents, 
distinguished on the basis of the findings of the current investigation.  
 
A second limitation stems from the cross-sectional nature of the research design. 
The nature of data collected at a single point in time precluded any possibility of 
making causal inferences. The current study re-contextualized the notion of the 
psychological contract from the perspective of power. Saunders et al. (2009) 
argue that, for studies investigating a phenomenon from a different perspective, a 
cross-sectional research design is more effective. Later research with a 
longitudinal research design may investigate the nature of causal relationships, 
once the underlying dynamics of the concept are determined by an initial cross-
sectional research (Bryman, 2008).  
 
A third limitation stems from the responses of the research participants that are 
based on their perceptions rather than actual behaviours. Wright and Nishii (2004) 
differentiate between perceived and actual human resource practices. The results 
acquired from the answers based on the perceptions of the research participants 
may, therefore, differ from responses based on their actual behaviours. This is due 
to the fact that individuals, on the basis of their subjective perceptions (Radin and 
Calkins, 2006), have a tendency to interpret the same information differently 
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(Lepak and Snell, 1999). Although, this approach to data collection may induce 
subjectivity in the research findings, this feature is largely compatible with the 
fundamental conceptualization of psychological contracts, i.e. employees’ 
subjective perceptions and subsequent interpretations of their employment 
relationships (Conway and Briner, 2009; Wellin, 2012). 
 
Finally, the current study is conducted within a particular context, i.e. the call 
centre industry. The findings of the current study, because of its distinct context of 
a highly bureaucratic (Brook, 2007) and intensively monitored (Batt and 
Moynihan, 2002; Deery and Kinnie, 2002; Tyler and Blader, 2013) working 
environment prevailing in the call centres, may not ideally be generalizable to 
other industries with different working arrangements. Later research may, 
however, further explore the implications of the current study for other industries 
with different employment arrangements for the purpose of generalizability.  
 
6.5 Practical implications 
The findings of the research have significant practical implications. As noted, the 
existence of indeterminacy in employment relationships is a major source for the 
development of perceptions of breach in employees’ psychological contracts. The 
psychological contract literature, however, emphasizes the notion of implicit 
mutuality between employees and the different agents of the organization. 
Rejecting the assumption of implicit mutuality, the findings of this research, 
emphasize the notion of clear and explicit communication in organizations. This is 
because curtailing indeterminacy on the basis of clear and explicit communication 
will not only reduce the development of employees’ perceptions of breach but will 
also reinforce their psychological contracts with the organization.  
 
In addition to the issue of curtailing indeterminacy, the notion of explicit 
communication in organizations gains further currency due to its significant role 
in promoting the trustworthiness of the different agents of the organization. As 
noted in the study, employees’ perceptions of agents’ trustworthiness are largely 
based on their ability to explicitly communicate the expectations of the 
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organization and the rewards/punishments associated with the fulfillment/non-
fulfillment of these expectations. Therefore, the organizational agents, based on 
their trustworthiness which largely stems from their unambiguous and explicit 
communication ability, can further reinforce the development of the perceptions 
of a balanced psychological contract among employees.  
 
The findings of the current study highlighted the issue of the prevalence of 
transactional contracts, particularly among the category of atypical workers. This 
perception largely stems from their assumptions of being a peripheral workforce, 
hindering the development of the relational dimension in their psychological 
contracts with the organization. In this context, employers need to focus on this 
category of employee. This approach will largely result in a win–win situation as, 
in addition to enhancing organization performance, it will also reinforce the 
psychological contracts of these atypical employees with the organization.  
 
As already discussed in detail, human resource managers generally have a limited 
influence on employees’ psychological contracts. Human resource managers 
therefore need to enhance their professional knowledge and skills, which are not 
only applicable to their own departments but also to the functioning of other 
departments. As argued by Guest and Woodrow (2012), in addition to reducing 
the perceptions of the ‘lack of power of HR managers’, it will also reinforce the 
psychological contracts of employees (p. 110). 
 
Electronic agents appeared to play a significant role in the psychological contracts 
of employees. The established psychological contract literature is largely based on 
the notion of human agency. The research findings, however, highlight the critical 
influence of electronic agents in the psychological contracts of employees. 
Primarily coercive in nature, the influence of these electronic agents mostly 
results in the perceptions of psychological contract breach among employees. 
Organizations and particularly call centres, therefore, need to pay significant 
attention to the use of these electronic agents. In particular, electronic agents, 
rather than invading employees’ privacy, should be largely used from the 
perspective of controlling detrimental employee behaviour. 
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6.6 Recommendations for future research 
A meta-analytic review of the relevant literature reveals that a number of 
researchers (e.g. Conway and Briner, 2009; Coyle-Shapiro and Shore, 2007; 
Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; Guest et al., 2010; Shore et al., 2012) criticized the 
underlying conceptual inconsistencies in the theorization of psychological 
contracts. Although, the discussion of these researchers emphasized the need to 
conceive of the notion of the psychological contract in a more realistic rather than 
rhetorical manner, the focus of the majority of these arguments has largely 
remained limited to mere criticizing, rather than to advancing its 
conceptualization. Future research therefore needs to focus on the issue of 
advancing the understanding of the notion, rather than on relying only on 
theoretical criticism. A more viable and appropriate approach may be to expand 
the domain of investigation to other industries for the purpose of validity and 
generalizability.  
 
The current study also urges future research to further explore the notion of the 
psychological contract from the perspective of interdependence rather than 
mutuality in the employment relationship. Investigating psychological contracts 
on the basis of interdependence rather than mutuality will discharge the relevant 
research from the unachievable responsibility of promoting mutuality among 
exchange actors that enter into a relationship with dissimilar rather conflicting 
objectives in many cases. Furthermore, it will enable researchers to pay more 
attention to the implications of the notion of power, a critical but largely ignored 
issue in the psychological contract literature. 
 
The current research, on the basis of its inferences, invites future research to 
explore the notion of the psychological contract on the basis of negotiation rather 
than reciprocation. As previously discussed in detail, the notion of reciprocity is 
neither conceptually applicable nor practically workable within the domain of 
employment relations. The two major issues with the notion of reciprocity are the 
assumptions of power symmetry and the voluntary nature of exchange relations. 
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As noted, these two assumptions are generally not very relevant from the 
perspective of employment relations. With more significance to the domain of 
employment, negotiated contracts not only acknowledge the implications of 
power asymmetry but also consider the transactions between exchange actors on 
an obligatory rather than voluntary basis.  
 
A number of themes emerged in the context of the issue of agency. Future 
research might further investigate the proposed primary/secondary agents’ 
typology not only in terms of its application to traditional employment 
arrangements but also in relation to other relevant (i.e. multiple and incumbent 
agents’) typologies in the context of non-traditional employment settings. The 
notion of agency in the psychological contract literature is largely based on the 
allusion of leadership. This issue makes it very difficult to make a conceptual 
distinction between the two notions. No research since the earlier 
conceptualizations of the psychological contract has explicitly attempted to 
determine and analyze the underlying conceptual differences between the two 
notions of agency and leadership. Another important research avenue may, 
therefore, be the conceptual demarcation of the notions of organizational agents 
and leaders.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT FOR THE RESEARCH 
PARTICIPANT 
 
1. Study title and Researcher Details 
The implications of the notion of power in the psychological contract literature 
University of Glasgow, College of Social Sciences, Business School, Department of Management 
 
Researcher:  Haris Ali, Phd Student Email: 0903778a@research.gla.ac.uk 
Supervisors:  Dr. Judy Pate    Email: Judith.Pate@glasgow.ac.uk 
 Professor Fiona Wilson      Email: Fiona.M.Wilson@glasgow.ac.uk 
2. Invitation paragraph  
'You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask if there is anything that 
is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to 
take part. 
Thank you for reading this'. 
 
3. What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of this study is to improve the understanding of the process of developing 
expectations by employees from their employers. How the employees communicate their 
expectations to the employers? How these expectations are influenced by the daily interactions 
between the employee and the employer? The answers to these questions will assist in reaching a 
better understanding of the influences of the daily employee-employer interactions, on the 
employees’ understanding of their employment relationships. 
 
4. Why have I been chosen? 
You are being chosen as this research primarily focuses on the full-time employees working in the 
call centre industry. 
 
5. Do I have to take part? 
You are at complete liberty to decide whether to take part in this study. If during the interview, 
you think of leaving the interview, you are absolutely free to do that. In case, you do not want any 
statement to be attributed to you or you want some part of your discussion to be deleted from the 
transcript, it will be managed according to your suggestions.  
 
 
6. What will happen to me if I take part? 
Your contribution will help this research project to reach a better understanding of the informal 
aspects of employment experienced by employees on daily basis. You will be participating in an 
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interview that will last up to 40 minutes, which will be audio recorded after your consent. This will 
further enable the research to explore the employment relationship on a more practical basis. Your 
anonymity and confidentiality, however, will be absolutely preserved. All the statements from you 
will be treated in an anonymous manner.  
 
7. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
As mentioned earlier, your anonymity and confidentiality is of prime importance. The data 
relevant to you will be kept in a password protected file, in a personal computer and will be 
deleted at the end of the project. Any statements from you will be attributed on the basis of 
pseudonyms.  
 
8. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
If you require, you will be provided a copy of your transcript and it may further be amended on 
your request. The results of the study will be discussed as findings as a part of this dissertation. 
The results of the study will be discussed in an anonymous manner, in order to minimize any 
possibility of identification of the research participants. The results of the study will be helpful in 
analysing the different research issues, investigated in my PhD. In addition, the results of this 
study may be further helpful for the purpose of later publications in academic research journals.  
 
9. Who has reviewed the study? 
The study will be reviewed by the two full time senior academic staff members of the study. In 
addition the ethical issues will be taken care of by the College of Social Sciences Ethics 
Committee as well.  
 
10. Contact for Further Information  
Researcher:                      Haris Ali, Phd Student          Email: 0903778a@research.gla.ac.uk  
Supervisors:                     Dr. Judy Pate    Email: Judith.Pate@glasgow.ac.uk 
              Professor Fiona Wilson        Email: Fiona.M.Wilson@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
If you have any concerns regarding the conduct of the research project, you may contact 
the College of Social Sciences Ethics Officer John Mckernan.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
STATEMENT FOR INTERVIEWEE BEFORE START OF INTERVIEW 
 
Welcome and thank you very much for agreeing to take part in this interview.  
The interview should take no longer than one hour. However, should this time be 
exceeded for any reason I will specifically ask your permission to continue at that 
point. If you should not be happy to proceed beyond this time, please let me know 
and I will then stop promptly after the agreed period.  
 
I also want to assure you that there are no right or wrong answers to the questions, 
I will be asking you.  Therefore please feel free to open up and share as honestly 
as possible your perceptions and expectations as this will be extremely valuable 
for the purposes of this research. Please also please bear in mind that you do not 
need to answer specific questions, if you do not want to. If you want the interview 
can be stopped at any time.  
 
I would also like to assure that your anonymity will be protected at all times. Your 
name will not be revealed and where I make references to you in the transcript of 
this interview, your identity will be obscured by giving you a pseudonym such as 
‘particiapnt x’ or ‘participant y’. Any other information which might potentially 
identify you will also be withheld. 
 
Before going on I would also like to confirm that you are happy for me to record 
this interview? 
 
(After voluntary consent of interviewee) Thank you and by all means please 
feel free to ask or share anything as this is quite an open, semi-structured 
interview so you can raise issues as they come along.  
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APPENDIX D 
WRITTEN PERMISSION FROM THE RESEARCH PARTICIPANT 
Researcher: Haris Ali: 
Project title: PhD Management Research Dissertation 
Organization: Department of Management, University of Glasgow. 
 
I have been given and have understood the details of this research project. I have had an 
opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction. I understand that 
I may withdraw myself or any piece of information that I have provided without having to 
give reasons or without penalty of any sort. 
 
I understand that any information I provide will be kept confidential to the researcher and 
to the supervisor and my name will not be used in the verbatim transcription of interview 
recording. Furthermore, no opinions, judgements or inferences will be attributed to me in 
any way that may reveal my identity. I will be given an electronic copy of my audio 
recording and transcript for my review. Moreover, the audio recording and transcript of 
my interview will be wiped at the end of the project.  
 
Please select from the following options 
 I consent to use the information or opinions provided by me in an absolutely 
anonymous and confidential way. 
 I would like the tape recording and transcript of my interview returned to me for 
my review and any modifications, I suggest.  
 I understand that the data I provide will not be used for any other purpose or 
released to others without my written consent. 
 I would like to receive a summary of the results of this research when it is 
completed. 
 
Name of research participant 
 
 
Signed:     Date: 
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APPENDIX E 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
Q1: How do you communicate your expectations to your employer? 
 
Q2:  How does your employer communicates their expectations to you? 
 
Q3:  How do you and your employer ensure that both have a precise 
understanding of   other’s expectations? 
 
Q4:  Who do you look for in your organization to find out what your employer 
expects from you? 
 
Q5: Does your organization understand your expectations, even if you do not 
mention them? 
 
Q6:  Do you think your organization rewards your contributions properly? (If 
not, why is that?) 
 
Q7: How do you react, if you see your organization not rewarding your 
contributions properly? 
 
Q8: Who is the most likely person in your organization to acknowledge and 
reward your contributions? 
 
Q9: Can you withhold your contributions, if your organization does not reward 
your contributions properly? 
 
Q10:  If yes, would you withhold your contributions? 
 
Q11: Who is the most important person for you in your organization? 
 
Q12: Can you give me example(s) of the incident, which made this person 
important to you?  
